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Conditions of Minorities

Judit Tóth

Census in Hungary in 2011: migrants or ethnicity?

Abstract

Hungary belongs to those nation states that insert the question on ethnic, religious and linguistic affiliation of resident people in census. This approach is based on the idea of cultural nation taking into account the minority communities as static, objective, historical determinant and continuous entities differing from the essentialism or constructivism in the notion of ethnicity and nation. Since 1870 the 15th census will be in 2011 that contains the most sensitive issues of personal identity at a growing prejudice level against otherness and in anti-Roma attacks. This article analyses the minimal requirements of international migration statistics by Reg. 862/2007 and the Reg. 763/2008 on census in EU Member States that contain questions neither on language, nor religious and ethnic identification of residents. What are the possible purposes of these questions in the census in Hungary? The author intends to give answers on the logic of ethnopolitics.

1. The purposes of census and statistics

The recent developments in information technology, universal spread of its instruments, the protection of personal data, birth of new states (e.g. due to dissolution of Yugoslavia), or extended international migratory movements have strongly influenced the purpose and acceptance of census. For this reason the proposal on its replacement by aggregated data based on existing registers means a competitor to the expensive traditional census. The United Nations ECE and the EUROSTAT make efforts to iterate the two different methods

but debates remain.¹ On the other side, the register on ethnic origin of population would be refused at least in Hungary because these records have negative connotations in past (e.g. these data were used for deportations, forced removal of minorities living in the country) and today the personal data protection provides freedom to anonymity. The only exception is the register of persons entitled to vote on the ethnic representatives (members in ethnic self-governments) that was introduced in 2005. However these records shall be deleted just after the elections. There is a further shortage of the register-based population files, namely that those contain obsolete dates due to missed notice on changing address of inhabitants inside the country or abroad leaving the country. The EU requires more and more aggregated data collection from the member states compensating this fragmentation, while the relevance of census is administratively reduced but politically is coloured in public opinion of member states in parallel.

The other poser is how to measure the ethnic origin, the linguistic, national or ethnical affiliations of the population in data collection of census. The answer depends on the self-determination of states reflection the perception of minorities. The Art 68 of the Constitution² “the national and ethnic minorities are part of sovereignty of nation as constructive entities in state”. It means that persons belonging to minorities are equal members in the political community either as individuals or as their collective fellowships. With reference on this provision in the Constitution the last census in 2001 put question on national affiliation and – after 52 years in silence – religious belonging of respondents. It is worth mentioning the purpose of latter was widely discussed (e.g. why the historical churches would attract mass of supporters, how they enforce a bigger budget contribution to own social activities using these data) neither the alternatives of minority origin questions (direct question on ethnic, national origin, or rather indirectly on language usage) nor the credibility of answers, records collected by registry-makers were negotiated.

¹ Griffin T.: The Census in Europe. *Statistical Journal of the United Nations ECE*, 1999/2-3: 223-230

² Act XX of 1949 modified in great extent by the Act XXXI of 1989

Ethnicity has been considered as partly or not measurable phenomenon since the establishment of nation states. According to the *constructivism* the notion of minority is in change and modification, and individual belongs under this notion on the ground of freely chosen ties, such as social, ethnical, linguistic, religious or other affiliation depending on his/her social, economic or cultural impacts living in a society. Consequently, the self-definition of individual is determined by situations and relationships, and being a changing component of personality, it cannot be measured by statistics. According to the *essentialism* the ethnic belonging is a ready-made and a rather objectively existing category based on cultural, linguistic dividing lines from others. This approach accepts certain continuum of ethnicity, consequently is can be measured at individual level, however the process of community setting and of self-determination is hardly followed by statistics.

The *Act on Ethnic and National Minority Rights*³ defines the ethnic or national community that is based on common history, traditions, culture or language creating a common awareness of belonging during their residence as a community for at least 100 years in Hungary. It follows the concept of essentialism considering the nation/al minority as basically determined by its cultural heritage. In this way the measurability of minority size through the members is accepted taking into account the existing continuity, objectivity and declaration of individuals on ethnicity. This rather static approach is a bit primordial but supported in census and it explains why questions on religious and ethnic/national affiliation of respondent are put.

The other issue of clarification is the method of measuring: what would be the basis of registration, the locality of residence, the common origin, the proximity in anthropometric character or language?⁴ The language and its usage (the mother tongue, langue applied in daily conversation, spoken language) is considered as hard core in census purposes although it cannot be the exclusive criteria of self-definition of minority belonging. This uncertainty argues why

³ Act LXXVII of 1993 that was amended in great extent in 2005. It ensures individual and collective rights for designated (13) communities living in Hungary.

⁴ Keményfi R.: *A mérés lehetősége az etnikai, a vallási és a nemzeti kisebbség fogalmában*. Történeti Demográfiai Évkönyv, 2001. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal Népeség tudományi Kutatóintézete, Budapest, 2001. Szerk. Faragó T. – Óri P. 65-78.

only 13 states from 40 put a question on ethnic/language affiliation in the interwar period census, and not surprisingly, the Central-Eastern European countries were rather represented among them.⁵ The issue is complicated by the legal regulation dividing the autochthon (historical Diaspora) minorities from the new minorities formed by immigrants in our region but neither kin-minorities across the borders (due to the changing state borders) nor trans-border communities (due to the free movement of persons and labour migration) has been reflected properly in measuring methodology introduced by law in (new) member states of the EU.

The census made in member states of the Union can provide comparable data on the European population and its composition if its structure and data collection is standardized. The standardization includes unified definitions, timing and localization (regions, settlements) of family, social, economic and housing conditions of the population. On the basis of these aggregated data on the same period from the member states can serve for various European policies, action plans, such as the to the social cohesion fund, environment protection or energy efficiency assessment. In order to achieve comparable data the Council defines the common statistical system of the Union (Reg. 322/97/EC, 17 February 1997) meeting the requirements of impartiality, objectivity, scientific independence, transparency, relevance, credibility and cost-efficiency. Protection of mutual trust in the exchange of statistical data inside the Union shall be also ensured (Reg. 1588/90, 11 June 1990). Naturally, these rules shall fit to the principle of subsidiarity (Art 5 of TEU), proportionality and the rules of personal data protection either at member state or at Union level.

⁵ Klinger A.: *A nemzetiségi statisztika Európában és Magyarországon*. In: Magyarország nemzetiségeinek és a szomszédos államok magyarságának statisztikája (1910-1990). Szerk: Klinger A. Budapest, 1994. KSH, 22-41.

2. Distinction between registry and census

Allow me some examples on differentiating the registration of population living in a given area and census. The case of Roma ethnic registration in Italy was strongly targeted. The European Parliament underlined the relevance of non-discrimination protecting minorities.⁶ This body drew the attention of member states to ensure the hygienic and security requirements even in illegal camps or slum because many Roma children died in fire and in absence of the human conditions. Roma have been the majority of racial prejudices and violence not only in contemporary Italy but also in Hungary as it is proved by the Eurobarometer's surveys. Their exclusion and disintegration makes matters worse.

The Italian government passed a decree (21 May 2008) in three regions (Lazio, Campania, Lombardia) based on the Act 225 of 1992 on national catastrophe, civil defence management. It entitles the government to declare emergency period in case of natural or human catastrophe or other extraordinary event of which effects area is in great extent. During this period extraordinary administrative measures can be taken. Moreover, the prefects in these regions (in Rome, Naples and Milan) were appointed as Roma emergency commissioners up to the end of May 2009. It orders identification of each inhabitant, inmate including minors, taking fingerprints, measures against the potential expellee and deported persons and limitation of their numerous fundamental rights. This limitation means no to give proper information on the purpose of taking fingerprints or their rights to refuse the identification through taking fingerprints, photo or biometrics in absence of his/her suspicion or endangering behaviour.

The minister of the interior announced the purpose of taking fingerprints: the registry and identification of Roma living in these camps and ghettos including minors in the environment of the three cities until mid-October 2008. However, the human rights commissioner of the Council of Europe as well the Italian data protection authority rejected this explanation. According to their opinion, the

⁶ European Parliament resolution of 10 July 2008 on the census of the Roma on the basis of ethnicity in Italy (2009/C 294 E/12)

social emergency of Roma living in these cities concludes the threat to public order and security and the emergency period of a whole year is manifestly disproportional. It is obvious that this registration serves exclusively to the removal actions in future without contact to protection of minority rights.

The relationship of census to minority, ethnicity and language usage draws the attention also of the institutes of the EU. For instance, a member of EP put a question in writing to the Commission how the Polish government would manage the census in May 2002.⁷ Why did the questionnaire contain question on respondent's ethnic/national affiliation and language usage? According to the Central Statistical Office each person has right to declare own affiliation during the census, and the list of options contains eleven national minorities. Why the Schlesien was missing? Because – allegedly - the CSO instructed the field interviewers to consider Schlesien as Polish, and in case of self-completed document by the respondent would be recorder as Polish in its electronic processing.⁸ It means manipulation that violates the freedom in self-declaration of identity, and a candidate state would be studied the lessons by the Commission. On behalf of the Commission the commissioner responsible for enlargement gave answer⁹. The Polish legislation entitles the authority – as they informed the EU – to put question on ethnic/national affiliation (Polish or other origin) of the people. There is no an exhausted list of ethnical/minority groups, and instructions for the interviewers was not given. In this way Schlesien is also an acceptable answer on ethnic/national origin without change, and data are available only for the CSO.

As regard the perverseness of census in Greece held in 2001 was also inquired to the Commission.¹⁰ The member of the European Parliament raised the issue of credibility of data because the National Statistical Office instructed the interviewers to complete the questionnaires with pencil, in particular data on residing foreigners. The

⁷ Written Question E-1302/02 by Miquel Mayol i Raynal (Verts/ALE) to the Commission (7 May 2002)

⁸ Local newspaper *Dzien*, 2 March 2002

⁹ Mr Verheugen (6 June 2002)

¹⁰ Written Question E-1072/01 by Stavros Xarchakos (PPE-DE) to the Commission (5 April 2001)

non-Union nationals were randomly interviewed or during their interview their residence authorisation and length of their residence or plans on further staying were neglected. Due to this negligence of the NSO the political opponents stated how the vague data of irregular naturalised persons or quasi nationals in mass had influenced strongly the results of prior general elections. What could the Union do with unreliable statistics? The census should meet all requirements concerning the population and housing registry as determined by the UN ECE and EUROSTAT – underlined the respondent of the Commission.¹¹ Although they are in silence on whether pencil shall be used in completion of the questionnaire but the proper method shall be respected. Furthermore, the registration of foreign population covers on all non-national residents staying in the period of census in the country. It includes all residing persons that have been arrived before the census and have intention to remain in the following 12 months as well as permanent residents for leaving abroad no more than 12 months. As it means the physical and not legal residence of persons is relevant regardless its authorisation or valid address card. And each residing individual shall be interviewed concerning his/her nationality and the state of birth in the census. It is obvious that census means a key data collecting method on residing non-nationals and all data shall be transferred to the EUROSTAT as the EU law determines substantially and in format. These comparable data are available also for the members of the European Parliament. The EU institutions are connected to national statistical offices instead of respondents.

3. Migration statistics – also from the data in census

In order to achieve comparable data the measuring method and the circle of data and period of collection shall be determined in a comprehensive way at the EU level. The European Parliament and the Council adopted the Regulation 862/2007/EC on migration statistics covering also on internationally protected third country nationals

¹¹ Mr Solbes Mira (21 May 2001)

replacing the prior rules passed in 1976. Accordingly, the migration statistics includes:

- a) data on immigrants to and emigrants (residing at least for 12 months) from each member state covering on movement intra- and extra-Union;
- b) data on habitual residents in member states by nationality, place of birth, the mother's place of residence at birth;
- c) data on authorisation of immigration, residence, acquisition of nationality, asylum or another status under the international protection as well as on preventive measures of illegal migration and judgements.

Due to the gradual introduction of these requirements the first year of reference was 2008 when the transferred data to the EUROSTAT could be based on the national definitions in statistics if those were previously noticed to the European Commission. This temporary deviation was finished and data on 2009 shall be provided to the EUROSTAT as the Regulation defined unless the member state requested opt-out taking into account the administrative capacity of statistical system. Hungary did not request exceptions. The Statistical Program Committee supports to prepare the implementing measures adopted by the Commission (e.g. actualisation of statistical definitions, structure of data). Taking into account the national regulations and practice, the source of statistical data shall be based on items of judicial and public administration proceedings, administrative registration, population and address registry, data of census, surveys and sampling or other proper source. Statistical estimation based on scientific and properly documented methods can be also implemented. All of these sources and methods shall be listed in the yearly report of member state to the EUROSTAT.

What is the structure of required statistical data that shall be forwarded also from Hungary to the EU?

- a) annual number of foreigners moved to the country (by their rate of nationality, age, gender, place of birth, state of prior habitual residence);

- b) annual number of inhabitants emigrated from the country (by their rate of nationality, age, gender, state of actual habitual residence);
- c) number of residing foreigners (by their rate of nationality, age, gender and place of birth) at the end of the calendar year;
- d) annual number of persons acquired nationality (by their rate of age, gender, prior nationality or stateless status);
- e) annual number of applicants for international protection (by their rate of nationality, age, gender, family member's nationality, age, gender);
- f) monthly number of foreigners under the ongoing procedure for international protection (by their rate of nationality, age, gender, family member's nationality, age, gender);
- g) monthly number of withdrawal of international protection status (by their rate of nationality, age, gender, family member's nationality, age, gender);
- h) quarterly number of refused applications for international protection (by their rate of nationality, age, gender) at first instance;
- i) quarterly number of recognised refugees and its withdrawal (by their rate of nationality, age, gender) at first instance;
- j) quarterly number of foreigners accessed to subsidiary protection and its withdrawal (by their rate of nationality, age, gender) at first instance;¹²
- k) quarterly number of foreigners accessed to temporary protection and its withdrawal (by their rate of nationality, age, gender) at first instance;¹³
- l) quarterly number of foreigners accessed to humanitarian residence permit and its withdrawal (by their rate of nationality, age, gender);
- m) number of unaccompanied minors with application for protection in the country (by their rate of nationality, age, gender);¹⁴
- n) yearly number of finally refused applicants for international protection (by their rate of nationality, age, gender);¹⁵

¹² See its notion in Art 2 of Dir.2004/83/EC

¹³ See its notion in Art 2 of Dir.2001/55/EC

¹⁴ See the notion in Art 2 of Dir.2004/83/EC

¹⁵ It includes all applications without appealing, in which remedy is not allowed and final decisions in public administration and in justice.

- o) yearly number of finally recognised, withdrawn refugees, foreigners in subsidiary or temporary protection (by their rate of nationality, age, gender);
- p) yearly number of finally accessed to humanitarian residence permit and its withdrawal (by their rate of nationality, age, gender);
- q) quarterly number of resettled foreigners (by their rate of nationality, age, gender);¹⁶
- r) number received and transferred applicants for asylum in the Dublin regime to the responsible state (by the rate of states);¹⁷
- s) yearly number of refused entry at borders (by the rate of foreigners' nationality, the border zone and reasons of denial);¹⁸
- t) yearly number of illegal migrants staying in the country (by their rate of nationality, age, gender, the place of capture and its reason);¹⁹
- u) yearly number of migrants in possession of residence permit (by their rate of nationality, age, gender, the purpose and length of staying);²⁰
- v) number of residence permit holders (by their rate of nationality, age, gender, the purpose and length of staying) at the end of the calendar year;
- w) number of foreigners forced to leave the country (by their rate of nationality, age, gender, the reason of removal);²¹

¹⁶ In order to provide durable solution out from the non-Union states migrants, refugee and stateless persons would be received.

¹⁷ Statistics on the grounds of Reg. 343/2003/EC and its implementation rules in Reg. 1560/2003/EC

¹⁸ See the Schengen Border Code (Reg. 62/2006/EC) as it defines the rate in Art 13(5)

¹⁹ It is applied on non-union citizens that do not meet the requirements of entry and residence as determined the Act II of 2007 and the exceptions in the Schengen Border Code (in particular persons faced refusal at borders, refoulement or implementation of , readmission agreement). The data on capture may assess the efficiency of border zone control in member states.

²⁰ It covers on labour migrants, patients in medical treatment, visitors, students, and perhaps the residents relating to kin-minority affiliation and visitors with small border traffic card. The long-term migrants belong to another category but it fits only to this line.

²¹ These details can be found in the Act II of 2007 including the ban the entry/residence, expulsion, deportation and voluntary leaving upon the authority notice. The asylum applicants in the Dublin regime are out of this line.

- x) yearly number of left foreigners on the grounds of decision on removal (by their rate of nationality, age, gender, the reason of removal and proceedings authority).

This long list proves the relevance of migration statistics, in particular on reasons of movement and the legal status of migrating persons in comparison to the data collection in census. Furthermore, these data shall be transferred continuously enhancing the importance and controllability of international migration in the public opinion while the census means a data collection per decade. In this way it can be said that the census means a subsidiary method in data collection on migratory movements providing static (stock) information that support to setting up periods, trends and epochs in migration flow. The cited Regulation also mentions the complementary character of census data to the migration statistics. However, the member states are entitled to extend the circle of data in the questionnaire of census beyond the minimum requirements of the Union. The implementation of this opportunity is identical for each government whether the knowledge on presence of migrants, foreigners – including the movement of kin-minority across the borders – is influential on domestic policy and strategy or not. The appearance of residing foreigners happened at first time in the census of 2001 in Hungary, it was the first attempt to put questions on refugees, inmates of refugee camps and alien's detention centre.

The registrability of leaving for abroad and home return of migrating persons has been problematic since the introduction of free movement either of nationals or non-nationals in Hungary. Although there are some provisions on obligatory notice of the final leaving for or return to the country that would be taken to the local registry office or the immigration authority but in vain. There is no advantage for aliens if notice is neglected, and legal consequence of omission for nationals is less known (public health contribution shall be paid during the residence of Hungary; registry of birth, marriage and death abroad must be registered in Hungary). In this way only the mirror statistics of destination country (state of migrant's residence) is the only source of information in calculation the yearly net migration. Naturally, the census may provide data on missing people from

the given generation but the reasons of disappearance, the time and direction of migration remain uncovered.²²

Summing up, the Union regulates on migration statistics, its minimal data and sources but the ethnic origin, religion and language affiliation of migrants are out of this required, comparable data circle. Although the Union is working on a common migration policy as the Lisbon Treaty provides this competence, the approach of ethnicity is not generally accepted, and the member states are responsible to collect data on resident migrants' origin if those data would become relevant to integration, nation building or kin-state policy.

4. The relevant data in census

The Council and the European Parliament passed the Reg. 763/2008 (9 July 2008) the common circle of data concerning the population and housing conditions shall be collected in case of census in member states of the EU. It must be applied together the Reg. 1201/2009 (30 November 2009) containing the terms and methodological requirements in census. Accordingly, the census shall be managed in the first year of decade gathering data of population in habitual residence (the place in which people reside in non-working time regardless their holidays or visiting period abroad, leaving for medical treatment, business purposes or pilgrimage). The notion of habitual residence covers on staying for at least 12 months or move house of person within 12 months with the intention to stay at least one year. In absence of this criterion, or in doubt, the habitual residence means the lawful registered address of people. The weekly return home or staying abroad for less than 12 months (e.g. as students) can be considered also as habitual residents. In final solution, people without clarified place of habitual residence shall be registered in residing place during the census. The obvious purpose of census is to gather data on all people belonging to the state as residing inhabitants. In parallel, this data

²² See the expert estimations and data by Tóth Pál P.: *Haza csak egy van? Mene-kültek, bevándorlók, új állampolgárok Magyarországon. 1988-1994*. Püski Kiadó, Budapest, 1997.

collection covers on housing conditions of all human accommodations, living places including buildings, settlements and residences.²³

On the basis of certain demographic, social, economic, family and house-holding of each inhabitant must be registered in census as follows:

- a) data on his/her gender, age²⁴, family status²⁵, place of birth (city, village), nationality, prior place of habitual residence, the date of move (within a year exceeding to the census) and relationship to the other members living under the same roof in place of habitual residence;²⁶
- b) number of population in each settlement including the status of breadwinners, his/her family status, the structure and size of the family, the character and size of private house-holdings;²⁷
- c) number and data of regional population²⁸ that include the distribution of habitual residents' working place, age, gender, family status, economic activity, occupation (the branch of economy, employee or self-employed person, entrepreneur, qualification), the rate of foreign born and local population whether they have ever lived abroad or not, when they returned home (since 1980), the place of prior habitual residence, the date of move (within a year exceeding to the census), the composition of house-holdings;
- d) data on housing conditions at regional and settlement level²⁹, for instance locality of dwelling houses, density of inhabitants in each, the date of building, the rate of useful inhabiting area in each, the conditions of heating, water, bathroom and toilets.

The interviewers put questions to all persons over 15 whether s/he was working at least one hour during the week of census or earning money (even in kind), or s/he was temporary out from the work (e.g.

²³ All settlements with less than 2000 inhabitants mean a unit of human habitat.

²⁴ Reg. defines the age periods per 15 years (1-15-30-45-60-85-over)

²⁵ Reg. determines the options: single, divorced, widow/er, married, or registered partnership

²⁶ Reg. defines the categories of administrative sub-national unit (e.g. NUTS3, LAU2)

²⁷ The questions on genuine co-existence can be put regardless the formal family status

²⁸ This unit (NUTS1, NUTS2) is not applicable in Hungary, it would be a statistical planning region (from the seven ones).

²⁹ It covers on sub-national units as NUTS1 and NUTS2

being on sick-list or on holidays) as subordinated employee or an independent self-employed person not including the family member as supplementing labourer. It demonstrates the collection of data on unemployment level of population over 15 because the questions extend on the actual unemployment or the readiness to be employed, self-employed, or the respondent is seeking employment. The rate of economic activity in adult population can be calculated beyond these data through the data on inactive persons (e.g. attending secondary school, tertiary education or pensioners).

The occupation of inhabitants is registered on the grounds of ten options indicating the branches of economy. The qualification means the highest and finished studies either in formal schooling or obtained in adult, informal professional education. The place of birth and (multiple) nationality of migrants/inhabitants may support to control the rate of naturalisation since the prior census seeing the ratio of stateless, non-Union citizens and migrating Union citizens.

The data on returnee, staying abroad of nationals and immigration of non-nationals are also required that would supplant – at least per decade - the missing standard information on nationals' migratory movement, commuters and trans-border workers in Hungary. However, it would be problematic that respondents cannot remember the date of entry, leaving or return precisely.

The Regulation draws the attention to other data resources because the census also can be based on existing administrative registrations using those aggregated or synchronised data lines, surveys, rotating samples or combination all of those. The implemented resources and methods shall be informed the EUROSTAT taking into account the rules of statistics in details determined by the European Commission³⁰ as well as the guidelines of the European Statistical Conference to the next census.

³⁰ Commission Regulation No 519/2010 of 16 June 2010 adopting the programme of the statistical data and of the metadata for population and housing censuses provided for by Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council

5. Some conclusions

Reviewing the questions and definitions of migration statistics we can see that the Union prefers the univocal terms, consequently the EU rules steer clear of the data collection on vague phenomenon such as linguistic, national and ethnic belonging. The systematic data collection made on the legal status of migrants, ratio and dynamics of its authorisation is required that may test the efficiency of the common migration policy in the Union. For instance, the high rate of re-migration or home return of protection seekers would reflect the poor family unification and the weak border zone control. This logic can accept only the data collection on the nationality, the age and the gender of migrants but the ethnic affiliation being kin-minority is not covered (even s/he is staying in the kin-state).

The EU law on census is not exclusive thus each member state can gather data on the composition of its habitual resident population, on the rate of its ethnic origin, religious or linguistic belonging. In this way the common minimal data collection in the Union covers neither on ethnicity, nor other affiliations of inhabitants. Although the government refers on the EU as a great regulator preventing political debates, the length of questionnaire in the census belongs to the responsibility of the ruling power.

Despite of this fact, the Act CXXXIX of 2009 on the census in 2011 cites the Reg.763/2008/EC. Taking into account the situation on 1st October 2011 the census will be managed in October-November. It will be the 15th census since 1870 in Hungary. The electronic or paper questionnaire shall be completed by the interviewer or by the respondent as s/he opts – in possession of information and his/her ability in IT. Each adult with habitual residence or staying in Hungary is obliged to give data on the following issues: gender, date of birth, address, family status by law and in fact, fertility, attendance at school, qualification, material resources of the house-hold/family, employer and its address, trafficking to the work, health conditions, disability, nationality, religious affiliation, ethnic origin, mother tongue, language knowledge, legal entitlement of housing/accommodation, property of flat and resort. It seems that health conditions, disability, nationality, religious affiliation, ethnic origin, mother tongue, language knowledge are considered as permanent,

objectively declarable feature of respondent. Naturally, the text of the Act makes no distinction between the data required by the Union and decided by the Parliament. The Explanatory Report to the Act contains some words on ethnic origin: “*The necessity of data collection on national and ethnical origin is proved by the data users with reference on the changing size of community of national and ethnic minorities since the recent census, the planning of budget and activities of self-governments of minorities, the implementation of non-discrimination rules in the Constitution (Art 70/A) together with affirmative actions to equality in practice, the preparatory of Roma integration programmes, the program setting to the Union funds (cohesion funds, regional development) and in general those are required to a more effective implementation of the Act LXXVII of 1993 on rights of ethnic and national minorities. The expert opinion of the Advisory Committee to the Framework Convention of Minorities (Council of Europe) suggested Hungary also to obtain reliable data on minorities encouraging minorities to declare own ethnic affiliations during the forthcoming census.*”

This approach is a bit problematic because the realization of all equal and minority policy and legal tasks depends on the ethnic data from the census in Hungary although the rate of refusal in answering and the incomplete, unreliable data would be high. On the other side, the answer is option on the questions concerning ethnic affiliation while there is no ethnic statistics³¹. In this context the data collection method and encouragement of participation in census is vital but there is no developed information campaign or other supplementary ways in prevention of the absence of data. In the growing prejudices against otherness and anti-Roma sentiments³² the Art 3(2) of the Act on census means imperfect guarantee: “*the answer on health conditions, disability, religion, mother tongue and national/minority affiliation is voluntary.*” How is Hungary able to give a correct report on implementation of minority rights to the international organisations?

³¹ Tóth, Judit Cultural Rights of Minorities in Hungary on the Ground of International Undertakings. *Minorities Research*, Lucidus, 2010/12: 103-119

³² Tóth, Judit: *The Incomprehensible Flow of Roma Asylum-seekers from the Czech Republic and Hungary to Canada*. CEPS „Liberty and Security in Europe” publication series, Brussels, November 2010 1-42

There is a chance to discover further communities of migrants due to the data collection in census instead of controlling and completing the existing administrative registration on migrants. On the basis of answers on ethnic, linguistic and religious belonging of habitual residents there will be identified as non-ethnic Hungarians although they have Hungarian nationals, immigrants with non-Hungarian origin, immigrants belonging to certain ethnic or national (historical) minority community, immigrants without intention to speak Hungarian or to acquire Hungarian nationality, the community of persons with multiple affiliations, Hungarian citizens without speaking Hungarian or the group of multiple citizenships. The list of variations is not exhaustive. These data may support new analysis but in absence of complete information due to the uncertainty in answer refusal or to relativity of answers in the given situation it would be embarrassing in public discourses.

Finally the minimally required transferring of data on migrants to the EUROSTAT is not ensured by Hungary because the administrative registries collect different data in different timing that are defined in the EU law. The data of the first year of reference are not forwarded due to late/no transposed rules to the national legislation in absence of the governmental interests in usage of data to preparatory of (the common European) migration and integration policy. There are no questions on legal status of immigrants, the length of their residence and the intention to stay in future in the census as manifestly irrelevant ones. Why do migrants want to give own sensitive personal data to the interviewer if those will be neither applied to a stronger human rights protection nor to a human integration programme? The Bill on migrants’ integration was on the agenda for years but it is deleted and replaced by the data collection on ethnicity and religious affiliations of inhabitants.

Attila Z. Papp

**The Western Hungarian diaspora and some
demographic and social
characteristics of their organisations**

Abstract

The paper analyses the main historical migration processes which contributed to the forming of Hungarian diaspora communities in Western Europe, in America, and in Australia since of the middle of 19th century. Analysing the demographic and the organizational aspects of Western Hungarian diaspora communities is seems to be important because there are only few social and demographic research in the field, and the lack of sociological informations and (self)-knowledges often gives way of a certain ethnical activism.

Hungarian diaspora in the west exist since the second half of the 19th c. Though information is available about Hungarians emigrating in earlier centuries and eras too, communities to be described as diaspora were appearing by the 1870 when the migration movements of modern times had reached Hungary too. The present paper is going to investigate the migration processes that resulted in the forming of Hungarian communities outside the Carpathian Basin and the demographic and social characteristics of these communities.

The most important sources of the development and maintenance of the western diaspora communities of Hungarians were the mass emigration peaking in the years before the outbreak of World War I. Later it was the reproduction of those of Hungarian origin on the one hand and the later arrivals of refugees and/or emigrants on the other that kept them alive. The last great mass arrival was in 1956 as the outcome of the historical events but there were many who emigrated during the era of state Socialism and also after the change of regime.

Table 1. Overseas Hungarian emigrants between 1871 and 1913

	Data of the USA Immigration Office	Data of the seaports	Data of the Hungarian Statistical Office
1871-1879	5 597	7 682	-
1880-1889	115 252	164 119	-
1890-1899	235 895	261 444	-
1900-1909	1 094 116	1 171 758	854 584
1910-1913	410 480	433 230	315 498
TOTAL 1871-1913	1 861 340	2 038 233	-
TOTAL 1900-1913	1 504 596	1 604 988	1 170 082

Source: Puskás 1982. 443-446.¹

Between 1871 and 1913 there were about 2 million Hungarian citizens emigrating overseas mainly for economic reasons. The number peaked in the first decade of the 20th c. when about 1 million emigrants were registered by various sources, then by 1914 further 500 000 had left Hungary. In this mass emigration period $\frac{3}{4}$ of the emigrants were men, and $\frac{3}{4}$ of them 20–49 years of age, the generation fit for work, those above 50 years did not reach 3%. Naturally not all of them were Hungarian nationals. The proportion of Hungarians was 26,3%, Slovaks to a similar proportion, Croats 16,6% and Germans 15%.

Though in the earliest, end of 19th c., period of the emigration the role of merchants, artisans and miners was important, when it gained mass magnitude, persons from the agrarian sphere became dominant, this is why public opinion and also scientific literature has been talking about peasant exodus.

Emigration did not mean a one-way movement at the turn of the 19-20th c, partly because the emigrant themselves considered it as transitory movement partly because the home authorities recognizing the demographic and social hazards started action for resettlement and as a third feature the economic situation of the receiving country, too, influenced the possibility of settling down. Thanks to

¹ The data have been processed on from the ones in the *Függelék* [appendix] of Puskás, Julianna *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban 1880-1940* [Hungarian emigrants in the USA 1880-1940] (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1982).

these effects about a quarter of those emigrated between 1899 and 1913 returned to Hungary, according to the data of Hungarian statistics.²

During and after the WW1 the conditions of international migration changed and the USA being the prime target for emigrants tightened its emigration policy through various legislations, quotas according to origin tried to keep down migration from Europe. Because of these changes the number of Hungarian immigrants to the USA remained below 50 000 persons. The US restriction increased interest in Canada as target where about 25-30 000 emigrants arrived, mainly from the agrarian sphere of Hungary. Parallel to these movements, South American states, first of all Brazil and Argentina received Hungarian emigrants who were also mainly employed in farming.

Between the two wars changes in the route of emigrants can be noticed not only in its direction towards overseas but also in the changing tendencies within Europe too. In the 1920s it was France and Belgium, in the '30s Germany became the major target of emigration. It is true in these cases the two-way traffic was even more frequent than in those of the USA. Between the two wars migration lessened but with the multiplication of the target countries, the geographical, spatial distribution of the Hungarian diaspora communities grew and the newcomers after WW2 and 1956 joined them.

By the end of WW2 there were more than 11 million displaced persons in Europe of whom about 8 million were repatriated by the summer of 1947 but there were about 1,5 million who did not wish to return to their country of origin. IRO working under the aegis of UNO coordinated the settlement of more than a million displaced persons between July 1947 and end of 1951 who were waiting in Austrian camps to be able to start a new existence in an over-seas country. According to IRO's data there were 17 000 Hungarians accepted in the USA, about 3500 in France. Between 1946 and 1955 there were about 16 500 former Hungarian citizens registered in Canada; in Australia about 14 500 Hungarian post-war emigrants were registered; according to various estimates there were about

² In reality the number of home comers could be higher. The US authorities registered out-going migration between 1908 and 1913 and that would make about 40% for those who returned from the US.

10 000 Hungarians settled in South America and 5000 in the Scandinavian countries.³ There were economic and political aspects specified by some countries as conditions of the reception: the US had the strictest political control and saw to it that no one compromised by the Hungarian Arrow Party or fascist activities should enter the country; other countries were motivated by the needs of their labour markets and accordingly accepted persons with specific skills. 20% of the displaced persons were of Jewish origin whose majority moved to Palestine and later the newly created Jewish state.

The period between 1949 and 1956 could be regarded as characterized by ‘migration lull’⁴ due to the Communist takeover and the following administrative restriction; during the period there were only some 2500 persons to legally leave Hungary. After this short period there were about 250 000 persons fleeing the country causing considerable demographic loss;⁵ on the other hand it provided the most important addition to the organizations of the western diaspora communities. The previous emigrants had already created their organizations: societies, churches, youth organizations, etc. but their existence on the long run depended on the masses of newcomers. In addition the 1956 people created their own organizations too.

The exodus caused by the events of 1956 did not stop and there were about 3–6000 persons per year to leave the country till the change of regime. Between 1960 and 1989 there were about 130 000 person emigrating, legally or illegally. The official Hungarian data indicate that when the number of legal and illegal emigrants was more or less near each other in the ‘60s and ‘70s, in the last decade of the state socialist illegal departures were proportionally higher. (cf. *Table 2.*)

³ For details cf. Puskás, Julianna: *Migráció Kelet-Közép-Európában a 19. és 20. században. Regio*, 1991/4, [Migration in east Central Europe in the 19th and 20th cc.] and Szántó, Miklós: *Magyarok Amerikában*. Gondolat, Budapest, 1984. 106–108. p. [Hungarians in America].

⁴ The term was created by P.P. Tóth: A nemzetközi vándormozgalom szerepe a népességfejlődésben. [The role of international migration the development of population] In: Faragó Tamás – Óri Péter (szerk.): *Történeti demográfiai évkönyv, 2001*. Budapest, KSH NKI. p. 327–343. p.335. [Yearbook of historical demography].

⁵ Habcsek László – Illés Sándor: Az 1956-os kivándorlás népességi hatásai. *Statisztikai Szemle*. 85. évf. 2. 157-172. [the demographic consequences of the 1956 emigrations].

Table 2. Proportion of legal and illegal emigrants between 1947 and 1989

	Emigrants		
	legal	illegal	TOTAL
1947-1955	2 553	n.d.	2 553
1956-1962	20 703	193 835	214 538
1963-1979	36 713	40 725	77 438
1980-1989	14 931	30 266	45 197
<i>Összesen</i>	<i>74 900</i>	<i>264 826</i>	<i>339 726</i>

Source: *Tóth 2001, p. 336*


There was a short lull following the change of regimes but the flow of westward emigration did not stop; in addition Hungary became a transit country as many foreign citizens – partly Hungarian nationals of the neighbouring countries – moved on, the impact of which could be assessed only from the registrations of the receiving countries. According to the 2008 official Hungarian data 359 persons emigrated, the immigration data of the western countries registered 26 661 Hungarian citizens, 70% of them in Germany.

Since the last major resources of the western Hungarian diaspora were the 1956 refugees, let us analyse the main elements of the wave of migrants. After the 1956 events the refugees left Hungary via Yugoslavia and Austria. For the first half of 1957 the Austrian and Yugoslavian authorities for internal affairs estimated 193 885 persons in total (170 704 and 19 181 respectively). *Ungarischer Flüchtlingshilfdienst* registered 183 667 refugees between 1st of November 1956 and the 30th of June 1958⁶; the majority arrived in November and December 1956, in the first half of 1958 there were only 394 arrivals. About 10% of the refugees remained in Austria, about 6% returned to Hungary, the remaining 84% left for other western countries. 80% of

⁶ Soós Katalin: 1956-os magyar menekültek a statisztikai adatok tükrében. *Levéltári Szemle 2002/3.pp.* 56–60. [Hungarian refugees and the data of statistics]. Cseresyés Ferenc: Ötvenhatosok menekülése Ausztriába és Ausztrián át. *Múltunk*, 1998/1. 42–70.

them settled down mainly in seven countries: USA (22,7%), Canada (15,9), United Kingdom (13,3%), Germany (9,2%), Switzerland (7,7%), France (6,6%), Australia (6,2). Besides these countries other European and Latin-American countries, Israel and South Africa, too, accepted Hungarian migrants.⁷ (Figure 1.)

Figure 1. Hungarian citizens departing from Austria between the 1st of November 1956. and the 30th of June 1958. according to target countries



Source: Soós 2002.

USA, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland, France, Australia, Sweden, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Israel, South Africa, Norway, Denmark, Brazil, New Zealand, Argentina, Venezuela, Other European, Other

After October 1956 about 20 000 Hungarians were in refugee camps in Yugoslavia, most of them came at the beginning of 1957 when the Hungarian authorities had hermetically closed the Hungarian – Austrian border, thus the main escape route remained toward Yugoslavia. There were about 2000 persons who returned to Hungary,

⁷ In many cases the target country was another one (usually the USA) but if they were left out the quotas offered by the countries, they emigrated to another one as the first step.

500 settled down there the rest migrated further west (to France, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand, Canada and Austria).⁸

There are detailed data about 80% of the emigrants (151 731 persons) collected by the Hungarian Central Office of Statistics.⁹ It can be stated that more than half of the refugees were from the capital, Budapest, 30% from Transdanubia; 2/3 were men and about the same proportion were townspeople. According to age more than half were under 25 year of age, and a contemporary Hungarian account remarks that about 20% of the men of military age of 19-20 years “defected”, the use the term of the period. 2/3 of the persons departing illegally were breadwinners and within this group 2/3 worked as non-agricultural manual workers, 1/4 white-collar workers and only 7% were agricultural workers. The white-collar workers were employed as intellectuals; engineers were in the majority (indeed 10% of the country’s engineers left). Half of those being dependent were pupils, about 3200 of them university students that meant more than 11% of the total number of students in Hungary at the time.¹⁰

All in all it can be stated that after October 1956 young urban men of working age left the country in masses that was tempting for the labour market of the receiving western countries’. It was no mere coincidence either, that the major motivation of the refugees was the possibility of a better quality of life, the real political consideration was less important.

While the people that left Hungary are fairly accurately documented sometimes by several sources, it is difficult to estimate the number of Hungarians living abroad at present, with only few exceptions. First of all who is Hungarian? Persons who emigrated from Hungary after the war were most probably Hungarians – unless

⁸ Hidas I. Péter: Magyar menekültek Jugoszláviában, útban Kanadába. *Múltunk*, 1997/3. pp. 172–182. [Hungarian refugees to Canada via Yugoslavia]

⁹ *KSH jelentés az 1956-os disszidálásról*. REGIO, 1991/4 [Report on the 1956 emigration].

¹⁰ Várallyay Gyula knows about a greater number. According to him the contemporary statistics and report would add up to 6000 to 8000 student refugees. Várallyay Gyula: „Tanulmányúton”. *Az emigráns magyar diákmozgalom 1956-ban*. Századvég, 56-os Intézet, Budapest, 1992. p.57. [Students’ movement in emigration].

the person decided to assimilate voluntarily and quickly.¹¹ But the definition of the native country does not offer enough information: there are Hungarians emigrating from the neighbouring countries too, however, the receiving countries register them according to their citizenship. Mother tongue could also be an important criterion but there are several definitions of mother tongue in various countries and there sometimes no question asked about the mother tongue. E.g. in the USA there is no question about the mother tongue only about the language spoken at home in the census after 1980; the answer given to such a question cannot be definitive it can happen that though the persons mother tongue is Hungarian but for reasons, e.g. because of mixed marriage they do not use it at home. The ethnic data collection has other obstacles too, the descendants of earlier Hungarian emigrants cannot always speak the language but 'in their soul', 'in their hearts', they 'feel' Hungarian. The methods of census questioning can have further influence on the evaluation of the size of an ethnic group. It has been pointed out in the USA and in Australia that the example given on the questionnaire meant as a help can influence the answer. And there is also the problem of ethnic concealment that can also distort ethnic data collection.¹²

In spite of all the vagueness there is still information about the number and order of the Hungarians living in the western world. (Tables 3.-5.). On the one hand there are various specialist estimates – not always well documented – and on the other, there are detailed official data in certain countries. The specially immigration interested countries as the USA, Canada, Australia can provide with detailed data (Table 3.) and in some South American and European countries the number of Hungarians can be estimated by the country of provenance and/or date of immigration as well as religion.

¹¹ It exists, there is the tops: 'hardly arrived he one or two years ago and cannot speak Hungarian anymore'.

¹² Tóth, Pál Péter: Magyarok a nagyvilágban. *Kisebbségkutatás* 2001/4. [Hungarians in the wide world].

Table 3. Inhabitants of Hungarian nationality or origin in the USA, Canada and Australia (Census data)

Country	Census year	Of Hungarian origin Total	Language spoken at home: Hungarian
USA	1980	1 776 902	178 995
USA	1990	1 582 302	147 902
USA	2000	1 398 724	117 975
USA ¹³	2006	1 563 081	n.d.
Canada	2001	267 255	23 685
Canada	2006	315 510	21 905
Australia	2001	62 507	24 485
Australia	2006	67 625	21 565

Source: U. S. Census Bureau, *Census 2000 Special Tabulation PHC-T43*; U. S. Census Bureau, *Census 1990 Special Tabulations CPH-L-149*; U. S. Census Bureau, *Ancestry of the Population by State: 1980 (Supplementary Report PC80-S1-10)*.; Canada: *Immigration and Citizenship Highlight Tables, 2006 Census. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 97-557-XWE2006002. and Catalogue Number 97-562-XCB2006012*.; Australia: *Australian Bureau of Statistics, Table: 20680-u16-Australia and Table:20680-c37c-Australia*.

In the USA there live about 1 500 000 persons of Hungarian origin, but it does not mean that we can count with a Hungarian population of that size. The census following 1980 asks about *ancestry* but it is not about the mother tongue but the language used at home. Thus between 1980 and 2000 those speaking Hungarian at home represent only about 8-10% of the population of Hungarian origin. In 1970 was the last time when the language spoken in childhood was inquired about (and not the ethnic ancestors). In 1970 about 447 000

¹³ American Community Survey (ACS) 2006. On the characteristics of the ACS data collecting cf. Pakot, Levente: A 2000. évi amerikai népszámlálás jellegzetességei és kihatása az amerikai magyarok számbavételére [characteristics of the ACS data collecting and its impact of the taking account of Hungarian-Americans]. In Papp Z. Attila (ed.) *Beszédből világ. Elemzések, adatok amerikai magyarokról*. Magyar Külügyi Intézet, Budapest, 2008.

Hungarians registered and analyses carried out on different bases gave it as 421 000, i.e. representing only 6% difference.¹⁴ It can be interpreted that around 1980 23,6% of those of Hungarian origin had Hungarian as their mother tongue and if this number is projected over the 2000 census data about 330 000 could be the estimated number of Hungarian speakers in the USA (not counting the loss caused by assimilation).

In Canada it is not only ethnic origin but various language uses are also inquired about, e.g. the mother tongue and the language spoken at home. In 2006 315 510 informants mentioned Hungarian ancestors of whom 88 685 (28%) had only Hungarian ones, the others were born in mixed marriages. Those of Hungarian ancestry 76 595 (24%) had Hungarian as their mother tongue and only 20 905 (7%) used it at home; the proportions in 2001 were 28,8% and 8,8% respectively.

In Australia too the question is about ancestry, the informants can give two ancestors. The options combined gave the result that in 2001 62 507 informants mentioned Hungarian ancestors, in 2006 the number was 67 625. Concerning the language – similar to that in the USA – it is not the mother tongue but the language used in the family is asked about. In 2001 39% (24 485) of the Hungarian descendants, in 2006 somewhat less 32% (21 565) used Hungarian in their homes.

In connection to these three countries that count as immigration targets it is important to notice that of persons of Hungarian ancestry the proportion of those stating Hungarian as their mother tongue and the ones who were using Hungarian at home is about the same in the USA and Canada, while in Australia the proportion of Hungarian speakers at home is considerably higher. It indicates that in Australia the ethnically homogeneous marriages may be more frequent thus delaying assimilation.

¹⁴ Fejős Zoltán: Magyarok az Egyesült Államokban az 1980-as években. (Demográfia, társadalmi adatok, fogalmi problémák). In: *Magyarsághutató 1988. a magyarsághutató Intézet Évkönyve*, Budapest, 1988. pp.177–216. [Hungarians in the US in the 1980s. Demography, social data, conceptual problems.]

Table 4. Estimate of Hungarians living in Latin-American countries

	Borbándi, 1996	MVSZ, 2000	HTMH, 2006	IPUMS
Mexico	100	300	n.d.	n.d.
Costa Rica	n.d.	1 100	n.d.	n.d.
Venezuela	5 000	4 500	4-5000	2 600
Brazil	60 000	70 000	5-10 000	14 000
Peru	150	2 000	n.d.	n.d.
Chile	2-3000	2 000	n.d.	1 115
Uruguay	5 000	3 500	4-5000	n.d.
Argentina	40 000	40 000	20-30 000	12 000
Paraguay	150	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Columbia	150	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
TOTAL	112 450-113 450	123 400	33 000-50 000	

Table 5. Estimate of Hungarians living in European countries outside the Carpathian Basin

	Borbándi, 1996	MVSZ, 2000	HTMH, 2006
Austria	60 000	40-45 000	40 000
Belgium	10-15000	14-15 000	5-6000
Cyprus	n.d.	n.d.	2-300
Czech Republic	n.d.	20 000	19-20 000
Denmark	2 000	4 000	2-4 000
Estonia	n.d.	n.d.	150
France	50 000	40-45 000	15-19 000
Finnland	n.d.	n.d.	1 000
Greece ¹⁵	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
The Netherlands	10 000	11-12 000	8-10 000
Latvia	n.d.	n.d.	300
Lithuania	n.d.	n.d.	120
Poland	n.d.	n.d.	500
Luxemburg	n.d.	n.d.	2-300
Great Britain	25 000	25-30 000	25-30 000
Germany	62 000	120 000	120-160 000
Norway	3 000	4 000	3 000
Italy	10 000	9-10 000	n.d.
Portugal	n.d.	2 000	n.d.
Spain	200	n.d.	n.d.
Switzerland	20 000	18-20 000	20-25 000
Sweden	25 000	25-27 000	30-35 000
TOTAL	277 000-282 000	332 000-354 000	289 470-354 670

The comparison of the data concerning Europe and South America¹⁶ coming from various sources give the result that in certain countries (especially in those where the census does not provide

¹⁵ There are several thousand Hungarians living in Greece. According to the 2001 IPUMS-database about 1300 of them were born in Hungary and about 500 are Hungarian citizens.

¹⁶ There are other estimates too: Károly Kocsis estimates the number of Hungarians in European countries outside the Carpathian Basin (Austria included) to 270 000 persons; in the Latin American countries to 100 000. (Kocsis, Károly and Kocsis-Hodosi Eszter: *Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Basin. A study in Ethnic Geography*. Matthias Corvinus Publishing, Toronto-Buffalo 1995. p. 13.)

details of ethnic, national provenance) there are considerable differences between the various estimates. It is South America, in Brazil and Argentina the two countries with the largest Hungarian communities, where the differences are the more conspicuous (*Table 4.*) In Western Europe it is Germany, France, Belgium and Sweden where the data seem to match the least. (*Table 5.*)

For the Latin American countries we can make our own estimates by the help of census databases.¹⁷ Our estimation presupposes four sources for the Hungarians living in these countries: those born in Hungary; those coming from the neighbouring states of Hungary; the children of the two groups. Based on the census question about the birth country and number of living offspring the number of persons coming from Hungary and that of their children can easily be established. Those coming from the countries surrounding Hungary religion that can indicate their being Hungarians if the birth country was Romania, Yugoslavia/Serbia or the former Soviet Union/Ukraine: Roman Catholics and Protestants are most probably Hungarian. Those persons coming from former Czechoslovakia (Slovakia) cannot be estimated by religion because there is no difference among Hungarians and the majority population, thus 50% minority Hungarians will be reckoned (which may not be correct, but the data have been over estimated on purpose). The proportion of Hungarians established by the above method will than be extended to the productivity of the persons coming from the countries in question. Since religion is not among the questions asked in the latest Argentinean census, the proportion of Hungarian nationals coming from the Carpathian Basin will be reckoned with the help of the data obtained in Brazil. Naturally this kind of reckoning has its drawbacks since it is arguable whether the children born to Hungarian mothers have remained Hungarian or are they still alive or have remained in the country of the census. Also the third and fourth generation Hungarians are also left out, i.e. the offspring of those already born abroad, who may still have preserved their Hungarian identity in some forms.

¹⁷ The basis is the database Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of Minnesota Population Center (MPC). (Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 5.0 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2009.). thanks to MPC and the countries that provided us with their databases.

With the help of the reckoning it was found that about 12 000 potentially Hungarian persons (first and second generation) could live in Argentina, 14 5000 in Brazil and in Chile and Venezuela the number may somewhat be less than the known estimates but proportionally similar. It has to be noted that the Argentinean value seems acceptable as there have been estimates with similar results,¹⁸ and in the case of Brazil our estimate is near to the value given by HTMH (see *Tables 4. and 5.*).

In France there were about 10 000 persons who were born in Hungary but obtained French citizenship or permission to reside according to the data of the 1999 census;¹⁹ if the ration of birth, as well as Hungarians arrived from other countries of the Carpathian Basin and their progeny, about 20 000 Hungarian nationals could be reckoned with in France.

The data from Germany indicate a kind of dynamic growth compared with the 1996 data. That could be plausible, since as has already pointed out above, 70% of Hungarians living and legally registered in Western Europe (about 19 000 persons) had settled down in Germany according to the 2008 data. If this 19 000 is added to the 1996 data together with the stipulated number of their offspring as well as minority Hungarians from the neighbouring countries, that would total to 100 000 persons at least – near to the estimated 120 000 given by the Association of Hungarians in Germany (BUOD).

There are two reliable sources for Belgium: firstly there were about 3500 persons emigrated to Belgium after the 1956 events, and secondly the 2006 official Belgian data mention 2000 Hungarians staying in the country. Thus 7-8000 Hungarians can be estimated for Belgium.

The Swedish sources mentioned 25–30 000 Hungarians in Sweden based on official statistics that may represent the maximum number.²⁰ In 2002 there were 13 935 persons born in Hungary and 13 956 already born in Sweden from Hungarian ancestors. Based

¹⁸ According to Kósa, László 10 000 persons in 1980, Balázs, Dénes 15.000 persons. Cf.: Kósa, László (ed.): *A magyarságtudomány kézikönyve*. Budapest, 1990. and Balázs, Dénes: *Argentína, Uruguay*. Budapest, Panoráma Útikönyvek sorozat, 1988. [Handbook of Hungarian studies].

¹⁹ Also in the 2006 report of HTMH.

²⁰ *Statistika Centralbyrån (SCB) Befolkningsstatistik del 3*, 2002. pp. 20, 70, 74.

on these two data the number of persons of Hungarian origin can be estimated at about 28 000 but if the number of those who were born in the Hungarian communities outside Hungary first of all from Transylvania is added to it the number becomes considerably higher (in 2002 there were 12 172 persons registered coming from Romania of whom 6 808 emigrated in the 1980s and many of them could have been Hungarians. Unfortunately it cannot be established what proportion of the 12 000 emigrants from Romania, about 2000 from Ukraine, and about 75 000 from the former Yugoslavia were Hungarian nationals. Even if their number is estimated at a minimum level, the persons with Hungarian attachment could be estimated at about 35 000 persons.

Though it will not be discussed in detail but there are Hungarians, persons of Hungarian origin or coming from Hungary living in other countries, on other continents too. The sources cited above estimated that in Israel there are about 200–250 000 persons coming from Hungary and the surrounding countries who know Hungarian; in Africa and Asia too there are about 10 000 and 300 000 Hungarians respectively. It is possible that the data for Israel are also estimated numbers. According to the IPUMS database the 1972 census registered about 51 000 persons, the one in 1983 only about 23 000 persons who were born in Hungary.²¹ The two censuses asked over 15 years informants what language they used in everyday communication,²² in 1972 there were 21 000 persons mentioning the Hungarian language, in 1983 only 15 000 persons. The case in Israel is special because the population with Hungarian attachments did not consider themselves immigrants but home comers to their new situation and the younger generation speaks Hebrew.

In the above it was attempted to estimate the ‘potential’ number of Hungarians in the various countries. But it would need further research in order to find out whether the Hungarian person, or person of Hungarian origin is an effective member of the diaspora

²¹ Unfortunately the 1995 census did not give the number of those who were born in Hungary but probably it would have been below the number given in 1983. The average age of those born in Hungary was 57,8 years, of those who used the Hungarian language in everyday communication was 66,5 years in 1983.

²² ‘What language do you use daily?’ The question was not included in the 1995 census questionnaire.

community. The research in the USA and Argentina has found that about 5-10% of the Hungarians participate in any kind of Hungarian social activity and it seems that the proportion is not higher than 10-15% elsewhere either.²³ The least information is available about the so-called worker diaspora and the less successful emigrants, i.e. about those who were at the edge of the local Hungarian community or the receiving society and lowering their potential ability to enforce their interest and/or participating in organized institutions.

There is a great variety of organisations and of many types especially that every larger group of emigrants set up their special social life. Already in the 1880s there were land a hand institutions in the US that served as insurance offices for immigrant workers in case of accident and illness. The associations published newspapers and to enhance community life there were dances and other events were organized. After the change of regime in Hungary the western community life underwent a kind of post-emigration development and started taking up the function of maintenance of Hungarian ethnic culture.

Since it is the Church and the scout movement that are the most important organizations in the maintenance of the Hungarian culture and identity in present day western diaspora there follows a short survey of these institutions. It does not mean that there are no other organisations²⁴ or that their importance should be neglected e.g. cultural, intellectual, political and lobby organisations extending from the press to the progressively widening internet-communities.²⁵

The church communities were organized since the end of the 19th c. too, though the majority of the emigrants were Catholics it was the Protestant community that organised their community sooner. The first Hungarian ecclesiastical community was founded in Cleveland in 1890, but the first church building of the Hungarian Reformed

²³ HTMH mentions 10% for South America, and at other places the activity shows similar proportions. Borbándi found similar tendencies in Denmark and in other countries too. Borbándi 1996, p.68.

²⁴ there are about 700 organizations in the USA. Cf.: Papp Z. Attila: *Beszédből világ. Elemzések, adatok amerikai magyarokról*. Magyar Külügyi Intézet, Budapest, 2008 [a world of speech. Analyse, data on Hungarians in America]. Also: (<http://www.mti.hu/magyarsag/szervezetek/>)

²⁵ Kovács, Ilona. Borbándi.

Church was consecrated in Pittsburgh in 1893. The congregations of the Reformed Church were connected to the German branch and later that was the source of Americanisation, too. The wish for independence grew in the Hungarian communities and the connection to the Reformed Church in Hungary but it was somewhat thwarted by reasons of existence since the ministers received their salaries from the German Reformed Church. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the American Presbyterian Church of Scottish origin also established Hungarian parishes.²⁶ At present there are two major Protestant denominations collecting the Hungarian church communities *Hungarian Reformed Church in America* independent of the American diocese and the autonomous *Calvin Synod* as part of the *United Church of Christ*. The former has 34 the latter 28 congregations. There are several Hungarian congregations in Canada (at 12 places) and Australia (8 places) but in Argentina, Brazil and western European countries too e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, France.

The establishment of communities within the Roman Catholic Church was more difficult because of its universal and hierarchical structure. The end of the century was the time of the organisation of church communities thus there were about than hundred communities by the beginning of the 20th c., however, the number decreased later and now there are 22-29 Roman Catholic communities known and not all of them have services in Hungarian.²⁷ There are ecclesiastical communities belonging to the Roman Catholic Church in Canada (18 churches), Australia (6 churches) but there are Catholic parishes, missions and monastic communities in Western European and South American countries too.

It is worth mentioning the increasing interest among Hungarians toward the Baptist Church. In North America the congregations are

²⁶ Várdy, Béla Op.cit. pp. 295 – 299.

²⁷ Mustos, István: Magyar nyelvű szolgálat és oktatás az amerikai magyar katolikus egyházakban. In: Nagy – Papp i.m. 65–67. [Services and teaching in Hungarian in the Hungarian Catholic Churches] and Miklósházy, Attila SJ: *A tengeren túli emigráns magyar katolikus egyházi közösségek rövid története Észak- és Dél-Amerikában, valamint Ausztráliában*. Toronto, 2005. pp. 13-68. [The short history of Hungarian Catholic church communities in North and South America and Australia]

organized by the Society of Hungarian Baptist Congregation in North America that invites its members three times a year. Officially there are 10 congregations officially; and there are Hungarian congregations in Melbourne, Australia, too.²⁸

Churches play an important role in the maintenance of the ethnic/national identity of the diaspora and it is to understand that the challenges of assimilation appear most acutely in this sphere. Not only the replacement of priests and ministers (especially in the case of Catholic Church) is endangered but because of the decreasing number of Hungarians the maintenance of the congregation itself too. In ecclesiastical circles the question also arises what is the task of the church – to promote religious belief or to cultivate Hungarian identity.

The spreading of the Hungarian scout movement started in 1945 when the Hungarian Scout Association, founded in 1912, was revived in Austrian and German refugee camps, and their work was assisted by the Teleki Pál Scout Team organized in 1946. The organisation went on among the émigrés in America, Australia and Western Europe. In Hungary the movement was absorbed into the pioneer movement in 1948 and the Team changed its name to *Hungarian Scout Federation in Exile*, and since 1989 to *Hungarian Scout Federation in Exteris*. In the USA it was Gábor Bodnár and his team who started the movement and the centre of the Scout Federation has settled in Garfield NJ. In the following decades it continuously gained momentum and now there are about 70 troops with 4000 odd members. Tradition has it that the largest number was reached in the 1980s with 6200 scouts in 84 troops. The greatest challenge is that the statutes order only such members to accept who speak Hungarian. Thus with the decrease of Hungarians it is difficult to recruit young people with adequate knowledge of the Hungarian language.

Among the Hungarian diaspora Churches and the Scout movement are running Sunday schools but there are other civil organisations too that oversee Hungarian schools. There are 26 Hungarian schools in the USA and 15 in Germany but there are other schools too – mainly Sunday schools - in other countries. In Canada there is a Hungarian secondary school in Toronto, and public school/class are

²⁸ www.evangeliumhirnok.net

also known about, e.g. in Bankstown, Australia there is a Hungarian class with final exam candidates. Sometimes the Hungarian Sunday schools also run crèches and kindergartens.

The greatest problem the schools operated by churches or civil organisations have to face is the difficulty of recruiting well qualified teachers. Sometimes the appropriate school material is also lacking that can only partially be made up by contributions from Hungary. There is still aversion against schoolbooks from Hungary and frequently they have not been properly adapted to local needs. It is also important to establish how these schools, mainly teaching during the weekends, contribute to the social assimilation in the wider sense and how they could help the young people in their studies not in the Hungarian language. There is information about positive examples because in some countries the Hungarian teaching language is officially accepted, e.g. Germany there is accredited Hungarian education and in California too, credits can be obtained for the knowledge of Hungarian in secondary schools.

The most important question regarding the whole western organisational world is whether the various organisations are able to cooperate with one another, even whether they know about each other at all. Though there are organisations based on the principle of collective upkeep (churches, and the scout movement are especially meant to be umbrella organisations) in other institutions networking counts as a novelty. Schools offer an example: e.g. the society of teachers of Hungarian schools in Northern America, but the societies for representation of interests too. In 2001 the association of the Hungarian organizations in Western Europe was founded, the members being the national Hungarian organizations of the UK, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden. In 2004 the association of the Hungarian organizations in South America was founded with the participation of Argentina, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Venezuela and Brazil.

The major interest of these umbrella organisations is the upkeep and maintenance of the Hungarian language and culture. It is especially important because the most imminent danger for the western diaspora is assimilation. That was already indicated by the demographic data described above; and the individual of Hungarian origin

is always exposed to it at a daily basis in the western world, as there are many factors to counteract the attraction of the mother country, the maintenance of the Hungarian language and culture in a linguistically different world. However, in spite of the frequently contradictory and seemingly contingent character, the framework of the Hungarian organizations has been preserved for decades that offered everybody the possibility of keeping their identity in an organized way. The Hungarian organized world has fulfilled the idea of civil society. The Hungarians in the western world were able to create their own organisations built on solidarity and voluntariness, and maintain them by their own moral and financial sources thus setting an example, an alternative for the statist civil organizations of the Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin.

Balázs Bartóki-Gönczy

State Languages in Europe

Abstract

While the Hungarian public life is loud about the modified Slovakian State Language Act, less mention is made about the fact that there are more states in the European Union beyond Slovakia who intend to strengthen the place of the ethnical majority's mother language by a State language act, often at the expense of the minority's rights. The study makes an attempt first of all to define the "state language" and to separate it from the "official" and "national" languages. In the second part, the author demonstrates, through the example of the Baltic states and France, how different regulations exist in the European Union on the state language which are even more discriminative in certain respects than the Slovakian.

The debate triggered by the Slovak language law is no more the 'home affairs' of two countries only and has put minority language use and the right to the use of the mother tongue in a wider sense into the focus. When examining the question we cannot neglect the laws regulating the use of the language of minority societies that – as the Slovak case exemplifies – frequently restrict the use of minority languages for political reasons.

At present the Hungarian public reverberates from the news of the Slovak state language law, however, it is rarely mentioned that there are other member states of the EU that also wish to strengthen the hegemony of the majority state language by language laws, blocking the way of any ambition toward any kind of language emancipation. The present paper tries to define the concept of state language and to separate national and official language and through the examples of the practice of the Baltic States and France in order to show what other types of language regulations – sometimes even more discriminative ones – exist in the EU today. It is important to examine these examples to realise why is the consensus seeking Brussels politics

so reluctant to take firm opinion in the Hungarian – Slovak debate; on the other hand it is important for the Hungarian enforcement of interests too, to understand that it is a problem reaching over the Hungarian – Slovak one and the Hungarian diplomacy could find allies by embracing the cause for others too.

1. The concept and definition of the state language

As mentioned above, this can only be an attempt at the definition of the concept of state language as it is not contained in any law of an individual country neither is it part of any international agreement. It follows that the individual states use the term differently. Conceptually it could be best described by the definition of national and official language and their separation from the state language.

1.1. *The distinction between national and official language*

Most states make no difference between national and official language. France and Hungary, lacking regulations to the contrary, do not consider the important fact that in certain countries not every national language has the status of official language. National language is the mother tongue of a given language community that is the ‘spiritual country’ of that community. The most poetic definition has come from the Hungarian poet Dezső Kosztolányi, who claimed that the mother tongue is a food one cannot have too much of, that immediately becomes our blood; other languages can only be endured in smaller portions as if taking some medicine.¹

The right to language use of speakers of minority languages was described in Article 27. of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* of the United Nations:

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

¹ Kosztolányi Dezső: *Nyelv és lélek*, Osiris, 2002, Budapest, p.100 [Language and soul]

The right to the own culture, to the free practice of religion, to the use of the mother tongue is a particular one. As described in Art. 27. it is the due of a certain group of people only, e.g. ethnic, religious and language minorities in contrast to other rights that are universally due to every person as acknowledged by the Covenant.² There is no mention about the language use of the majority society as there have been no such norms defined in other international legal documents either. The states decide themselves upon the question when they accept the majority language as the official one thus implicitly acknowledging the right of the majority society to the use of its mother tongue.

The difference between national and official language is inherent in the official aspect of the latter, as in most cases the national language almost automatically becomes the official language of a given state, while minority national language(s) not necessarily do so. E.g. it is since 2002 only that Hungarian counts as an official language in the Hungarian inhabited regions of Serbia.³

1.2. *The relationship between the majority and minority national languages*

Prof. László Trócsányi has classified the member states into four groups according to their relationship between majority and minority national languages.⁴ The first group contains those states that have declared in the constitution or in a language law that the country has more than one official languages, i.e. the communities living in the territory have equal language rights: *Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg and Switzerland*. Belgium and Switzerland are federations. In Belgium the official languages are Flemish, French, and German; in Switzerland Italian, German, French and Romansh.⁵ Luxembourg acknowledges the Luxembourg language of symbolic function. Of

² Andrásy György - Az anyanyelv használatához való jog jellege, *Romániai Magyar Jogtudományi Közlemény*, 2006. IV. évf. 2. szám, pp. 13–19. [The character of the right to the use of the mother tongue]

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⁴ Trócsányi László: Az anyanyelv használatához való jog a nemzeti alkotmányokban, *Romániai Magyar Jogtudományi Közlemény*, 2006. IV. évf. 2. szám, pp.7–11. [The right to the use of the mother tongue in the national constitutions].

⁵ Constitution of the Swiss Confederation Article 4.

the above federal states Finland is the obvious odd man out that has acknowledged Swedish as an equal language for historical reasons.

Members of the second group are those that provide special rights to autonomous communities, regions with different languages: *Italy, Spain* and the *United Kingdom*. Of Italy's twenty regions 5 have special rights of which Valle d'Aosta and South Tyrol is worth mentioning for their wide ranging administrative and legislative autonomy. Valle d'Aosta has a large (17%) Francophone population while in South Tyrol 31% of the population is German, 3,2% Rhaeto-Romanic. In Spain Basqueland, Catalonia and Galicia are the autonomous communities, while in the United Kingdom it is Wales.

Ireland and Malta form the third group where the historic dominance of the English language overshadowed the vernacular and there were attempts to legally give equal rights to them. Similar is the case of the Luxembourg language since it has a mere symbolic function between German and French.

Finally there are those states collected to the fourth group that do not ensure or only restrictedly ensure the right to use the mother tongue disregarding the size of the minority language communities. Characteristically, in addition to the declaration of the constitution, these states have special laws to stress the official, state language status of the majority language.

1.3. *The distinction between state language and official language*

As pointed out above, there is a strict division between national and official language. It is more difficult to tell official language and state language apart. The interpretations vary and the two concepts are frequently obfuscated. Jenő Kiss accepts those European languages as state languages that are national languages with legally privileged status in countries formed by independent nations.⁶ The definition, however, does not consider the fact that the declaration of the official language as the state language has its symbolic functions. The codification of the majority language as the official language goes hand in hand with the wish for nation states. According to László Szarka,

⁶ Kiss Jenő: *Társadalom és nyelvhasználat, szociolingvisztikai alapfogalmak*, Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, 2002, p.192. [Society and language use, sociolinguistical concepts]

there is a political intent behind the codification: states with considerable minority language communities want to strengthen the position of the majority language by declaring it as the state language and thus make the situation unchangeable, closing the path before any kind of ambitions toward language emancipation and thus before any kind of policy in favour of autonomy or federation.⁷

In the following the example of the practice in the Baltic states and France will be used to show what other different language regulations are there in the EU, sometimes stricter than the Slovakian language law. As an enumeration of the factual regulations are not enough to understand the motivation and consequences of the regulations, the historical, political and social reasons of the regulations in question have to be explained too.

2. The Baltic states

2.1. *Similarities*

The own majority languages of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are Estonian belonging to the Finno-Ugric language family while Latvian and Lithuanian to the Baltic-Slavic branch of the Indo-European one. It is a common feature of the three countries that they have legally defined the position of their official languages as the state language. All three language laws are considerably discriminative toward the use of the minority tongues in the public sphere. Another shared feature is that there are considerable Russian speaking communities living in the territories. The Russian language has preserved its importance in the private sphere especially in Estonia and Latvia as well as in the international communication of all three countries, because the so-called 'Baltic Russian' is a generally accepted medium of regional commerce.

The spread of the Russian speaking minority and thus that of the Russian language did not begin with Soviet occupation. The first

⁷ Szarka László: *Államnyelv, hivatalos nyelv – kisebbségi jogok Kelet-Közép-Európában*, in: Szarka László – Nádor Orsolya (szerk.): *Nyelvi jogok, kisebbségek, nyelvpolitika Kelet-Közép-Európában*. Akadémiai Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2002. p.19. [state language, official language – minority rights in East Central Europe]

Russian merchants had already appeared in the area of present-day Latvia and Estonia during the 17th – 18th cc. Following the 1633 schism caused by the reform attempts of Patriarch Nikon the orthodox believers found asylum there. As a result of the conquests of Tzar Peter the Great the Baltic provinces (Kurzeme, Livonia, Estonia and Ingria) in the 18th – 19th c., Lithuania in 19th c. came under Russian rule (eventually under different names), followed by the strong policy of assimilation during the Romanoffs. It was compulsory to use the Russian language in education, administration and legislation. Finally it is important to mention the considerable masses of Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian migrants during Soviet times.

According to the data of the most recent censuses Russian is the mother tongue of 29,7% of the Estonians⁸, 37,5% of the Latvians⁹ and 8% of the Lithuanians.¹⁰ It is noteworthy that above indices are higher than those of the ethnic Russians themselves in all three countries,¹¹ showing how strongly Russian has been embedded into their societies.

2.2. Latvia

According to the data of the 1920 census there were 91000 Russians, their number increased to 170.000 (9%) by 1935. Mass immigration of Russians started after the WWII., their number increased to 902.000, representing 35% of the population's total. Many of them have returned to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union thus now ethnic Russian represent 28,8%, 50% of whom live in cities.¹²

After the establishment of independence the first language law was accepted¹³ followed by an amended version in 2000, still in force.¹⁴ Paragraph 4. of the Constitution and par. 3. of the language law designated the Latvian language as Latvia's official language. The

⁸ Eesti Statistika, www.stat.ee

⁹ Latvijas Statistika, www.csb.lv

¹⁰ Statiskos Departamentas Prie Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės, www.stat.gov.lt

¹¹ 2004 data: 28,8% of Latvia's inhabitants were ethnic Russians. Belorussians, Ukrainians and Poles also prefer to use Russian instead of the country's official language.

¹² Russian speakers in Riga 43%, Daugavpils 55%, Rēzekne 50% and Ventspils 32%.

¹³ <http://www.vvk.lv/index.php?sadala=135&id=165>, Izteikt Latvijas Padomju Sociālistiskās Republikas 1989. gada 5. maija Valodu likumu (Latvijas PSR Augstākās Padomes un Valdības Ziņotājs, 1989, 20. nr.

¹⁴ Official language law of the Republic of Latvia, 9 December 1999.

Liv, a Baltic-Finnish language at the verge of extinction also received its official status (§4), it is spoken at the northern part of Latvia. The last Liv speaking areas were on the western shores of the country but now it is being spoken in some fishing communities only.

With the exception of Latvian and Liv, every other language is considered as a foreign language. Thus Russian too that cannot be used in **public communication** (§§ 10. and 13) neither any other languages unless a notarised translation is attached. This renders the use of the Russian language difficult at the self-governments in areas with Russian majority population. The law allows exceptions in the use of Latvian only in extreme cases, not enumerated in detail.¹⁵ Persons working in the private sphere too have to use the state language if they have to deal in important tasks in connection to their work (§6.(2)), such as public security, health care, consumer protection, public morality, etc.

At foreign language programs it is compulsory to have state language interpretation if an official person is present (§11 (2)). The law authorizes the government to regulate such instances where it is necessary to provide interpretation 'in the spirit of the law, for common sake' even at events mainly for minority audience (3.). However, this paragraph has not been followed in practice so strictly. There are about 10 major Russian cultural festivals,¹⁶ and about 200 Russian cultural societies supported by the *Foundation for the Integration in the Latvian Society*.¹⁷

For the **mass communication** the language law has no special regulations, it rules to observe the 1995 Radio and Television Law18 (§16.) that can be considered favourable for the written and electronic press in the Russian language. There are five national daily papers in Russian¹⁹ and about 30 weekly, monthly and other periodic publications. The four largest news portals have Russian versions too.

¹⁵ §10 (2): police complaint, health hazard, fire alarm, etc.

¹⁶ In Daugavpils, Riga and Ventspils.

¹⁷ 2006: http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/archive/languages/langmin/euromosaic/lat3_fr.html, Henceforth: Euromosaic 2006.

¹⁸ http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache%3ApjBPIC716JkJ%3Awww.policy.hu%2Fmyagmar%2FLatvia_Radio_and_TV_Law.PDF+radio+and+television+law+latvia&hl=hu&gl=hu&sig=AHIEtbQG4CE4yfJ-6umn6hqBhLYZLLJ1z-Q&pli=1

¹⁹ Chas, Vestji, Segodnja, Komersant Baltik, Telegraf and Bizness & Baltija.

20% of the programs of the second largest public radio is in Russian. The 34 regional and local commercial radio stations are of special importance as they broadcast mainly in Russian. 40% of the programs of the second public television station is also in Russian.²⁰

The attitude of the Latvian government was not always as accommodating. The parliament was for the suppression of Russian content in the Latvian media and established contingents for the programs not in the state language. This regulation was cancelled by the decision of the Constitutional Court in 2003.²¹

Due to the relative freedom of the Russian media there are two fields of information in Latvia that have hardly any connection to each other: press in Latvian and Russian and the latter prefers to orientate toward Russian topics and interests. Since the two forums rarely share their audience there is a fragmentation of the society along these lines that would be dangerous even in a homogeneous society.²²

Place-names can appear only in Latvian or Liv (§18 (1)). Even discriminating is the regulation that forbids personal names in the Cyrillic script, thus ethnic Russians can write their names only with Latin letters (§19 (1.)). The law allows two exceptions: if the person can document the original form of their name, it can appear in Cyrillic script in their passport and certificates. (§19.(2)).

Education in minority languages is permitted. There are about 300 Russian language schools (33% of the general and secondary schools) besides the ones where the teaching language is Belorussian, Ukrainian, Polish, German and Hebrew.²³ However, the number of students attending the Russian teaching institutions are in the decline which could be connected to the attempt of the government to gradually develop the mono-language minority schools into bilingual ones. The 2004 amendment of the Education Law caused heavy criticism.

It can be stated the Latvian language policy completely ignores the populous Russian minority and the fact that in present

²⁰ 20-50% of the programs of 4 commercial television stations is also in Russian.

²¹ case No.2003-02-0106 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia

²² Cass R. Sunstein: The First Amendment in Cyberspace, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 104, 1995.

²³ Euromosaic 2006:3.

day Latvia there are more fluent speakers of the Russian language than that of Latvian (about half of those who cannot speak Latvian live in Riga, the capital).²⁴

2.3. Estonia

According to the data of the 2000 census, 25,6% of the Estonian population belong to the Russian minority;²⁵ that is a considerable decrease compared to the 1989 data (30,3%).²⁶ Besides Russian Belorussian and Ukrainian minorities also live in Estonia, in decreasing number.

The first written documents of the 14th c. note the existence of Russian settlements on the western shore of Lake Peipus;²⁷ considerable population of “old believers” arrived as the aftermath of the Russian schism, similar to the other two Baltic states. Large religious groups of Orthodox faith²⁸ have been living in closed communities in the territory. Their centre is MustveE where only 40% of the population are Estonian speakers, however, there are such settlements too, where Estonians represent only 6% of the inhabitants.²⁹ Similar to Latvia, most of the Russian speakers are living in the capital, Tallinn (146 000 persons). It is important to note that only about half of the minorities are Estonian citizens partly due to the very strict requirements concerning the mastering of Estonian, partly because the language being a member of another language family, its acquisition may cause difficulties for speakers of Slavonic languages.

According to the §6. of the Estonian Constitution accepted in 1992, as well as §1.(1) of the 1995 **state language law**³⁰ the state language of Estonia is the Estonian language (*Eesti Vabariik*). The law regulates the requirements of the use and knowledge of the Estonian language as well as the use of foreign languages. Apart from Estonian every spoken language is a foreign language. There is the passage, and there is a similar one in the Latvian language law too,

²⁴ The survey of Vineta Ernstone and Daiga Joma. Hungarian review Lacház, Aranka: A hivatalos és a „kisebbségi” nyelv Lettországbán, *Kisebbségkutatás*, 2005. 3. Lucidus Kiadó, p.3. [official and minority language in Latvia]

²⁵ <http://www.stat.ee/population-census-2000>

²⁶ <http://www.stat.ee/26387>

²⁷ Lake Peipus is the fourth largest lake lying on the Russian – Estonian border.

²⁸ староверы

²⁹ Euromosaic 2006, Russian in Estonia p. 2.

³⁰ February 21. 1995, RTa 1995,23,334.

that the language of a minority group is a foreign language that has been used by Estonian citizens belonging to the minority for a long time. (§2 (2)).

The language law is especially strict in allowing the use of a minority language in the **public sphere**. Russian can be used only at self-governments of communities where at least 50% of the permanent inhabitants belong to the minority (§10. (2)). Permanent inhabitant is the person who

1. stays legally in Estonia;
2. spends at least 183 days per year in the territory of the self-government;
3. his absence does not exceed 90 consecutive days (§10. (2)).

The minority language can serve as the language of inner administration when the government especially grants it on the recommendation of the representatives of the self-government (§ 11). That particular condition made possible for the Cabinet to refuse the application of the cities of Narva and Sillamäe. Less strict is the regulation concerning the **cultural self-government of minority groups**, that can be organized by a community of at least 3000 members to maintain their language and culture.³¹

Similar to the Latvian regulation, the Estonian language law too forbids the use of the Cyrillic script to write **personal and place-names**. Every Estonian place-name has just one name written with the Latin alphabet (§19. (2)).

The national minorities have the right to **study in their mother tongue** established in § 37 of the Constitution and in the law for elementary and higher education law (*Pohikool -ja gümnaasiumi seadus, 1993*). Minority languages can serve as the language of education in primary and secondary schools, however, the language used in higher educational institutions is exclusively Estonian. 2006 there were 636 primary and secondary schools in Estonia of which 89 had Russian as their teaching language, 21 were bilingual: Russian – Estonian.³²

³¹ National Minorities Cultural Autonomy Act of 26 October 1993 (RT I 1993, 71, 1001), section 2 (2)

³² Euromosaic 2006, Russian in Estonia, p. 4.

The regulations of language use during trials is contained by the law for administrative³³ and civil code.³⁴ Foreign language can be used only by the consent of both parties and the judge, however, Russian is frequently used especially in the north eastern part of the country with denser Russian population.

According to §25. of the language law **television** broadcasting in foreign language is possible only with the submission of a correct translation of the program in Estonian. It can be waived if

- the program will be repeated in Estonian too;
- is the announcing text of own news production;
- it is a live program.

However, the news and live programs without Estonian translation cannot exceed the 10% of the own-produced programs (§25. (4)). In the case of **radio broadcasting** the law is more lenient as it is not a requirement to repeat the program in Estonian (§25. (3)).

The violation of the language law is a crime and the law for criminal procedures³⁵ will be applied. The fine can reach the sum of 50 000 Estonian crowns.

2.4. Lithuania

According to the data of the 2001 census 6,3% of the population declared to be Russians, about 220 000 persons that is a much smaller community compared to the other two Baltic states. The largest ethnic minority are the Poles (6,74%) the reason of what can be found in the special historical background of the country. The Lithuanian Grand Duchy was in personal union with Poland when the Grand Duke Jagellon was crowned king of Poland in 1386. The union later became a confederation (1569-1795) in fear of the growing power of the Grand Duchy of Moscow. During this period Polish culture gained the upper hand, the Lithuanian nobility spoke Polish leaving the Lithuanian language as the language of the lower classes. After the 1795 Russian occupation Vilnius was annexed to Poland for more than hundred years.

³³ Code of Estonian Administrative Procedure (25-02-19999), RT I 1999, 31, 425

³⁴ Code of Estonian Civil Procedure (22-04-1998), RT I 1998, 43-45, 666

³⁵ RT I 2001,61,364

The §2. of the **state language law** accepted in 1995³⁶ confirms §14. of the Lithuanian constitution³⁷ that the state language of Lithuania is Lithuanian. Similar to other Baltic States the law does not allow the use of the Cyrillic script to write personal and place-names (§§14.-15.)³⁸The highest administrative court of Lithuania turned down the request of Salcinkai, a settlement with Polish majority near Vilnius to indicate street-names in Polish too. In contrast to the language laws of other two Baltic States the language use of religious and ethnic minorities has not been regulated during events and official communication [§1.(2)].

The first paragraph of the **law on ethnic minorities**³⁹ as well as §37. of the constitution assures the minorities the right to keeping up their language and culture. The legislation is fairly vague on public communication because it rules that the minority language can be used in settlements with ‘concentrated’ minority population (§4.).

All in all it can be stated that the Lithuanian language regulation is more lenient than the Estonian and Latvian ones, may be because there are less populous minority groups living in the territory.

3. France

3.1. From an imperialistic language policy to a defensive one

France is often believed to be a homogeneous single language nation state in reality it shows a more varied picture. The French language has been accepted as the sole official language and the prohibition of the language use in the public sphere of other groups of the population living in the territory had served to the strengthening of the central power and to avoid territorial particularization in the Middle

³⁶ http://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Lithuania/Lithuania_Language_1995_English.htm

³⁷ http://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Lithuania/Lithuania_Const_excerpts_English.htm

³⁸ following Resolution of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, 1991, No I – 1031, on request the Cyrillic version of the name can be registered.

³⁹ http://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Lithuania/Lithuania_Minorities_English.htm

Ages. Later, in the times of the colonization, language became the major weapon of the imperialist politics to achieve assimilation. Not only in the colonial over-sea ‘districts’ (*Départements d’outre-mer*, *DOM*) and territories (*Territoires d’outre-mer*),⁴⁰ remaining from the earlier colonies are various minority languages spoken as well as in the “mother country”, the so-called *Metropol*, *Hexagone*, where several national minority languages are spoken,⁴¹ that has become endangered languages due to the assimilatory language policy of hundreds of years; UNESCO has declared Breton an especially endangered language.⁴²

The importance of minority languages in connection to national identity has been manifested itself at various levels in France especially in recent years. The 2008 amendment of the French constitution declares that the minority languages are part of the national wealth of France.⁴³ There are numerous festivals with the aim of maintaining national minority cultures but these “noble gestures” on the part of the state cannot solve the problem that French as the sole official language dominates and makes practically impossible the survival of minority languages.

Minority languages have been in a disadvantageous position in contrast to French for basically external reasons that change time to time but in consequences are the same for the minority rights in using the mother tongue. Earlier the dominance of the French language was important for the strengthening of central power and later the for the stabilisation of the colonial empire, nowadays it is justified by the seemingly unavoidable gaining ground of the English language. What might have changed was that at the highest level of

⁴⁰ The difference between DOM and TOM lies in their relationship to the ‘mother country’, to the “Metropol” DOM: French Guyana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Island of Réunion and soon also Mayotte are integral part of France since 1946 with the status as the other *département*. TOM: New Caledonia, Futuna, French Polynesia, etc. are attached more loosely to France. The 2003 reform of the constitution has given more independence to DOM and TOM has been restricted to the Australian and Antarctic territories; the other territories became *collectivité d’outre-mer*, frequently with independent status.

⁴¹ Corsu, Catalanian, Basque, Breton, German of Alsace-Lorraine, Occitane. (*Territoires d’outre-mer*),

⁴² <http://www.unesco.org/culture/en/endangeredlanguages/atlas>

⁴³ La Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Art. 75-1. – *Les langues régionales appartient au patrimoine de la France.*

politics the former open rejection and effort for assimilation as the attitude toward minority, regional languages has become a kind of “hostile tolerance”.

3.2. *The history of French language regulations*

One of the major means of the consolidation of central power is a uniform written law with the aim at unifying and restricting local customary laws.⁴⁴ The first instance was the royal legislation of Francis I. (***Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterets***),⁴⁵ that was the first to declare the French language as exclusive medium of the public sphere, especially in legislation and at the official places. The passage of the law has been argued whether it was Francis’ own mother tongue that was made official (*en langage maternel francoys*), or besides Latin, all the other language spoken in the country were also permitted according to the interpretation of several legal experts.

In 1790 the Assembly ordered the translation of every legal documents into all the languages spoken in the territory. History and the high costs did not allow completing the task. In 1793 with escalation of the revolution all the languages except French were deemed feudal remnants to be wiped out. The revolutionaries considered the French language the token of equality and union of the nation. During the time of the linguistic terror (*la terreur linguistique*) the Jacobins created a regulation (***Décret du 2 thermidor, An II, sur la langue française***) that made the French language compulsory and exclusive in the public sphere threatening the violators with six-month prison. At schools French became the sole teaching language (***Décret du 27 brumaire, An III, sur les écoles primaires***) and French language centres were also created (***Décret du 8 pluviôse, An II, sur les établissements d’Instituteurs de la langue française***). The process temporarily stopped under Napoleon’s rule who returned most of the schools to ecclesiastical care that re-established Latin in education. However, the use of the French language had increased mainly because of inland migration as the result of wars and terror. In 1810 already in 30 of the 130 *départments* French was the only

⁴⁴ In the northern areas the Norman law. In southern parts Roman law had been preserved.

⁴⁵ The complete texts of the law consisting of 192 articles: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/villers-cotterets.asp>

language, in 1863 there were still 7,5 million persons about 20% of the 38 million inhabitants of the country, who did not speak the “language of Paris”. The government started an aggressive policy for assimilation with the aim of wiping out Breton.

The period of the second half of the 19th c. and the first half of the 20th is sometimes referred to the time of “linguicide”. There were about forty regulation that prescribed the exclusive use of the French language in education, press, administration and the writing of place-names. One of the most important of these was the 1882 ***loi Ferry*** that made primary education compulsory and free with French as the exclusive teaching language.⁴⁶ The hegemony of French at schools lasted till 1951 when the ***loi Deixonne*** allowed the teaching of Breton, Catalanian, Occitane and Basque language in secondary education.⁴⁷ Amendments to the law included other regional languages: Corsican⁴⁸, Tahiti⁴⁹ and Melanesian.⁵⁰ The 1975 ***loi Haby*** allowed the regional languages in education from elementary to higher education.⁵¹ However, the same year the parliament accepted ***loi Bas-Lauriol***,⁵² that prescribed French as the exclusive language of commerce and that is the forerunner of ***loi Toubon*** regulating the use of the French language.

3.3. *International agreements*

Though recent political declarations are much more tolerant towards the regional languages⁵³ there has been not manifestation of it in the form of assistance. In 1992 the European Council accepted the **European Charter of regional or minority languages** that was not signed by France. The same year at the meeting of both

⁴⁶ Loi n° 11696 du 8 mars 1882, *JORF du 29 mars 1882*.

⁴⁷ Loi n° 51-46 du 11 janvier 1951, relative à l’enseignement des langues et dialectes locaux, *JORF du 13 janvier 1951 page 483*.

⁴⁸ Décret 74-33 du 16 janvier 1974, *JORF du 18 janvier 1974 page 694*

⁴⁹ Décret 81-553 du 12 mai 1981, *JORF du 16 mai 1981 page 1489*

⁵⁰ Décret 92-1162 du 20 octobre 1992, *JORF n°247 du 23 octobre 1992 page 14767*

⁵¹ Loi n° 75-620 du 11 juillet 1975, *JORF - 12 Juillet 1975 - Pages 7180 à 7182*

⁵² Loi n° 75-1349 du 31 décembre 1975 relative à l’emploi de la langue française, *JORF du 4 janvier 1976 page 189*

⁵³ The politically sensitive term *patois* has been changed to *langue regional* to avoid *langue minoritaire* since France does not officially admit that there are minorities living in its territory.

houses (Congress) that was convened to amend the 1958 constitution to according it with the Maastricht contract, the sentence was added that the language of the Republic is French (§2) thus *de jure* confirming the position of the French language.⁵⁴

In 1999 France too, signed the *Charter* but has not yet ratified it claiming that it would be against the constitution. The leading political class, preserving its old ingrained reflexes,

has still been hostile towards minority languages referred to as regional varieties and regards the French language as the sole medium of unity, equality and integrity, claiming that the use of any foreign language would endanger those principles. There is little hope for the ratification of the charter. During his 2007 campaign in Besançon Nicolas Sarkozy declared that in case of his election to president he would not support the ratification of the *European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages*; he would not want to have a European judge with different historical experience about minorities decide whether a regional language should be equal with French as the language of the Republic.

It has to be mentioned that France has asked for derogation for Article 27. of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations and Article 30. of the International Agreement of the Rights of Minors that deal with the rights of using the mother tongue.

3.4. *The loi Toubon*

On the 1st of July 1994 the French jurisdiction accepted the language law named after *Jacques Toubon* the minister of cultural and franco-phone affairs of the Balladur government that has since been in force to replace the above-mentioned *loi Bas-Lauriol*.⁵⁵

The aim of the law is the protection of the French language especially against the spread of English e.g. in the sphere of science, media and commerce.

Originally the law would have obliged every civil servant and civil persons dealing with public affairs and also every person active

⁵⁴ Loi constitutionnelle n° 92-554 du 25 juin 1992 a apporté des modifications à la Constitution française de 1958

⁵⁵ Loi n°94-665 du 4 août 1994, *JORF n°180 du 5 août 1994 page 11392*

in broadcasting to the use of legally prescribed terminology. Sixty representatives turned to the *Conseil Constitutionnel* (Constitutional Council) that ruled that the prescription is against the rights to the freedom of opinion and speech ensured by Article 11. of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and annulled it.⁵⁶

The law in force regulates the use of the French language in economic advertisements, communiqués as well as in contracts. The §2 of the constitution declaring that the language of the Republic is French, assures the public to receive the public announcements in French, e.g. legal documents, papers concerning consumer protection etc., the work contract of employees must not contain foreign words if there are appropriate French expressions for it; if not an explanation in French must be provided. The documents distributed at conferences also have to be in French with eventual supplements in foreign language translation.

The law replaces the 1951 *loi Deixonne* preserving its major regulations unchanged. Accordingly the language of education, examinations and entrance examinations is French as well as that of reports and essays, with the exception where it is necessary for instruction in the regional language and culture (Article 11-1).

According to §2 consumer information cannot be but French. In 2000 the European Committee considered the regulation contradicting to the principle of the free movement of goods. After lengthy debate the French government issued an obligatory *circulaire* that assures that the consumer information in a foreign language is not illegal if an unambiguous illustration, symbol or pictogram is provided. The *Association pour l'Avenir de la Langue Française* was not satisfied and turned to the *Conseil d'État* to declare the *circulaire* unlawful. The Supreme Court cancelled it on the 30th of July 2003 with the verdict that it with the new law of interpretation it had overstepped its competence.⁵⁷ According to the law in force French is the only permitted language in consumer information.

⁵⁶ Décision n° 94-345 du 29 juillet 1994 du Conseil constitutionnel à propos de la loi relative à l'emploi de la langue française

⁵⁷ Conseil d'Etat, 30 juillet 2003, n° 245076, Association "Avenir de la langue française"

3.5. *The consequences of the language polity: the present situation of the Breton language*

Regional languages have no official status whatsoever in France. Though their cultural value has been accepted,⁵⁸ they cannot be used in the public sphere and with the closure of school classes and the replacement of bilingual teachers by monolingual ones, education in the minority language has become difficult too. Languages as Basque, Corsican, German are in better position since there are neighbouring countries, Spain, Italy, Germany to keep the languages alive. Breton is an entirely isolated group of languages spoken almost exclusively by the older generation, open to external influences that shoved the language to the brink of extinction.

Breton belongs to the Celtic branch of the Indo-European language family that was spoken in the northern- western part of the country. It is usual to refer to it as 'continental Celtic' that was brought over by insular Britons at the fall of the Roman Empire. There are four dialects distinguished: that of Léon, Treger, Kernev and Gwened. In the Middle Ages the whole population used it, their majority had no French at all, though the nobility used French, the language of the court. Since the revolution violent assimilation, "linguicide" has diminished the number of Breton speakers to 100 000. The attitude of the period is well represented by the letter of a prefect of Finistère written in 1831 to the minister of public institutions, M. de Montalivet that every means had to be used to make Breton extinct to the effect that one village would not be able to communicate with another and thus should be forced to learn French to destroy the Breton language completely.

As a result of the above it is no wonder that there is not a town in Brittany where Breton would be the dominant language in everyday use; it is still used in small inland villages only. There are no statistics about the exact number of speakers, according to estimates there could be 108 000 persons who use it and 140 000 more who can understand it.

The problem is that the members of the young generation can hardly speak Breton, and 40% of the inhabitants under the age of 25 leave their country. It is the members of poorer rural population who

⁵⁸ La Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Art. 75-1.

still use Breton, but because of lack of work opportunities they tend to leave too.

There were several attempts at the revival of the language in the last decades. The most important are the *Diwan*- schools founded in 1976 to teach Breton. According to the 2006 survey of the European Committee on language minorities there were 8000 pupils learning Breton in elementary schools at least one lesson per week and 1000 of the children were the pupils a *Diwan* – school; and there were 4000 secondary school pupils.⁵⁹ It means that only 2% of the young people learn their mother tongue; the situation is aggravated by the attitude of the government that has not agreed to open further bilingual classes in state schools, has not ensured the continuity of language learning from elementary school to higher educational institutions and reduced the number of positions for Breton language teachers.

The situation of the media is similarly dire. It is only the regional public television broadcasting programs in the Breton language, consisting merely of 4-5 minute daily news and a cultural program scheduled outside the major airtime on Sundays. The two regional radio stations broadcast 12-14 hour programs in Breton per week.

This is why UNESCO repeatedly classified Breton as an exceptionally endangered language.

In the world of utopias

It would have exceeded the volume of the present paper to examine the situation of all the language in Europe from the point of view of language regulation. The examples of the Baltic States and France, however, make clear that not only in Slovakia, but in other countries too there are strict language regulations discriminating the use of the minority mother tongue of groups of the inhabitants. There are counter examples too, e.g. that of Finland, where the Swedish language has been given equal status expressing the historic affinity of the two nations.

⁵⁹ Euromosaic – 2006: *Le breton en France*, 2006., http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/archive/languages/langmin/euromosaic/fr3_fr.html

Equal rights for every language in the future may be a utopia and ever since nation-states are formed there is also the right of the language of the majority nation to enjoy privileges. But harmony should be found between the language of the majority nation and that of the minorities in a given country. That would require abandoning the ingrained reflexes of politics as well as the real or alleged grievance that seems to be an even less realizable utopia than equality of languages.

Minority culture

Csaba Keresztes

Returning home: Hungarian students from Czechoslovakia studying in Hungary between 1949 and 1951

Abstract

With the permit of the Czechoslovakian government the Hungarian students of Czechoslovakian citizenship could study in Hungary from the Autumn of 1949. Till the summer of 1951 they were also allowed to travel back to their families in Czechoslovakia for their summer holidays, too. After that date, however, the Czechoslovakian authorities prevented them to return to the higher educational institutions in Hungary.

In the countries becoming under Soviet interest the political development was transformed by the end of the 1940s, i.e. after the Communist parties of the states in question had assumed power the relationship between the countries started to be consolidated. The governments acting under the slogan of ‘internationalism’ tried to normalize the relationship to one another. In the years following the end of the war the states were able to strengthen their inland systems and the role of earlier tensions and problems lessened in the relationship between governments. The consolidation was of one of the major interests of the Soviet Union too.

A similar process was in motion between Hungary and Czechoslovakia too since in 1949 the treaty on the so called population exchange had been closed that in addition the peace treaty and the border question was one of the most prominent problems between the two countries.¹

¹ Vadkerty, Katalin: A kitelepítéstől a rezlovakizációig. Kalligram, Pozsony, 2001. [From deportation to re-Slovakization]. Szabó, Károly: A magyar – csehszlovák lakosságcsere története dióhéjban. In: Új Minden Gyűjtemény 10. (1993). Pozsony [the history of the Hungarian – Czechoslovakian population exchange in a nutshell]

Earlier, since from the end of WW2 many young Hungarians went or rather fled to Hungary across the newly drawn border area that again were under Czechoslovakian rule because of the anti-Hungarian deprivation of rights.

In the spring of 1945 the first wave of refugees arrived to Hungary about the same time as the issue of the deprivation of rights raised.² The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Hungarian children of school age could not start to go to school in September 1945 the Hungarian schools being closed down in the areas annexed again to Czechoslovakia,³ serving as the reason of another large wave of refugees to cross the Hungarian border.⁴ There was yet another instance when masses fled to Hungary in order to avoid deportation to the Czech region.⁵

At the beginning the Hungarians in the Upland region organised several protests and tried to ensure schooling by organizing 'illegal' opportunities.⁶ Since it could not solve the problems the Hungarian youth was forced to flee over the border in the face dangers even at a very young age.⁷ The Czechoslovakian border authorities deported groups of Hungarians as many of them chose escaping the branding of being 'war-criminals'.⁸

² G. Jakó, Mariann – Hőgye, István: A magyar - szlovák lakosságcsere és előzményei 1945-1948. Miskolc, 1995. p.8. [precedents of the Hungarian – Slovakian population exchange 1945-1948].

³ László, Béla: A (cseh)szlovákiai oktatásügy szerkezete, valamint közigazgatási és jogi keretei 1945 után. In: A (cseh)szlovákiai magyar művelődés története 1918-1998. II. Budapest, 1998. p.97. [the system of the (Czech)Slovakian education and its administrative and legal framework]; Janics, Kálmán: A hontalanság éve. Hunnia, Budapest, 1989. p.153. [The years of homelessness]

⁴ Jakó 1995:11.

⁵ Vadkerty 2001:42. According to data there were 38 458 refugees before the exchange, many of them started going back after September 1949. The Czechoslovakian authorities tried to hinder the process but could not stop it because according to the Czechoslovakian laws of the times they had their right to Czechoslovakian citizenship. Many of them took the oath at the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Budapest and crossed the border as citizens. Vadkery 2001:213.

⁶ Tóth László: Köz - művelődés - történet. In: A (cseh)szlovákiai magyar művelődés története 1918-1998.p.235.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Vadkerty, Katalin: A belső telepítések és a lakosságcsere. Kalligram, Pozsony, 1999. pp. 86-87, and pp. 154-156. [Internal relocation and population exchange].

After the 'years of homelessness' 1948 brought some mitigation, e.g. teaching in Hungarian could restart in the schools. The autumn opening of schools and the gradual extension of the secondary school system were received with relief by the Hungarian population.⁹

The young people of school age were mainly received with understanding in Hungary and their schooling and lodging in Hostels were guaranteed as much as was possible.¹⁰

In 1949 the situation of young Hungarians of school age who had arrived by various ways and means started being consolidated. Their returning, visiting home was deemed the most urging problem to be solved and it depended on the decision of the Czechoslovakian authorities.

In June 1949 the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) opened the negotiations to solve the problem.¹¹ MFA informed the Ministry of Religion and Education (MRE) that it wished to facilitate the returning of students to Czechoslovakia who had arrived to Hungary *legally or illegally*.¹² MFA took it for granted that the Czechoslovakian authorities would issue a collective passport to these students. The collection of the necessary particulars was the task of MRE.¹³

MRE expressed satisfaction over the information being certain that it would solve the summer lodging especially of university students though not the question of their citizenship. It was arranged that every regional superintendent of schools, rectors of colleges and Universities and some connected ministries should inform the students concerned and the press and radio were also asked to make the notice public. June 17. was the deadline of reporting. The MFA was assured of the required particulars and at the same time asked

⁹ A (cseh)szlovákiai magyar művelődés története 1918-1998 pp. 106, 125, 243.

¹⁰ Magyar Országos Levéltár (MOL) XIX-I-1-v-2585-1949.

¹¹ In March there was a list of 45 names of students studying in Hungary who wished to return to their parents if Czechoslovakia. It turned out that it was not the Slovakian Office of Settlement responsible for the case but the Inland Procuratorial Office. MOL XIX-J-32-b-3081-1949 (Box 30.).

¹² MOL XIX-I-1-e-151-2. t.-269130-1949.

¹³ Ibid.

to start organising the students' return to Hungary for the beginning of term in September.¹⁴

In answer to the notices the students' applications continuously arrived. By the start of June 617 students were registered, by the end of the month there were 691 persons who wanted to return to Czechoslovakia for the summer recess. Of the 691 there were 99 (14,3%) primary school, 257 (37,2%) secondary and vocational school pupils, 57 (8,24%) college -, 177 (25,6%) university students, 22 (3,2%) apprentices, 72 (10,4%) teachers' and 7 (1%) kindergarten teachers' college students.¹⁵

MRE also found important to *assure the students of their return to Hungary* to complete their studies and that those would also be included who in the meantime had got their citizenship. In addition it was also an important point that the *diploma they get in Hungary should be accepted by the Czechoslovakian authorities* without any differences being made based on the place of issue of the diplomas. It was suggested that the Hungarian – Czechoslovakian cultural agreement should ensure that the more than 500 young persons could return to their country as whole persons. The assurance of these principles was the condition of the departure.¹⁶

An August return was also considered should the school examinations take longer, in smaller groups or individually for the autumn return as well. In the case of secondary school pupils the early travel was preferred. There was also the practical question of the permitted content of luggage and transport free of charges. It is noteworthy that two new border stations were opened at Bánréve and Sátoraljaújhely to help the enterprise.¹⁷

In the meantime MFA started organizing the matters in its competence. MFA directed the Hungarian consul in Bratislava to clear all the debated and ambiguous matters and to square matters

¹⁴ July 7 was the date set for those students who had arrived by collective passport in 1948 and returned also as a group. According to a later note there were about 800 students registered. MOL XIX-I-1-h-1064-7-2-1950.

¹⁵ MOL XIX-1-1-e-151-2 t.-269 467-1949.

¹⁶ Ibid. Originally the text contained a passage about the students being exempted of the eventual punishments later deleted. Deleted was another passage about 'psychic problems' caused by the eventual denial of the return to Hungary.

¹⁷ Ibid.

with the Czechoslovakian authorities as well as to ensure and arrange the students' travel home and back to Hungary.¹⁸ The National Land Registry (NLR), the successor of the defunct Commissariat of Resettlement, opened negotiations with the Czechoslovakian inland commissariat and especially with its head, Daniel Okáli and came to an agreement on the matter of the students' return to Czechoslovakia whether they had entered Hungary legally or illegally. There was a group of students with a collective passport i.e. legally arriving to Hungary and their return was planned to be the first.¹⁹ The collective passport of the students was validated, they were notified through press and post and they could go home via Komárom on the 7th of July.²⁰

The Czechoslovakian authorities issued collective passport for 339 persons with border crossing at marked out places: 41 persons were to use Filakovo – Somoskőujfalu, 105 Komarno – Komárom, 29 Rusovce – Rajka, 51 Sena – Hidasnémeti, 113 Sturovo – Szob as their border station. Persons with collective passports were allowed to use the appointed places only, had to produce their identity documents, last school report and forms of notification of departure; at that time no proof of citizenship was necessary. These persons were all under 21 years of age.²¹

Several problems arose during the negotiations between the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian authorities. Commissar Okáli stated that there were three categories established for the students. Those over 21 who did not have Czechoslovakian citizenship; these persons did not get entrance permit because they could not be considered Czechoslovakian citizens. The students who had finished their studies also were denied entrance. Only the group under 21 who had not yet finished their studies were accepted; however, Commissar Okáli refused to consider the permit of their return back to Hungary

¹⁸ MOL XIX-J-1-k-Csehszl.-29/b.-6018-1949.

¹⁹ MOL XIX-I-1-e-152-1 t.-269648-1949. they were the children of parents appointed for resettling.

²⁰ MOL XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t.-269 727-1949, and 269 728-1949. There were about 100 persons and they were allowed to cross the border till the end of July.

²¹ MOL XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t.-269 947-1949, and 270 427-1949. The permit of the Hungarian office for the supervision of aliens was also necessary. The crossings were supervised by the National Land Registry, XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t.-269 968-1949.

to continue their studies. He, too, left the question to be regulated by the cultural agreement that, however, was scheduled for the end of September.

As September was the time of the beginning of term too, MRE had to warn the students that they had to count with the possibility of the interruption of their studies.²²

In accordance with the above conditions the travels of the applicants were carried out till August. Then, after long debates the Czechoslovakian authorities consented to the entrance into Czechoslovakia for those too who were born in 1928 or earlier, i.e. those over 21 years of age, but the *oath of allegiance* was the condition of the actual authorization of crossing the border. MRE, NLR and the Office for Supervision of Aliens (OSA) continued to organize the transports obeying the above conditions. All the persons who wanted to cross the borders were notified that only those persons were allowed to cross the borders whose name was in the collective passports and only at the appointed border stations any day till the 31st of August. Identity documents, the last school report and forms of notification of departure were to be produced at the border as well as the document certifying citizenship. Those who did not have such a document were told to go to the Consulate of Czechoslovakia in Budapest where they could make their oath and receive the certification of it.²³

There were further 267 persons who were given collective passports under the same conditions: 80 persons crossed the border at Komarno – Komárom, 96 at Sturovo – Szob, 37 at Sena – Hidasnémeti, 47 at Filakovo – Somoskőújfalu and 7 at Rusovce – Rajka border stations.²⁴

The last group of 14 persons could cross the border between the end of August and 24th of September according to the above conditions.²⁵

²² MOL XIX-J-1-k-Csehszl.-29/b-7037-1949.

²³ MOL XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t.-270 426-1949.

²⁴ MOL XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t.-270 427-1949 The persons listed in the collective passport could cross the border not only as a group but individually too within the validity of the passport.

²⁵ MOL XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t.-270 623-1949. They were under 21 years of age. It is noteworthy, the Czechoslovakian border officials were not always thorough with the collective passports and did not mark who had crossed the border. Cf. XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t.-270 780-1949.

Soon after the operation was over, the next worry was how the students could return back to Hungary to carry on with their studies. The Hungarian Consulate of Bratislava negotiated about it with the Czechoslovakian authorities and dr. Károly Szabó managed to obtain the permission from Commissar Okáli.²⁶

As a result of Dr. Szabó's interventions there were 858 students who received their collective passports to start the 1949-50 school year in Hungary. With some exceptions everybody could use the same border station as before. MFA obtained the passports at the end of August but the final permission depended on Hungarian domestic decision.²⁷

However, the journey was not without obstacles. Though MRE had started to organize the arrival of the students to Hungary in the first days of September, especially the permission of the OSA. There occurred difficulties caused by parallel organizations, since MFA also got into action to obtain the permission. MRE then left it in the hands of MFA, but soon it turned out the latter was not active enough, thus MRE and the Consulate in Bratislava had to act effectively.²⁸

In the meantime the students urged the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava to act in favour of their travel to Hungary that in its turn had to seriously approach its Ministry and sternly intervene.²⁹ The Consul had to turn several times to MFA for the entry permit into Hungary. At the time the Czechoslovakian authorities were fairly quick and almost lenient about the return to Hungary, now it was the Hungarian side procrastinating so that the consul had to send dramatically worded letters to his superiors as the one dated on the 19th of September 'it is very difficult to give such an answer to the urging of the students and the almost mocking inquiry of the Czechoslovakian authorities that could satisfactorily save the face of the Hungarian authorities.'³⁰ Besides Kovac Karol, a student from

²⁶ MOL XIX-J-32-b-4236-1949 (Box 30.).

²⁷ MOL XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t.-270 751-1949.

²⁸ MOL XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t. 270 765-1949.

²⁹ MOL XIX-J-1-k-Csehszl.-29/b-9619-1949. The consul informed MFA that his office had been stormed by many of the students who wanted to turn back to Hungary for the beginning of the term.

³⁰ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Csehszl.-29/b-644-1949. The entry permit arrived after this letter.

Zsigárd tried to intervene at MFA by telegram 'in the name of the students.'³¹

Finally the joint appeal was successful and the Hungarian students could return from Czechoslovakia to Hungary. In order to make their entry free of problem lists of names were prepared again. The 858 registered persons could choose the border station according to their place of residence. 359 entered at Komárom, 106 at Somoskőújfalu, 225 at Szob, 97 at Hidasnémeti and 38 at Rajka.³² The return to Hungary of these students was accepted and assisted by the Czechoslovakian state and they could continue their studies under guaranteed circumstances.³³

Most of the participants of the summer enterprise were born at the end of the 1920s, in 1930 and at the beginning of the 1930s, thus their average age was about twenty years. Most of them left their birth country after 1945, but many of them fled in 1945-46 and also in 1947. There were also those who entered the territory of Hungary delineated by the Trianon and Paris treaties, had been living there since 1938. The lists that came down to us also noted the names of both parents, their residence, often marking the district the domicile belonged to. Their domicile in Hungary was also given and what school they went to in Hungary. Most of them were students of higher educational institutions, then came the secondary school pupils and finally those going to other types of schools. It is to be noted that as an answer to the question when and how did they leave Czechoslovakia, only the date of the last exit was filled in.³⁴

It is part of the success of 1948 that the students studying in Hungary could spend the Christmas holidays at home and return back to their studies without delay. Again it was with the help of collective passports that they could cross the border between the 18th of December and the 18th of January.³⁵

³¹ MOL XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t.-271 078-1949.

³² MOL XIX-J-1-j-Csehszl.-29/b-9327-1949. The list of names: MOL XIX-J-32-b-sz.n.-1949 (Box 30.).

³³ They even had possibility for bank transfer: MOL XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t.-271 571-1949 és 271 576-1949.

³⁴ MOL XIX-J-32-b-4236-1949 (Box 30.).

³⁵ MOL XIX-I-1-e-151-2 t.-272 175-1949, and XIX-J-1-k-Csehszl.-29/b-1949.

At the beginning of 1950 the issue of the students of Czechoslovakian right of citizenship was raised again. MVE ruled that the various schools and institutions should make a list of their pupils belonging to the category and further the data to the ministry.³⁶

Besides the various regional superintendents of schools the archiepiscopal seminary, the Episcopal seminary in Vác reported the number of students of Czechoslovakian citizenship.³⁷ The regulation had the *sole purpose to serve the issuing of the identity card* for the Hungarian students from Czechoslovakia that was required at the border crossing. The 1200-C-1/1950. IV. and P 1064-7-2/1950 VI/3. regulations issued by MRE mentioned the collective passports as the usual means of their travel and the new ID cards were meant to make the border control at their returning back to Hungary easier for the students of both secondary and higher education.³⁸

The Department of Higher education and science of MRE knew about 850 students with Czechoslovakian citizenship and presumed the existence of about 100 more who had not yet approached the authorities for 'various reasons e.g. for fear to be deported or to have missed the deadline, etc.'³⁹

It was also believed that not every student took the opportunity to visit home and the authorities also presumed that in cases others had usurped the place of those who had not made use of the possibility and remained in Hungary. That was why the Ministry of Home Affairs and especially the National Security decided to provide every Czechoslovakian student studying in Hungary with an identity card with photo. The filling in, authentication and distribution were the responsibility of the head of the institutions.⁴⁰

³⁶ MOL XIX-I-1-g-1200-C-1950.

³⁷ MOL XIX-I-1-g-1060-7-1950. The church institution provided with the names of the students too.

³⁸ MOL XIX-I-1-g-1200-C-1-1950.

³⁹ MOL XIX-I-1-h-1064-7-2-1950. 90% of the arrived illegally.

⁴⁰ MOL XIX-I-1-h-1064-7-2-1950. There are the lists of names provided by the heads of institutions. According to the note National Security demanded the issuing of the ID cards.

In April the traffic for the Easter holyday passed off following the by then familiar scenario with the new ID cards as a novel momentum, a necessary addition to the crossing of the border.⁴¹

During May MRE completed the list of the students. At the checking of data between the ministries there were 5-600 persons known as Hungarians of 'Czech citizenship' learning in Hungary, but they were not able to give an exact number. They believed the 'Czech' consulate *did not mind the situation* because the consulate was of the opinion that after their final return to Czechoslovakia the students would be needed as experts there.⁴²

MRE had had a list of most of the students compiled earlier who already had their ID cards but there was necessary to make another list of those who applied for the first time.⁴³ MFA made the usual steps towards the Czechoslovakian authorities who accepted the citizenship of the applicants 'with some exceptions' and issued a collective passport for them.⁴⁴ By June there was a list of 913 names but even later there arrived applications from students who wished to return to Czechoslovakia; they had illegally arrived to Hungary and had not yet registered.⁴⁵

The journey back passed off as in the previous year. In the middle of summer the persons could cross the borders at the various check-points, however, there appeared a new feature again: they had to cross the border as a group and could not do so individually any more. Several groups of various size are known about: a group of 460 with ID cards, another of 159 whose papers were about to be issued, and third one of 44 as well as a one of 18.⁴⁶ Two more groups, one of 154

⁴¹ MOL XIX-I-1-g-1060-7-15-1950. The homing was urged because MVE knew that was the time parents provided their children with money and clothing. XIX-I-1-h-1064-7-3-1950.

⁴² MOL XIX-J-1-k-Csehszl.-29/b-1950. The student illegally arriving from Romania applied for collective passport but since there were Hungarian higher educational institutions in Romania, they not successful.

⁴³ MOL XIX-I-1-g-1060-7-19-1950. the lists were sent over to the Czechoslovakian Embassy, there are no copies to be found among the MRE papers.

⁴⁴ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Csehszl.-29/b-04384-1950, and XIX-I-1-h-1064-7-2-1950.

⁴⁵ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Csehszl.-29/b-022471-1950.

⁴⁶ MOL XIX-I-1-g-1060-7-26-1950, valamint 1060-7-30-1950.

and another of 9 persons were to cross the border between the 8th and 30th of September.⁴⁷

Those who wanted to return to Czechoslovakia could again do so without difficulty.

There was a change, however, if they wanted to return to Hungary. In the summer and autumn of 1950 the Czechoslovakian authorities did not express their intentions and did nothing in help of the journey, i.e. no passports were issued, thus making the continuation of studying in Hungary impossible in spite of the consultations between the two countries. On these consultations the Hungarian side was passive, reassuring the Czechoslovakians that the Hungarian government was ready to 'completely support' the decisions they would make. At the beginning of September the Czechoslovakians merely declared that their nationality policy had 'Leninist- Stalinist basis'.⁴⁸

At the end of September the students' case became urgent. MRE felt again compelled to deal with the matter especially because many of the students *did not speak the Czechoslovakian state language*, some of them would have liked to *apply for Hungarian citizenship* and stay in Hungary, and there were those too who wanted to absolve their last year at their college or university to get their diploma.⁴⁹

After the approach to MFA it turned out the Hungarian consulate in Bratislava had been stormed by young Hungarians who wanted to return to Hungary but the consulate had not informed MFA about it. The Hungarian authorities responsible for foreign affairs had become increasingly passive and did not wish to deal with the problem effectively; the stand-point being that the travel to Hungary could only be initiated by the students themselves and in case it happened, the consulate would inform its ministry, MFA could not make steps only after receiving the information. Moreover it was not considered an acceptable reason that several of the students wanted to apply for Hungarian citizenship and stay in Hungary.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ MOL XIX-I-1-g-1060-7-32-1950. Seven more students received their permits at the end of October MOL XIX-I-1-g-1060-7-38-1950.

⁴⁸ MOL XIX-J-1-k-Csehszl.-17/f-016667-1950.

⁴⁹ MOL XIX-I-1-g-1060-7-35-1950. The number of students was 674 according to MRE.

⁵⁰ MOL XIX-J-1-k-Csehszl.-17/d-0680/28/93-1-1950.

However, the Czechoslovakian authorities were the ones to put obstacles in the students' way. Already during summer those returned to their homes were informed through the press and also verbally that in case of a plan to return to Hungary they had to fill in an application in duplicate and submit a copy each to the competent educational office and the office of the representative of home affairs.⁵¹

Afterward the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia took over the matter as the highest level of Prague authority and the Hungarian organs were not informed about the plans. The consulate started to realize that the reason of the long silence, or as they put it, the 'negligent treatment of the matter' was that the Czechoslovakian policy would have preferred those students to continue their studies at schools in Slovakia and finally settle down there. Notwithstanding, the consulate made another attempt to force a decision and sent the list of the students who approached the consulate to MRE.⁵²

The return became more and more indefinite. The letter signed 'Hungarian Students of Upland' truly characterized the situation. It asked for the list of names and addresses of Hungarian students studying in Hungary in order to get exact information about who was still within their studies and where was their residence. The letter mentioned that the lengthy administration had given the impression that the authorities wanted to keep them put. The Czechoslovakian authorities and state organisations even believed the quick acquisition of the state language viable, while the Hungarian applicants wanted to get their education in their mother tongue.⁵³

The notice typed on the above document in MRE is also instructive: 'Of the Hungarian students of Czechoslovakian citizenship about 670 returned home during summer. According to our knowledge none of them have come back yet, thus we cannot answer the request. Even if we could we would not either. Judging by what has happened up till now, the Czechoslovakian government did not want to let the students back to continue their studies in Hungary. *Ad Acta!*'⁵⁴

⁵¹ MOL XIX-J-1-k-Csehszl.-17/f-027485-1950.

⁵² Ibid. They still hoped for the return of those about to finish their studies.

⁵³ MOL XIX-J-1-g-1060-7-39-1950, ill. XIX-I-1-g-1063-16-1951.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

The Czechoslovakian authorities had issued no passports for the students and because of their negative attitude the return to study became *completely impossible* so that even the belongings of the students and most of all their clothing remained in Hungary. The venture to get back the belongings could be started only at the beginning of winter. It was only at the end of 1950 – beginning of 1951 that the Czechoslovakians applied for permit for three appointed persons to cross the border in order to collect the effects of their colleagues and transport it back by trucks.⁵⁵

The final and farewell venture was also protracted and the transfer was still going on in April. At the time the Czechoslovakian Youth Organisation took over the directions and asked the appointment of Komárom as the border station for the transport to cross. MFA agreed with the closing of the affair that way and with the help of the Hungarian Working Youth Organisation the transport was finally completed.⁵⁶

During and after WW1 parts the Upland were annexed to Hungary; after 1945 the area again became part of Czechoslovakia, the education of young Hungarian people living in this region took a sharp turn in 1950. In the previous years they could study under more or less favourable conditions in Hungary. In 1949 they were able to spend the holidays with their families being now in Czechoslovakia by legal authorisation. With the consent of the Czechoslovakian government they could return to Hungary to resume their studies. After the winter holiday and Easter (in 1950) they could repeatedly return to their studies. However, after the summer recess the Czechoslovakian government denied this possibility to them. The decision was quick and without warning or precedents and greatly surprised even the fairly experienced Hungarian authorities too. The Czechoslovakian government wanted to close the issue of the Hungarian students for once and for all and wanted them to be educated in the institutions of the Czechoslovakian state.

⁵⁵ MOL XIX-J-1-k-Csehszl.-17/d-0715/Cse/27-3/Pol-1951. It was about the effects of 500 persons.

⁵⁶ MOL XIX-J-1-k-Csehszl.-17/d-1064/1/14-1-1951.

András Zoltán

The language situation in Ukraine

Abstract

It was only in 2001 that Ukraine gained its sovereignty and it heavily determined the linguistic situation of the new state the territory of which used to belong to various states. The development of the Ukrainian language was further endangered when after World War II almost the entire linguistic region became Soviet Ukraine since the Soviet language policy propagated the Russian language as the leading one all over the Union, pushing regional languages into the background. The inland migration within the Union also furthered the spreading of Russian at the expense of Ukrainian. 17% of the inhabitants of independent Ukraine claim to be Russian nationals; in 2001 30% of them regarded Russian as their mother tongue which means that about 15% of Ukrainian nationals have Russian as their mother tongue. In addition an important percentage of the members of minority groups also tend towards choosing Russian as a means toward assimilation.

It is customary among Hungarians to complain about the isolation of the Hungarian language that indeed has its disadvantages: it is a fact that of the inhabitants of the member states of the EU smaller proportions of Hungarians appear to be able to speak foreign languages. Besides the long lasting failure of educational policy the fact has to be accepted that Hungarians are living in greatly monolingual communities and are required to make greater efforts in learning any of the structurally different Indo European languages than the speaker of one IE language acquire another one. It can also be disadvantageous if a language area is surrounded by speakers of languages that are in more or less close relationship with it, and especially if one of these related languages used to function in the community as the administrative and/or literary language too for centuries.

The Ukrainian language – as the other Slavic languages too – is a variety that developed from of the once common Old Slavic language. The differentiation of Old Slavic was complete about the end of the 12th c as witnessed by the last shared Slavic sound change, the loss or vocalisation of ‘*jerek*’ (reduced /i/ and /u/ marked with <ь> and <ѣ> respectively in the early MSS). The development of independent Slavic languages was fairly late and were developing in neighbouring areas this is why they show considerable similarity. Ukrainian is in closest relationship with the two other Eastern Slavic languages, i.e. Russian and Belorussian. The first eastern Slavic state *Rus*’ (*Kiev* being its capital) with its various provinces (*Csernigov*, *Galicja*, *Volhínia*) was established within the proto-Ukrainian dialect territory. Christianity was officially adopted in 988 according to the Byzantine, eastern rite and soon, in the 11th c., the first written documents started appearing. However, it was Old Slavonic (Old Church Slavic, Old Bulgarian) that became the language of liturgy and literature for the Slavic inhabitants of the eastern part of Rus’, thanks to biligual missionaries coming from Byzantium. The variety was developed out of southern Slavic (Old Bulgarian – Old Macedonian) dialects by the Macedonian brothers Constantin (Cyrill) and Metod in 863 that did not readily adapt to the eastern Slavic (Russian, later Great Russian and Ukrainian Church Slavic respectively) phonemic and structural characteristics.

In the territory of Rus’ there developed functional bilingualism: eastern Slavonic dialects were used in everyday communication and legislation and Church Slavonic for the purposes of higher culture which at the time meant ecclesiastical use. It was a dialect that though was related and thus more or less comprehensible still its mastering required long and intensive study.

Church Slavonic is still the language of liturgy of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine. The learning of reading and writing was based on texts of the Bible and especially on the Psalms written in Church Slavonic; however, the Cyrillic script became used to write vernacular texts (private letters, legal documents, deeds, testaments, trading contracts) from the 11-12th cc.

From the Rus’ period there came down a small number of non-literary type of texts too, representing the vernacular besides the great amount of documents written in Church Slavonic. Their importance

increased when after the Mongol invasion (mid 13th c) the eastern and southern parts of the former Rus’ came under the rule of the Polish Kingdom (Galicia) and the Lithuanian Grand Duchy; after the 1386 Polish-Lithuanian personal union practically the whole Ukrainian language area became part of the Polish-Lithuanian Union.

In the 15th c. when the territory of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy reached its largest extension 90% of its population consisted of Orthodox eastern Slaves (the ancestors of present day Ukrainians and Belorussians) thus when the pagan Lithuanians as the last in Europe - converted to Christianity following the Roman rite in 1386 it was impossible to introduce Latin as the official language of the Church – as was the case in Poland; thus in the vast country mainly populated eastern Slavic people Eastern Slavonic became the language of administration that was a compromise between Ukrainian and Belorussian preferring the common elements shared by the eastern dialects of Lithuania and neglecting the special Belorussian and Ukrainian features. This Old Ukrainian – Old Belorussian language (West Russian for short), based on the eastern Slavonic vernaculars, became the medium of the documents (charters, rights, legal decisions etc.) issued by the chancery of the Grand Duchy, and it was imitated by the scribes of the local administrations, too. The chancery language presented the basis for the common Old Ukrainian – Old Belorussian secular literature developed by the 16th c. the medium for literary and historical works, religious writings as well as partial Bible translations thus ending the vernacular East Slavonic and Church Slavonic bilingualism in the Ukrainian and Belorussian region.

The language of officialdom and secular literature was greatly influenced by the Polish language due to the strengthening of the Polish – Lithuanian union. As a result of the 1569 Lublin Union the area of Lithuania with its Ukrainian population were taken under direct Polish rule. Following the 17th c. Cossack uprising the Ukrainian language area east of the River Dnepr was annexed to Russia. The centralising policy of the Russian state and Church the West Russian language was pushed out as the medium on ecclesiastical writing, thus the former Ukrainian - Belorussian literary language – that in spite of its mixed character was close to the speech of the cultivated elements of Ukrainian society – was neglected too; In Russia it was

the Russian language that took over, in Poland the Polish and the Ukrainian population was left without an own literary language that developed of its own speech.

The Ukrainian vernacular appeared only as a characterizing feature in the interludes of school dramas, mainly for comic effects. This comic tradition led Ivan Kotljarevs'ky, the father of the modern Ukrainian literary language, to write his *Aeneis* travesty distributed in hand written copies since 1794 (first printed edition St Petersburg 1842); his other linguistically important work is the play *Natalka Poltavka* (1838), still performed in Ukrainian theatres. Kotljarevs'ky has proved to be a creator of traditions: the new Ukrainian literary language that he based on the south eastern dialect of Poltava reached its classic form in the poetry of Taras Ševčenko (1814–1861) who raised Ukrainian lyric poetry to international heights. Other authors using the Poltava dialect in their works are Ivan Nečuj-Levyč'ky (1838–1918), Marko Vovčok (the literary pen name of Marija Vilins'ka, 1834–1907) and Panas Myrny (1849–1920). After the 1795 division of Poland Galicia became part of the Austrian Monarchy; its most important authors: Ivan Franko (1856–1916), Lesja Ukrajinka (1871–1913), Mychajlo Kocjubyns'ky (1864–1913), shared their role in the cultivation of the Ukrainian literary language. The cultural life in Galicia was especially important at the times when publishing in the Ukrainian language was prohibited in Russia till 1905.

Thus it was important for the language development that the speech area politically belonged to several states before World War II. and its situation was comparable to that of the majority languages. The first printed grammar of modern Ukrainian (Little Russian, Ruthene) was published in Russian by Oleksi Pavlovs'ky (St Petersburg 1818). During the 19th c. no other publication of Ukrainian grammars was allowed in the Russian Empire. In eastern Galicia and Hungary, belonging to the Habsburg Monarchy, there appeared *Grammatica Slavo-Ruthena, seu Vetero-Slavicae, et actu in montibus Carpathicis Parvo-Russicae, seu dialecti vigentis linguae* by Mihály Lutsckay (Buda 1830) and *Grammatik der Ruthenischen oder Klein-Russischen Sprache in Galizien* by Josip Levyč'ky (Przemyśl 1834). Afterwards there were continuous publications of Ukrainian grammars since the language was part of school education. These grammars propagated the local, west Ukrainian usage.

After the 1905 Russian revolution the prohibition of the use of the Ukrainian language was lifted in east Ukraine belonging to Russia, and several grammars were published as schoolbooks, though only private pupils could use them as the Ukrainian language was not taught in public schools in the Russian Empire. In the period between the two World Wars west Ukraine belonged to Poland and Transcarpathia to Czechoslovakia. In Poland the initially free language use became gradually restricted; in the Transcarpathian region the majority of the local intelligentsia preferred the Russian literary language to Ukrainian.

In the 1920s the Soviet policy permitted the use of the Ukrainian language as the medium of strictly controlled culture with 'social' content in Eastern Ukraine, in order to gain the sympathy of the local and international intelligentsia; the use of it as the language of administration was advertised but never realised. During the 1920s a standardized Ukrainian orthography was established after lengthy debates and the result was published in Kharkov in 1928. Since west Ukrainian experts also participated in the process, the spelling standardisation could be introduced in Polish Ukraine too.

The 'Ukrainian program' stopped around 1928 due to a change of direction of the central policy in Moscow and the Ukrainian intelligentsia was pushed into the background, the possibility of the publication of their work limited. During the time of terror in the 1930s the people of patriotic feelings were systematically wiped out. The peasantry, the keepers of the language were decimated by deportation and deliberately induced famine. The Soviet industrialization created huge industrial cities that attracted masses of people from all the Soviet Union and the common language of the diverse people became Russian as preferred by the central government. Due to terror and mass migration the position of the Ukrainian language weakened already before WW II. In 1939 the Molotov – Ribbentrop pact annexed West Ukraine to the Soviet Union as well as Transcarpathia in 1944 and the restrictions were introduced in these areas too. However, west Ukraine, the former Galicia, kept its role as the mainstay of the Ukrainian literary language and culture in the vernacular all through the existence of the Soviet system characterized by Russification in the name of a the unified Soviet people.

Not only the people were Russified but the language too. Because of the relative short history of the Ukrainian literary language there existed a great variety of pronunciation, grammar, lexicon and phraseology and those items were supported as representing the standard that corresponded with the Russian usage. As part of the 1933 Soviet-Ukrainian orthographic reform, the exclusion of < r > (g) from the Ukrainian alphabet was of symbolic value; the practice was not followed either by Polish-Ukrainians or by emigrants.

After 1917 during the consecutive national and Bolshevik governments, there were school grammars published, later textbooks for the higher education that helped standardize the various Ukrainian literary varieties existing in the SU, especially the textbooks edited by Leonid Bulachov's'ky for colleges in 1931 and for universities in 1951. The largest comprehensive work is the five volume manual of the contemporary Ukrainian language edited by Ivan Bilodid (1969–1973); the separate volumes discuss Ukrainian phonology, morphology, syntax, lexicon and phraseology, and style. The standardization of the lexicon started with the help of bilingual dictionaries of which the two-volume *Ruthenisch-deutsches Wörterbuch* by Jevhen Želechiv's'ky and Sofron Nedil's'ky (Lemberg, 1885–1886) is worth mentioning. In Hungary there was the Ruthenian – Hungarian dictionary by László Csopci (Budapest, 1883) and in Russia the four-volume Ukrainian – Russian dictionary edited by Borys Hrinčenko (Kiev, 1907 – 1909). The largest 11 volume monolingual etymological dictionary was published in Kiev between 1970 and 1980.

Apart from the short lived Ukrainian statehood during the Russian revolutions and civil wars following WW I., notwithstanding important for the strengthening of Ukrainian national identity, it was only in 1991 that Ukraine became a sovereign state. The development towards an independent nation was a long and painful process. Till 1944 Ukraine was part of various states, mainly hostilely disposed against each other; since 1944 till the declaration of independence though it formed one state but it was only with nominal independence with quasi-statehood within the Soviet Union (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). These circumstances define the position of the Ukrainian language and the state of its standardization.

According to the results of the first independent census in 2001 Ukraine had 48,5 million inhabitants of which 37,5 million (77,8%)

were Ukrainians, 8,3 million (17,3%) Russians. The other minorities did not represent more than 1% each: Belorussian 275,8 thousand (0,6%), Moldavian 258,6 (0,5%), Crimean Tatar 248,2 thousand (0,5%), Bulgarian 204,6 (0,4%), Hungarian 156,6 (0,3%), Romanian 151 thousand (0,3%), Polish 144,1 thousand (0,3%), Jewish 103,6 thousand (0,2%), Armenian 99,9 thousand (0,2%). Other minorities: Greek, Tatar, Roma, Azeri, Georgian, German, Gagauz were represented below 100 thousand members. However, in smaller regions the minorities have higher representation than in the national total: e.g. in Autonomous Republic of Crimea there is a Russian majority of 53,%, Ukrainians 24,3% and Crimean Tatars are the third largest group at 10%; in Bukovine (Czernivci region) the inhabitants claiming to be Romanians and Moldavians represent 20%; at Transcarpathia the proportion of Hungarians is 12,1%.

Nationality does not exactly reflect the linguistic situation, e.g. 15% (5,6 million persons) of those claimed to be Ukrainian nationals stated to have Russian as their mother tongue; and there was 4% (0,33 million) Russian nationals who claimed to be Ukrainian speakers. Members of small minorities also increase the proportion of Russian speakers within the total: e.g. a mere 20% of the Belorussians claimed to be Belorussian speakers, for 65,5% of them Russian is the mother tongue as is for 88,5% of Greeks and Jews too. It is about 30% of the inhabitants of Ukraine whose mother tongue is Russian. As a result of the Russification during the years between 1930 and 1980, Russian was the dominant official language and in many eastern and southern cities of Ukraine Russian is still the everyday language.

As to language competence, according to a 2007 survey Russian has been in a more favourable position because 95,8% of Russian and 74,5% of the Ukrainian nationals can easily express themselves in Russian both in speech and writing, while only 82,1 of the Ukrainians and 30,1 of the Russians are fluent in the Ukrainian language. There were only 1% of Ukrainians who claimed to know no Russian while 6% of Russians do not speak Ukrainian at all. 73,2% of the Russians use solely Russian at home and 15,5% prefer to do so; Of the Ukrainians 36,7% use solely and 10,7% mainly Ukrainian at home. 22,6% of the Ukrainians use at home a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian, a variety differing from both literary languages and is scorned by standard speakers of both languages as substandard, *suržyk*.

All in all it means that every 7th Ukrainian uses exclusively or mainly Russian at home.

In modern times the strengthening of the position of the national language became the symbol of the Ukrainian struggle for independence. The first language law of 1989 –still in Soviet times - declared Ukrainian as the state language but it allowed the parallel use of the mother tongue for national and ethnic minorities living in closer communities. The most important features have been included into the Constitution of the independent Ukraine accepted in 1996 (Article 10) that declares that the state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language.

With the help of the state the sphere of the use of the Ukrainian language has considerably been widened especially in kindergarten and primary school education and in the function of state language in official and administrative spheres. The Soviet language policy has deformed the Ukrainian language itself thus it became necessary to revitalize it facilitated by the new atmosphere in favour of national developments. Thus the language maintenance gained importance. Following independence language maintenance has rocketed full speed. Already in 1990 there was an attempt at reconstructing orthography meddled with in 1933, e.g. <ѣ> has been reintroduced and reinforced by the 1993 orthographic regulations. The norms of the Ukrainian language have to strengthen against those of Russian and get reinforced especially in the consciousness of bilingual speakers.

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Minority politics and minorities rights

Bernadette Kiss

Linguistic rights and census of population and housing in Hungary

Abstracts

In 2011 the Hungarian authorities will organise the next census on population and housing. This survey will give information about the ethnicity and the language of the population. Because the classification and the large number of ethnic groups creates governmental liability, it is indispensable to compile an exhaustive questionnaire. The author compares the questionnaires to the international commitments how the governmental authorities would comply the undertakings on the basis of gathered data on language usage and minority share.

In Hungary the CXXXIXth Act of 2009 orders the organisation of the next census of population and housing. According to the Act, during this process statisticians collect all information based on the conditions existing on the 1st, October in 2011 at midnight. They will list all Hungarian citizens living in Hungary or abroad in the case where they have official residence in Hungary. They would like to measure the number of foreigners who spend more than 3 months in Hungary, the number of the EU-citizens, the stateless persons and the citizens of 3rd countries, too. Furthermore, statisticians have to list the housing facilities.

During data collection we have to anonymise all informations according to many Hungarian and EU acts. Editors of the questionnaires have to pay attention at the regulations of these acts: the Regulation of the Parliament and the Council 763/2008/EC (9th July 2008.), the XLVIth Hungarian Act (1993) on the Statistic, the Act on the Protection of personal data and the clarity of public data, the Act on the Law of Ethnic and National Minorities.

On the web page of the Central Office of the Statistic (KSH) we can download the questionnaires at large, but the filling process of the paper that contains the data of individuals needs great atten-

tion. Interviewers will ask everyone about the sex, date of birth, residence, marital status, fertility, studies and education, revenues, travelling practice, health and disability, citizenship, ethnicity, religion, language etc.

Keeping census is not an unusual process in Hungary, because already in 1777, at the early period of the absolutism (a Hungarian historical era in the 18th century), the authorities collected information about Hungarian subjects. The early questionnaires asked about the mother tongue, the religion, and the citizenship and in 1941 the questionnaire enlarged with the topic of ethnicity. At the time people could choose between ten ethnic groups (Hungarian, German, Slovakian, Romanian, Ruthenian, Croatian, Serbian, Bunjevac, Jewish, Gipsy) but they could declare themselves as the member of an „another” group. This registration was influenced by the political ideas of the Nazism, because the questionnaire contained a separated column where the Jewish had to confess their origin, but theoretically everybody could express their affiliation „without violent interference.” Then – except the census of 1970 – all questionnaires contained questions concerning the ethnicity of Hungarian citizens.

However, nowadays there are some topics that require voluntary response and free self-declaration of a person. For example in Hungary the Act on the protection of personal data declares the necessity of voluntary response in connection with health, disability, religion, mother tongue, and ethnicity. Topics above are „sensitive data”, but they are very important because by these categories the Hungarian government could support the better realisation of linguistic rights of minorities in Hungary.

In 2008 the United Nations (UN) declared the Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses and according to these Recommendations data on ethnicity are indispensable when we have to give a fair picture on the diversity of the population, the social status of certain minority groups – these information could be useful when governments would like to take measures against discrimination. In this respect during the next Hungarian census we should ask people in detail about their languages. According to the Recommendations of UN, we should register not only the mother tongues and the foreign languages spoken by the citizens, but the fair register should contain the term of „main language” (the language

which the person commands best) and „language most currently spoken at home and/or work.” By these new details people could express whether they prefer a minority language in special situations (e.g. at home, with the members of family, etc.) or no.

Present questionnaire contains pre-printed columns for answer but when we would like to express the ethnicity and language, we can choose the possibility of multiple (two-part) response. Despite this there is a strange solution on the blank because people could choose two answer for their mother tongue. Explanatory notes of the questionnaire define „mother tongue” as the first language spoken in early childhood, the language of the communication at home and this is the language that respondents mark by free and open declaration. In Hungary we can choose 18 languages from the list, but, of course, in order to guarantee the free self-declaration of language, respondents should be allowed to indicate „none, other” or „not declared” when asked for their language.

It is interesting to review the answers printed on the questionnaire. For example, authors indicated that the community and language of Roma people in Hungary is not homogenous, because the questionnaire mentions the Lovari, Beas and Carpathian Roma languages but respondents could not be allowed to indicate their less known languages – they should be allowed to indicate solely the Roma language. Nevertheless, the distinction is not correct, because the Act on the Law of Ethnic and National Minorities does not utilize the definition of „Carpathian Roma”, only the Romani and Beas. Apart from this, respondents can choose their mother tongue from this list: Hungarian, Arab, Bulgarian, Greek, Croatian, Chinese, Polish, German, Russian, Armenian, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian and Vietnamese.

Unfortunately, the same 18 possibilities are available to respondents when they would like to express their ethnicity. Although respondents can indicate more (two) minority groups, the mentioned list of ethnicity does not correspond to the Act on the Law of Ethnic and National Minorities, because this act does not include the Chinese, Arab, Russian and Vietnamese minority groups. Both the Act and the Hungarian Constitution recognise only 13 minority groups as national or ethnic minority, therefore Chinese, Russian, etc. communities are not allowed to identify themselves as a national minority

in Hungary. To achieve this status, at least 1000 members of these groups should ask for the recognition as a legal minority by a popular initiative.

There is no doubt, that in the past not only the aforementioned groups constituted a minority community (for example, the Slavic formed an own group), but the Act requires additional conditions. Outside the status of numerical minority the Act provides for the community to at least a hundred years to live in the Hungarian Republic, and the minorities have to express their separation from the majority by their language, culture or traditions. Therefore it is concluded that Arab, Chinese, Russian or Vietnamese communities could not fulfilled the conditions of the Hungarian legal system.

Perhaps we could argue about the existence of homogenous Chinese or Arab nation. By the way, „Arab” people in Hungary came from 16 „Arabian” state, this means that it is difficult to identify the Hungarian „Arab” community formed by 2200 „Arab” people. Most of them are Turkish, they formed their own religious organisations, and they have good relations with Turkey. But it should not be forgotten that in Hungary there are many Turkish citizens, who declared themselves Kurds, and Hungary is home to by and large 1200 Iranian people.

The Office of Immigration and Nationality registered 11.000 Chinese citizens in Hungary, but only 6800 of them are registered as employees, only 100 of them received the Hungarian citizenship. (The reason is that Chinese law does not allow the dual citizenship.) Between Chinese living in Hungary we can find various internal groups: groups of immigrants from the same province or clan of China who created their active social life, they edit Chinese newspaper for themselves, organised sport clubs, established a Chinese Cultural Office (Confucius Office), and broadcast a Chinese program on the Civil Radio. But Chinese people in Hungary divided in two groups: most of them is „hualiao”, a Chinese citizen living abroad and they have good political and cultural relations with China. Furthermore there is another small group of Chinese in Hungary called „huaren”: people who acquired the Hungarian (or other) citizenship, but because of their physical characteristics are used to identify „visible minorities”.

The questionnaire in 2011 is not a step forward from the previous one, because in 2001 there was many question about ethnicity and language. These columns of the present questionnaire are the same as the questionnaire in 1980 and 1990, but in 2001 four questions were formulated to affiliation with ethnic groups. In 2001 they asked the ethnicity of the respondents, they could identify their minority traditions, their mother tongue and their language most spoken at home. Of course, answer was not a must. This means that present questionnaire does not deal with the details of ethnicity and self-declaration because its technology and methodology is significantly simplified.

However simplification can be dangerous because sometimes does not provide real data. During the last two census statisticians realised that there were a few ethnic groups in Hungary who did not dare to define themselves and they choosed the „Hungarian” denomination. This phenomenon is rooted in historical and personal precedents (war, forced evacuation of certain ethnic groups) and that is why respondents indicated „Hungarian”. Moreover the use of minority language at home is relegated, too. We can study this attitude by the data of census in 2001.

Name of the ethnic group	Number of respondents whose mother tongue is a minority language or dialect	Number of respondents declared themselves as a member of ethnic group	Number of respondents linked to the traditions of certain ethnic groups
Roma	48 658	190 046	129 259
Greek	1 921	2 509	6 140
German	33 792	62 233	88 416
Slovakian	11 816	17 692	26 631

Source: János, Vékás: Statistical data for comparison the census between 1890 and 2001. In: Space and Terrain Ed: Nóra, Kovács-László, Szarka. Budapest, MTA 2006. 277-292.pp.

Another interesting phenomenon occurs when respondents are allowed to indicate two ethnicities. For example somebody identifies himself Hungarian at first, and secondly, Serbian. In itself is a

legitimate declaration, because the 7.§ article of the Act on the Law of Ethnic and National Minorities allows the expression of multiple ties.

Data on ethnicity are sensitive and associated with personal rights and governmental obligations. One of the most important minority rights are linguistic rights of ethnic groups that are linked to cultural and educational rights. In Hungary the 68.§ article of the Constitution requires the state to ensure the use of mother tongue for the state-minority groups in the education and they could use their first-name and surname in minority language. In practice, this means that everybody could use its name in mother tongue in official documents, too. In the case of non-Latin alphabet (Bulgarian, Greek), authorities are obliged to transcribe phonetically the names and when citizen requires, they have to ensure the preparation of bilingual documents.

Under the 51.§ article of the Act minority citizens shall enjoy the right to use their mother tongue freely in every situation, what is more, State has the obligation to guarantee the conditions of this. Nevertheless, Hungarian legal system is not unified on this issue, because our procedural law extends this right.

For example, only the parliamentarian who is a member of a minority group could spoke to the National Assembly in his mother tongue and the preparation of bilingual documents of local governments could be required only if the town has minority population. Moreover, when minority citizens would like to placard bilingual name plate on a public buildig, they have to prove that settlement has an elected minority government. In contrast, the Code of Civil Procedure Law provides for the use of interpreters when the person involved in litigation does not speak Hungarian. Code of the Criminal Procedure allows the same,¹ but in the administrative proceedings there are multiple conditions to use a minority language asm other tongue.

The elected minority government of a town could take a decision about the second official language of the adminsitrative proceedings. In this case, the minority citizen or the representative of a minority community could use his language before the authority and if he wishes, authorities have to translate every Hungarian decision

¹ Judit,Tóth-Péter,Kántás: Linguistic rights in the administrative proceedings. In: Kisebbségkutatás, 2005/2. 229-252.pp.

into minority language. If urgent measures are needed, state must guarantee that nobody will be affected due to lack of knowledge of Hungarian language.

It is undisputed, that Hungarian legal system needs reformation in connection with linguistic rights, because nowadays State has little information on the ethnic groups and their needs for language. To ensure the availability of interpreters, State must provide the necessary educational background and the use of minority languages should be guaranteed both education and cultural life. Unfortunately minority media has a small budget, and the maintaining of the minority education system is a big burden to the State. This explains, why only certain ethnic groups took place in the education system in minority language (Roma, German, Romanian, etc.) and another problem is the training of teachers for minority educational institutions. Hopefully, the present census will provides information about where have to change this system. Perhaps, this will mean that some university courses get more financial support.

In addition to the foregoing, there are international legal norms and standards which are also bound by the State. For example, the European Charta of Regional or Minority Languages dose not allow to State to specify every language on the Hugnarian questionnaire as a minority language. According to the Charta, Arabian, Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese languages are not regional or minority languages because they are not spoken by the national minorities of Hungary (although none of them considered the official state language of Hungary), but according to this norm, neither a dialect of the official language, nor the languages spoken by immigrants could be called „minority language”.

In Hungary it is well-known, that most of Russian, Chinese, Arabian and Vietnamese cizitens retained the nationality of their own. Therefore, despite the fact, that they are covered by the census, according to the Charta, they can not claim that Hungary guarantee them the lingusitic rights. Moreover, in addition to the Act on the Law of Ethnic and National Minorities, they are not the members of any national minority group of Hungary.

Actually Hungary has 13 national minority groups, but according to the Charta, Hungary had the opportunity to choose special obligations in connection with the lingustic rights of minorities. That is

why Hungarian State supports particularly the Croatian, German, Romanian, Serbian, Slovakian and Slovenian languages, because the location and population of these minorities is very remarkable.

Council of Europe issued many recommendation in connection with the minority policy of Hungary. In the last recommendation, in 2009, the Council proposed to support the teaching of Roma language and stabilize the financial background of minority language teaching and the minority media. Generally, the legal background of minority language teaching in Hungary is well-regulated, almost everyone could learn at school in his own mother tongue. Of course, in criminal proceedings and in mediation is possible to use minority language or interpreter, but up to now it is not often. There are some minority people working in the public administration, so theoretically they can understand the petition written in minority languages, too. Language difficulties are not typical in the economic life at all.²

Although the minority press and broadcasting is underfunded, certain ethnic groups maintain theaters, libraries and cinemas, and they are planning the translation of literary works into minority languages.

After the census the Hungarian government have to supervise the financial and legal background of the cultural support of minorities. Regardless of the census, we have to standardize the status of linguistic rights in procedural law, because the Act on the Equal Treatment (act of CXXV. in 2003.) prohibits the language-based discrimination, too. During the legislation we have to avoid the excessive regulation, such as the Slovak Law of the use of languages that provoked international indignation. The Slovak law restricted unduly the language of the communication of individuals in public areas, for example, in a Slovakian hospital patients and doctors can only speak Slovak and prohibited the use of minority languages in Slovak media. Nevertheless, the fact, that a state prepare a State Language Act is not illegal, but Slovakia should also be kept for international conventions, which prohibit such a restriction of human rights. Moreover, the Slovak State Language Act takes undue favour to Czech language, which is, in fact, a minority language in Slovakia, so the Act violates the

linguistic rights of other ethnic groups in Slovakia. This was the reason that in 2010 the Venice Commission criticized the Slovak legislation, and urged Slovakia to review the Act, particularly the articles on the culture and education.

Although it is unlikely that census will lead to large legislation in Hungary, we can not postpone the review of certain acts. During this procedure we should take into account the above-described errors, the needs of the minorities and international organizations. Thereby we facilitate the enforcement of civil rights and linguistic rights, too.

² Judit, Tóth: Cultural rights of minorities in Hungary on the ground of international undertakings. Minorities Research, 2010. 103-119.

Zsolt Körtvélyessi

Census, ethnic data and legislation¹

Abstract

The article gives a short account on the legislation concerning the collection of ethnic data on the Hungarian census of 2011. Examples from countries all over the world show that the otherwise comparable census data differ substantially when it comes to race, and ethnicity. While there are emerging European standards on national censuses, the case of ethnicity seems to remain untouched, left to the discretion of the country (the data on diversity thus remaining diverse). This does not mean, however, that there are no existing standards. The importance of these standards (that are summarized in the article) can be seen if we consider that the very framing of the ethnic question(s) reflect a view on ethnicity in the country, it is far from being neutral, and can have a large impact on the outcome, and the way people think of themselves as members of ethnic groups. Legislators should therefore provide arguments why they chose that specific method, they should make their motives explicit, making it clear what is the goal of the legislation, and of the data collection. Finally, the paper covers the recent legislative debates on the 2011 census, and concludes that the compliance of the Hungarian regulation remains to be seen: the existing standards require all efforts against undercount—something that happened most notably to the Roma community in earlier censuses.

In ideal circumstances the starting point of legislation and the special politics backing it is a constitutional goal where it can be decided whether the chosen solution was adequate, necessary and proportional. The history of census has shown that it originally served mili-

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tary and taxation purposes (this is why the French protested against any kind of census in the 18th c.);² later with the widening of the tasks of the state the aims also became manifold. Though it is difficult to question the necessity of census – the public utility services, the government and municipal self-governments need to have a reliable recording of the inhabitants it in their planning even if the data can be obtained from other sources too;³ what is still arguable is the kind of data to be collected and the form they are collected.

The collecting of data concerning the ethnic affiliation, nationality is especially sensitive in Hungary. The historic experience of the 20th c. raises suspicion against any kind of attempt of the state that aims at the registering of the minorities. In addition there are references to real or imagined obstacles laid by data protection that frequently hinders the realization of programs that are meant to be in aid of the equality of opportunity (e.g. making legally impossible to identify ethnic Roma students, thus rendering them unable to apply for the grants especially intended for them,⁴ or obstructing through the endeavours against segregation, too)⁵ In the case of such characteristics as ethnic identity there is even more truth that census is not an external, neutral institution but a tool of the state that itself can form the result.⁶

The present paper tries to delineate the legal aspects by presenting first examples from abroad, then focusing on Hungary, the European regulations will be overviewed. Then follows a survey of the

² David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel: Foreword. *Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2002. p. 7.

³ The parliamentary commissioner of minority rights explained in his 2009 report that the prerequisite of the creating effective social and minority policy is to have a possibly complete account of the number, geographical position and social-economic-demographic indicators of the minority communities living in the country. Report 2009. p.38.

⁴ Grants are mentioned together with voluntary acknowledgement and 'objective criteria' as conditions. <http://www.kisebbségiombudsman.hu/data/files/158627216.pdf>, p.13

⁵ Körtvélyessi, Zsolt: Etnikai adatok és stratégiák, szegregációs perek a hazai és strasbourgi példák tükrében, [Ethnic data and trials of strategy and segregation in Hungary and Strasbourg], *Föld-rész*, II. évfolyam, 3-4. szám, 7–17. pp

⁶ Kertzer & Arel: *im.*, p. 2.: „the census does much more than simply reflect social reality; rather, it plays a key role in the construction of that reality.”

Hungarian legal context and finally some questions of the organization of census will be discussed.

Leading practice from overseas

Maybe it is in America, in the USA, Canada and Brazil, where the ethnic, nationality and racial affiliations have been recorded the most complex way. The principle of the regulation, looking back at a long history (sometimes not without racist colouring)⁷ is that mixed identity it officially accepted.⁸ In the 2000 census of the USA the short explanatory booklet has a table showing that ethnic data⁹ offer a six-fold follow up of the answers.¹⁰ In the American system the native inhabitants have a special position who may enjoy extra rights but their acceptance depends on origin and the acknowledgement of the community.¹¹ In Canada there has developed a special situation: though there is the possibility for multiple answers, the specification 'Canadian' introduced in 1996 has been increasing in popularity¹² and it covers up the affiliation, just as the specification 'Yugoslavian' used after the Balkan wars, offering simplification and exclusion for those, e.g. born in mixed marriages.

⁷ "Brazilian censuses: White is better" Chapter of Nobles: Racial categorization and censuses, in: David I. Kertzer és Dominique Arel (eds.): *Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2002. pp. 60–63.

⁸ Melissa Nobles: *op.cit.* pp. 67–68., Tables 2.1. and 2.2.

⁹ Elizabeth M. Grieco and Rachel C. Cassidy: Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin. *Census 2000 Brief*, March 2001, Table 2, pp. 4-5. <http://www.census.gov/prod/2001-pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf>.

¹⁰ The homepage explains why the state needs the data. Question 8. asks about Hispanic origin. Since 1970 the aim is to monitor the success of regulations against discrimination as well as where would be needed state services in Spanish. Question No.9. aims at discovering racial inequalities since 1970. More than answer is possible. <http://2010.census.gov/2010census/how/interactive-form.php>

¹¹ Körtvélyessi Zsolt: Az őslakos népek jogai [The rights of natives] *Pro Minoritate* 2009. (Ősz [Autumn]) pp.10–30.

¹² Calvin Goldscheider: Ethnic categorization in censuses, in: David I. Kertzer és Dominique Arel (szerk.): *Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2002. pp. 79–83.

The successor states of the Soviet Union represent a special case where the practice to indicate nationality has been preserved in official documents. Benedict Anderson cites Ernest Renan saying that nationalism is not about finding national identity but creating nationalities where they had not existed before.¹³ The classification of nationalities by the state can contribute to nation creating efforts e.g. by the categories about nationalities in the census questionnaires. In Uzbekistan the official categorization (censuses, the data received being used in governmental decision making, individual statements, etc.) played an important role in the nationality self-definition of the individuals.¹⁴

The post colonial state building efforts in Africa continued the categorisation of the population – sometimes using surprising sources especially considering the possibilities of some of the countries.¹⁵ The registrations sometimes ending in brutality show how the census, the ethnic division of the population can become the tool of power and control.¹⁶

The most important lesson of the various census processes could be that those who are counting and those persons, institutions, the legislators themselves who define the methods of counting could just as easily influence the result as those who answer the questions.¹⁷ The frames set by the legislator can reflect presuppositions and prejudices during the process of categorization, the definition of the object and the formulation of the questions could be decisive. It is especially important that the questionnaires must not be arbitrarily constructed but should contain well-defined aims. Among the inter-

¹³ Benedict Anderson: *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Revised Edition. Verso, London – New York, 1991. p. 6.

¹⁴ David Abramson: *The Soviet legacy and the census in Uzbekistan*, in: David I. Kertzer és Dominique Arel (eds.): *Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2002. pp. 176–201.

¹⁵ Peter Uvin: *Categorizing and Violence in Burundi and Rwanda*, in: David I. Kertzer és Dominique Arel (eds.): *Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2002. p. 169.

¹⁶ Peter Uvin: *op.cit.*, p. 171.

¹⁷ David Abramson cites David Laitin: “Nations ... are not out there to be counted. They are a function of social, political, and economic processes.” David Abramson: *op.cit.*, p. 176.

national examples there are some that are nearer to statistics e.g. they are comparable (that is not entirely independent of legal and data protection aspects since they are closely connected to the aim). And also such that have direct data protecting, legal relevance in their connection to the legal aim.¹⁸

In the USA the device of census was adapted to the goal already at an early period of its history: the original text of the Constitution¹⁹ ruled that the number of the representatives in the Congress should be elected according to the number of free men in each of the states, not counting the Indian population who did not pay taxes and three fifth of every other persons.²⁰ The aim of the state was clearly the recording the population for drafting and taxation in the early period.

European models?

The European practice dealing with the data collected by census was varied, and the details of the regulation, too. The context of the regulation was brought into harmony and it made necessary that the data collected from the population also be comparable, and the statistical finding internationally extended. The Hungarian Statistical Office remarked in its information booklet²¹ that already in 1949 the UNO tried to give uniform directions for censuses (there is a detailed data-

¹⁸ Cf. 1992. LXIII. Law § 5. on the protection of personal data and the publicity of data of general interest.,

¹⁹ Article 1. Section 2. paragraph 3.: „Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”

²⁰ The regulation was changed by the Paragraph 2. of the 14. amendment accepted in 1868 extending it to the Indian population and every other inhabitants. Amendment 15. prohibited restrictions of races at elections from 1870, and 1920 Amendment 19. that of restrictions according to gender and according to Amendment 24. the deprivation of right to election because of tax debt is against the constitution since 1964; finally Amendment 26. lowered the election age to eighteen (from earlier twenty .one).

²¹ Központi Statisztikai Hivatal: *A nemzetközi szervezetek népszámlálási ajánlásai* [The recommendations of the international organisation]. <http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/dokumentumok/nemz1.html>

base on the UNO website with a collection of questionnaires from various countries,²² containing, among others, questions of ethnic interest and the ways those questions were formulated. However, a comparative analysis would carry this paper too far).

The recommendations of the European Economic Commission and the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) for the censuses to be held in the 2010s²³ count ethnicity, language and religion among the 'ethno-cultural characteristics', all described as non basic features, stressing that when presenting them the national characteristics must be taken into account. According to the recommendation the informants must be given opportunity to claim affiliation to more than one ethnic group,²⁴ as well as denying an answer has to be allowed too (options 'none' or 'no answer').²⁵ It has to be observed, too that the claim of ethnicity has to be defined widely, considering religion, regional, local or citizenship groupings, and stressing that the question is not recommended for comparison, the national characteristics should be observed instead.²⁶ It is an important advice that the users have to be informed about the scientific, social-political approach behind the ethnic categories and the methods the various countries have applied has to be explained too.²⁷

The question of language can be divided into four sub-questions: mother tongue (language learned in childhood, language first used), main language (language mastered), language most frequently used (at home or at work), other language knowledge.²⁸ In the first two cases it may be important for minorities to have an option of several choices.²⁹ Regarding religion, local characteristic can also be taken into account (thus ensuring voluntariness) but when classifying the

²² <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/censusquest.htm>

²³ United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, in cooperation with the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT): Conference of European Statisticians Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Population and Housing, ECE/CES/STAT/NONE/2006/4, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2006 (a továbbiakban: EGB/EUROSTAT)

²⁴ EGB/EUROSTAT 2006, Recommendation No. 426.

²⁵ EGB/EUROSTAT 2006, Recommendation No. 427.

²⁶ EGB/EUROSTAT 2006, Recommendation No. 429.

²⁷ EGB/EUROSTAT 2006, Recommendation No. 428.

²⁸ EGB/EUROSTAT 2006, Recommendation No. 430.

²⁹ EGB/EUROSTAT 2006, Recommendation No. 431.

data it is recommended to use uniform, comparable criteria (according to the major religions and groups within them).³⁰ The data about religion have five different questions: formal membership, accepted identity, religious belief, religious upbringing and participation.³¹

In Appendix 1.³² the recommendation divides the data received during the census into two groups. Among the basic characteristics that refer to geography, demography, economy, education, family and housing there are 29 questions about e.g. gender, age, domicile, citizenship, occupation, schooling, number of residents and number of rooms. Among the non-basic data there is e.g. the date of immigration, income, dependence or number of dependents, literacy, questions about the house equipments, or such questions that are important for the topic under discussion such as the acquiring of citizenship, ethnic and/or nationality affiliation, language and religion.

The European Union considered it necessary – in order to support its tasks – to obtain uniform and comparable data about the population. Therefore regulation 763/2008/EK (9. July 2008) about census (population and accommodation) of the European Parliament and Council was accepted and it was followed by the Hungarian legislation when preparing the 2011 census. The regulation, however, does not deal with the question of nationality, religion or language, since according to the classification elaborated together with EGB their necessity and methods have to be organized at member state level as was expressed by the current opinion explained above

The system of organization of the European Council contains recommendations especially targeting at the ethnic data and census. The Advisory Committee created by the EC for the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities³³ - expressed its opinion that especially deals with the 2011 census and the ethnic data on the 22th of September 2010 after having received the reply of the Hungarian government. The opinion dealt with the third cycle

³⁰ EGB/EUROSTAT 2006, Recommendation No. 444.

³¹ EGB/EUROSTAT 2006, Recommendation No. 439.

³² EGB/EUROSTAT 2006, pp. 155 ff.

³³ Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFC), Third Opinion on Hungary, adopted on 18 March 2010, Strasbourg, 17 September 2010, ACFC/OP/III(2010)001, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_3rd_OP_Hungary_en.pdf

of inquiry in Hungary and welcomed that there had been consultations with the representatives of minorities held during preparations and also that there will be several (non-compulsory and open end) questions on the census questionnaires concerning minorities. The document stresses the importance of guaranteeing the informants the choice among several questions – e.g. in the case of those born in mixed marriages that could more exactly reflect their real identity, language and culture – and that before the census begins there will be information campaigns aimed at the minorities urging them to acknowledge their affiliation.³⁴

It is interesting that when discussing the ethnic data the Opinion does not connect them to Article 4. of the Framework (where Par.2. is about the necessary of measures to guarantee equality opportunity) but to Article 3. that guarantees the freedom of identity choice and the individual and collective legal practice – the effective and democratic collective legal practice is inconceivable in social dimensions without reliable data about the given minority.

The ECRI, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance of the EC relies on ethnic data at several instances and condemns if they are lacking. Recommendation No. 4. of the Commission dealing expressly with data collecting, stresses the protection of informants as a legislative aim.³⁵

The Hungarian Regulation

Instead of connecting the ethnic data collection to governmental aims, Law 1993. LXXVII. §8. about the rights of national and ethnic minorities discusses the question as one belonging to the freedom of choice of identity, stating that it is the right of the members of minorities to acknowledge their belonging to a minority in anonymity during the census. §7.(3) further regulates the possibility of multiple identity, stating that the right to national and ethnic identity and the

³⁴ Cf. Points 40.42. of the Opinion, ACFC 2010, pp.10-11.

³⁵ ECRI General Policy Recommendation N°4: National surveys on the experience and perception of discrimination and racism from the point of view of potential victims. CRI (98) 30, http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XML/Ecri/ENGLISH/Rec_Gens/recgen-04-eng.pdf, In Hungarian: http://www.europatanacs.hu/pdf/ECRI_4.pdf

acknowledgement of the affinity to such a minority does not exclude the possibility of double of multiple affinity. Of this it may follow that persons could give several answers to the question about ethnic affinity. As has been pointed out above this is a solution in accordance with the international recommendation.

Law 1992. LXIII. §2.; 2. a) on the protection of personal data and the publicity of data of general interest concerning race, affinity to ethnic or national minority, political belief or party allegiance, religion or other ideological conviction are special ones thus all the data types discussed in the present paper belong to this especially protected category. According to §3.2. of the law such data can only be processed if the a) informant agrees to it in written form, or b) in the case of data described in §2.2.a) of the law if it is part of an international agreement or it is the enforcement of a basic right guaranteed by the constitution, or else is ruled by the law in the interest of national security, crime prevention or law enforcement; and c) in any other case ruled by legislation. In this case all the instances enumerated in a): according to resolution 121/B/2001. AB³⁶ the informant has agreed to the handling of data, b) it agrees with the international recommendations and relevant constitutional considerations, and c) are all realized.

Law 1993. XLVI. §6.(1) c) on statistics appoints the Central Statistical Office to periodically carry out the census ordered by a special law for the registration of the data of the population. This special law (Law 1999.CVIII. about the 2001 census,³⁷ and Law 2009. CXXXIX about the 2011 census) is authorized for the handling of ethnic and nationality data according to the Law on data protection. The history of the law and its discussion over the past year will be introduced below.

³⁶ 121/B/2001. AB határozat, 11. February 2002. According to the applicant the laws of 2001. about census and statistics are against the Constitution as in spite of §59. (2) it regulates the handling of personal data by a law accepted by simple majority. Constitutional Court established that the law according to §59.(2) is about data protection and not about census or statistics ad the rule of 2/3 majority does not apply. On the other hand it referred to voluntariness, i.e. in the case of answering non-compulsory question the informant agrees to the handling of data. (c.f. resolution II.1.1. and 1.2.).

³⁷ On the 2001. census and statistics; the Amendment of Law 1993. évi XLVI. by Law 1999. CVIII.

The history of the legislation for the 2011 census in Hungary

Of the data concerning minorities of the Hungarian census the information about the Roma are the most important socially. Every party has agreed in the necessity of programs directed toward the largest minority of Hungary (though they differ more in content than in prominence, e.g. LMP wants to achieve the same result by ‘colour blind’ programs, and the Jobbik went to extremities by suggesting to put them in lagers).³⁸

The legislative background of the 2011 census has been given by Law 2009. CXXXIX accepted by the Parliament on the 7th of December 2009 and amended on the 1st of June 2010. The party political debate was held around the questions of nationality, religion and handicap.

During the (general) parliamentary debate of the law the prime minister’s office presented the following arguments in favour of the collection of ethnic data:

One of the reasons is the planning of the national and ethnic minorities governments and the local and minority self-governments. Secondly prohibition of discrimination, and the realization of the demand for equal opportunity is extremely important as is described in §70/A of the Constitution.

The third reason is the well-grounded definition and successful realization of the Roma-program of the Government, the execution of the tasks connected to the integration of Roma; and the fourth is to provide the statistic indexes indicating the number and proportion of national and ethnic minorities that is necessary for the EU applications at settlement and regional level.³⁹

³⁸ A Jobbik táborokba zárna a „cigánybűnözőket” [Jobbik would put the Roma in lagers] Index/MTI, 2010. augusztus 24. http://index.hu/belfold/2010/08/24/a_jobbik_taborokba_zarna_a_ciganybunozoket/
http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat_aktus?p_ckl=39&p_uln=29&p_felsz=6&p_felszig=19&p_aktus=4 (14:50 perc előtt)
http://lehetmas.hu/upload/9/9/201003/LMP_Program_2010_1.pdf
http://mszp.hu/public/downloads/pdf/haladast_biztonsagot_demokraciat.pdf
http://www.demos.hu/Sajto?news_id=48&page=details

³⁹ Országgyűlési Napló 2006-2010, 221. ülésnap (2009.09.15.), 50. felszólalás, Dr. Molnár Csaba (MSZP), a Miniszterelnöki Hivatalt vezető miniszter [Parliament Diary....session ... address Dr. Molnár Csaba (MSZP) the Office director minister

The debate was not about the inclusion of the question about ethnicity but the way it had to be formulated. On the 21st of October 2009 László Sólyom President of the Republic sent back the version accepted on the 5th of October 2009 for reconsideration exercising his power of veto.⁴⁰ In his letter he missed the questions on productivity, handicap and religion though all three were there in the 2001 questionnaire, thus comparability would justify their inclusion.⁴¹ He found the question about productivity important for demography and planning while he considered the question about handicap – similar to that on ethnicity – important to the practical enforcement of equal opportunity.⁴²

The President also criticized (Letter 2.2.) the original version of the law that allows only the affiliation to ‘official’ minorities in Hungary. He has pointed out that in order to get a wider overview by the census data it is necessary to know about nationality affiliations in general, the inclusion of the question about mother tongue, neglecting the majority – minority dimensions. The President has introduced another important question that of multiple nationality. Though the letter did not elaborate upon the problem the international recommendations drew attention to it. On the one hand the exclusive choice of nationality may obscure nationality affiliations, the possibility of a multiple choice may give more detailed results thus fulfilling better the goals of the census. The Parliament accepted the President’s comments in part and included questions on the mother tongue, productivity and handicap, modified the definition of minority to national and ethnic *affiliation*, but the question on religion was left out yet again.

Following Fidesz winning the elections, in accordance with the President’s directions Law 2010. XLIX was the amendment of the law on census. The term of national and ethnic affiliation was replaced by nationality and questions on religion and language knowledge were also added. The first version of the motion for amendment handed

of the prime minister’s office]. [http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=38&p_uln=221&p_felsz=50&p_szoveg=&p_felszig=50

⁴⁰ Constitution of the Hungarian Republic 1949. law XX. §26.(2).

⁴¹ http://www.solyomlaszlo.hu/admin/data/file/6538_20091021_visszakuldo_level_nepszamlalas_cimerrel.pdf

⁴² Ibid. 2.1.

in by three members of the ruling party was withdrawn – it did not contain the voluntary question on handicap.⁴³ The Parliament accepted the effective text on the 1st of June 2010 that was published after its being signed by László Sólyom. The amendment preserved the text of Law 1999. CVIII. that was the legal background of the 2001 census, with the addition of the question about handicap.

During the debate of the amendment – just before midnight on the 21st of May 2010 – the MPs presented their opinion about the justification of the question on religion. It is evident from the above explanation that both the questions on religion and ethnic affiliation are optional and are based on voluntariness. The only opposition to the question on religion came from the MSzP faction where the speaker warned from fears, referred to scandalous illegal party-lists of voters and also that the state had nothing to do with such a question.⁴⁴ The speaker of LMP found the remark reasonable that in the 20th c how justified was the inclusion of a question on religion. This faction stated that

If we believe such statistical data are justified by serving social planning, social-political organisation we have to consider that religion has an important feature belonging to the cultural multiplicity, that let's hope will be maintained in our society. Thus if we want an accurate picture of the state of a society it cannot be neglected either, independently of the world view of the individuals and what is the proportion of religions in the country."⁴⁵

Then the MP separated the problem of financing the churches from the data of religion. The speaker of Fidesz agreed with the LMP speaker and criticized the MSzP standpoint because the ethnic data are private affairs too thus if consistency is sought that could not be asked either.⁴⁶

⁴³ http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_irom.irom_adat?p_ckl=39&p_izon=33

⁴⁴ Országgyűlési Napló 2010-, 5. ülésnap (2010.05.21.), 230. felszólalás, Dr. Nemény András (MSZP) http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_ulon=5&p_felsz=230&p_szoveg=&p_felszig=230

⁴⁵ Országgyűlési Napló 2010-, 5. ülésnap (2010.05.21.), 236. felszólalás, Dr. Schiffer András (LMP), http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_ulon=5&p_felsz=236&p_szoveg=&p_felszig=236

⁴⁶ Országgyűlési Napló 2010-, 5. ülésnap (2010.05.21.), 238-242. felszólalás, Balog Zoltán (Fidesz), http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_

It is evident that religion and ethnic, national affiliation are the most sensitive questions and need special circumspection during the handling of data, as was also indicated by the petitions concerning the 2001 census addressed to the commissioner of data protection touching mostly this aspect.⁴⁷ In one of his answers the commissioner of data protection explained⁴⁸ that he had consulted with the president of the Central Statistical Office and thanks to the applied precautionary measures – e.g. by withholding detailed addresses – the level of data protection was adequate. It, however, remains a question whether data collection is really a necessary process to carry out governmental tasks. The inquiry about the data of ethnicity, nationality are to serve the guaranteeing of equal opportunity, anti-discrimination, language, education etc. and is more important than questions about religion, because the former need governmental financing, however, the consideration and weight of the data obtained in the census were arguable.⁴⁹ In connection with the ethnic, nationality questions there were no similar problems raised.

The 2001 questionnaire contained a special question on language knowledge (it was compulsory, without special mention of the mother tongue), an other on 'nationality, language affiliation' and further four (not compulsory) sub questions limiting the possible answers at three. The first was about nationality affiliation, the second cultural identity, the third mother tongue and the fourth about the language used in the private sphere.⁵⁰ The available 2010 test questionnaire inquires about language knowledge (obligatory, with a choice of answers), mother tongue (non-obligatory, maximum two answers), and two questions about nationality affiliation (non-obligatory).⁵¹ All

http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_irom.irom_adat?p_ckl=39&p_ulon=5&p_felsz=238&p_szoveg=&p_felszig=242

⁴⁷ Az adatvédelmi biztos 2001. évi parlamenti beszámolója, II. A. 1. 1. 2. A 2001. évi népszámlálás, [Report of the commissioner of data protection. Census 2001]. <http://abiweb.obh.hu/abi/index.php?menu=beszamolok/2001/II/1/1/2>

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ The question on the homepage of the Statistical Office for the 2001 census was: „val-lása, hitfelekezete?” [religion?] (http://nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kerdoiv/hun_4.html, 24. kérdés); in the 2010 test questionnaire: „Mely egyházhhoz, felekezethez tartozónak érzi magát?” [which denomination do you feel to belong to?]. (<http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/portal/url/ITEM/903719112FD4508EE04400156004451E>, 36. kérdés)

⁵⁰ http://nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kerdoiv/hun_4.html, questions 22. and 23.1–4

⁵¹ <http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/portal/url/ITEM/903719112FD4508EE04400156004451E>, 32–34. questions

the questions are open and it is possible to add more languages or specify more nationalities. The last two items of the questionnaire do not offer multiple answers (the first is which nationality does the informants think themselves to belong to, the second whether there is other affiliation besides the one specified in an earlier question). While the solution for the mapping out of a more complicated identity has not yet been achieved, the method may help to make the results more exact: certainly it will be possible to fill in the questionnaire on the internet and may be that could increase the willingness in the participation of some groups otherwise difficult to reach.⁵²

As in various questions the census needs political decision what is especially true for the ethnic data (as could be observed during the debate in the parliament), the data obtained by the census also need to be treated critically. The legislator has to keep in mind that every new decision (an opportunity offered every ten years only) should rectify the omissions revealed by the earlier results. Concerning the ethnic data the most prominent shortcoming was the insufficient choice of minority groups contrasting to the number of possibilities revealed by research. The reasons causing such difficulties have been explained by Peter Skerry that in the USA there are entire different reasons for the undercount of Hispanic and that of the African – American populations;⁵³ therefore different methods have to be chosen to improve the efficiency of the census. The Hungarian legal context has surmounted the question of what to measure and what not and can start deliberating how to measure to get more exact results;⁵⁴ that could be later used by the Government or the civil rights organizations in their work. For the Hungarian society the most urgent and long-range problem of equal opportunity is the problem of Roma segregation at schools as a compelling governmental interest.⁵⁵

⁵² Waffenschmidt Jánosné: Felkészülés a 2011. évi népszámlálásra, [Preparation for the 2011 census]. *Statistikai Szemle*, 87. évfolyam 3. szám, p. 257.

⁵³ Peter Skerry: Counting on the Census? Race, Group Identity, and the Evasion of Politics. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2000. pp. 100–101.

⁵⁴ On the various methods of measuring, questions offering more exact picture cf. Hoóz István: Népszámlálás és nemzetiség. [Census and nationality]. *Kisebbségkutatás* 2000 (9. évf.) 4. szám,

⁵⁵ Cf. in the USA the strict measure used in cases of racial discrimination needing the existence of “compelling state interest” at the “strict scrutiny test”.

Summarizing it can be stated that the Hungarian legislation complies with the requirements of collecting complex data during the census about the ethnic composition of the population. The details, however, decisive for the qualities of the data do not appear at the level of laws: 1. how complex is the measuring of descent – at present the 2010 test questionnaire allows just two choices of identity and the language use has also only two aspects; 2. what does nationality mean, what sub-questions can be there and what goal can define success. The overview of the international recommendations reveals that the governmental obligations connected to the census is not a simple passive collecting of the data. The members of minorities must be informed about the possibility of acknowledging their affiliation, about its stake and have to be convinced that acknowledging their minority identity will not mean any disadvantage for them. In this respect the international recommendations require the ethnic data to give as exact picture about the society as possible; it is arguable that the census data obtained ten years ago would fulfil this requirement as e.g. the number of the Roma in Hungary was greatly underestimated (the official number representing less than the half of the actual one⁵⁶ compared with any other estimates given by specialists.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Data for 2001: 190 046 persons. Cf. A 2001. évi népszámlálás nemzetiséggel összefüggő kérdései, p. 4. [Question of the 2001 census related to nationality]. http://nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/04/04_modsz.pdf

⁵⁷ For methods to avoid undermeasuring cf. Peter Skerry op.cit. pp. 80–120.

Tamás Korhecz

On dual citizenship

Abstract

The constitutional expert from the region of Voivodina claims that the present Hungarian citizenship regulations openly discriminate against Hungarians living in regions outside the Hungarian borders. While expatriates who left the territory of present day Hungary can easily regain their citizenship (that they had given up by their own accord), the Hungarians living in the regions of historical Hungary and who are also ex-Hungarian citizens, need to undergo lengthy procedures of residence and repatriation, even though they have never renounced their Hungarian citizenship.

Citizenship is a special legal institution existing between the state and the inhabitants living in its territory; it contains mutual rights and obligations i.e. it is a complex legal relationship. Usually it exists on the principle of *ius soli* i.e. obtained by birth or *ius sanguinis* i.e. by the citizenship of the parents, but frequently it can also be acquired by nationalization following emigration or immigration.

Citizenship is a relatively novel legal institution closely related to the formation of modern bourgeois democratic states. The liberal democratic bourgeois model of state based on the sovereignty of the people was the achievement of the French Revolution and the formation of the USA. The new state-model practically ousted or basically changed the till then prevailing absolute monarchy as the form of government during the course of the 19th c. Citizenship is an important element of this form of government as this is what expresses the equality of the inhabitants and their belonging together to a political community (a political nation); on the basis of the sovereignty of the people the community is not the subject of the state but the sole source of the power of the state. The nation state is the defining form of the liberal bourgeois state, its essence being that the state can be equalled with the nation (Hungary with

the Hungarians, Romania with the Romanians, etc.). The modern nations are almost without exception based on ethnic groups and their common characteristics, e.g. mother tongue, religion, historic traditions, common provenance, etc. This concept of nation state results in the dichotomy that citizenship frequently means not only the relationship between state and its permanent inhabitants but also is a legal relationship between ethnic and culturally based groups as part of the nation and the state too. In multi-ethnic states in the triangle set up of state - ethnically based nation - citizenship there appear several problems that prove to be difficult to solve. The problems of the three cornered pattern will rise when there is a populous minority living in a nation state, i.e. there are citizens whose language, culture, traditions, identity differs from those of the state-forming majority nation. Such situations are the rule in the East Central European region with the result that the state and nation based on the ethnic nation regularly become the hotbed of national exclusion, oppression and conflicts.

Dual citizenship and the Hungarian nation-policy, autonomy

The question of dual citizenship has been an unavoidable topic in the life of Hungarian communities living outside the Hungarian borders, i.e. the political demand towards the Hungarian Parliament for a legislation that would render possible for citizens of Hungarian nationality living in foreign countries to obtain Hungarian citizenship under more favourable conditions. The decade long dispute was heated by dogmas and exaggerations and avoided several important questions raised by an expectable mass application for dual citizenship. Those advocating dual citizenship hope for a quick solution of the problems of Hungarians living in minority, the reuniting of the nation, while those in opposition scare with a possible collapse of the Hungarian economy followed by the eventual settling over of the new citizens. There was a referendum on the question on the 5th of December, 2004 that failed due to the lack of interest of the voters. The motivation behind this “nay” was a wish that “they should stay put” rather than the differences between national policies.

The purpose of the present paper is not to provide any answers to any of the questions or dilemmas raised by dual citizenship it only tries to point out ideas, arguments and counterarguments that have not been raised during the sentimental, superficial and boundless political debates going on for years on end.

When it is considered to establish the legal foundation of the granting of citizenship based on ethnical belonging to the nation for Hungarians in the hundreds of thousands or even millions, the following arguments are mentioned: we belong to the Hungarian nation; we are Hungarians therefore it is natural for Hungary, the state of the Hungarians to accept us as its citizens; the Trianon treaty cut off 1/3 of the Hungarians with the 2/3 of the territory, thus those living outside of the borders of Hungary became the citizens of other states without asking for it, without leaving their birthplace; it is the patriotic duty of Hungary to show solidarity by granting citizenship, expressing care for the separated members of the nation; there is the example of Croatia, Spain, Germany, Romania, etc. with legislation that allows the nationalisation of ‘fellow nationals’. Apart from patriotic feeling it is undeniable that the Paris treaty had cut off areas with Hungarian majority that was their birthplace for over thousand years under the pretext of national self-determination, in reality the design was only to punish the losers and satisfy the appetite of the ‘hungry’ small new countries. After ninety years and another World War, after several unsuccessful attempts at revision, and past Communism, the region now is part of the European Union. After ninety years there are still two million Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary in neighbouring countries and still it cannot be declared that their situation has been satisfactorily settled for the long term, e.g. those living in the region south of the Hungarian border. At the beginning of the 21st c the question is what remedy do we want to find for the legal situation of millions of Hungarians living outside of Hungary, what help could be offered by granting them Hungarian citizenship?

In the last twenty years the basic principle of the Hungarian national policy of those outside Hungary was to be successful at their birthplace. To create the conditions where Hungarians could be equals and could stay as Hungarians in their ancient country without the necessity to leave. To fulfil an aim is practically impos-

sible without minority rights inclusive of various forms of national autonomy, without the possibility of allowing Hungarians to become co-nation in their “new” country. Wherever in Europe the conflicts have been satisfactorily solved it was through co-nation status and various forms of autonomy. It is no wonder that larger Hungarian communities outside the border declared autonomy to the target of their political aim. However, the striving for autonomy and collective rights are alien to the nation concept adopted by Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Croatia and partially Serbia too. The ethnically formed nation and nation-state finds even the existence of other ethnic elements an obstacle that has to be done away with during the process of nation-building, i.e. the confirmation of such ‘obstacles’ by the institution of autonomy, the establishing of the co-nation status, a multi-ethnic state is considered totally unacceptable. It means that to make Hungarian collective rights and Hungarian autonomy become possible, these countries should abandon or considerably modify their prevalent model of nation-state. And thus the essence of the problem has been revealed: there is an irreconcilable opposition between the fact that the Hungarians outside the border require autonomy that preconditions the modification of the model of the nation-state to become co-nation and at the same time want Hungarian citizenship on the basis of ethnically belonging to the Hungarian nation-state. It is not only an inconsistency of theory and practice but the fact is that in concept an ethnically based nation-state is irreconcilable with minority rights and autonomy; thus the institution of dual citizenship on ethnic, cultural basis and autonomy for the birth country cannot form part of the same national policy. If we preserve the idea of the nation state in the area of East Central Europe the present multi-ethnic, multi-national set up is unacceptable and should be discontinued. Such a discontinuation has various rough or more refined ways with rich traditions used in the last ninety years: hastening assimilation by the state; artificial re-drawing of the ethnic map of regions with minority inhabitants; changing ethnic maps by state assisted migration; by ethnic-based land distribution; genocide, population exchange; re-drawing of state borders, etc. Another way is when nation states facilitate e.g. Hungarians to unite with their ethnic-cultural nation through citizenship and/or settle down in their “own” nation-state and leave their birth country. The alternative

would be to abandon the nation-state model and change over from states harbouring nationalities to multi-ethnic states and provide the populous national communities with strong national identity - in our case Hungarians – with internal self-determination in their territory. In the first place EU should be the framework to take advantage the freedom of mobility of persons and goods, the possibilities due to wide regional cooperation reaching across state boundaries that could help to create such maintainable and working state systems and policies where both the majority and the minority could feel at home for the long term. In this process Hungary would have an important role as patron for the Hungarians outside its borders. Present day Hungary and its inhabitants and the Hungarians living in neighbouring states are strongly connected to each other, thus it is Hungary’s historical responsibility to achieve that the Hungarians could be equals as Hungarians in their ancient birth place and would not happen by legally binding the to the Hungarian state – facilitating or urging them to resettle – but by helping the states of the region to abandon the nation-state concept impending Hungarians in their existence. This could only be successful and convincing if Hungary itself would reconsider its own prevailing ethnically based nation-state model.

One person, two states – on practical difficulties and problems to be solved

Apart from the above-mentioned arguments let us examine the practical legal questions that could crop up if the Hungarian legislation would allow a more favourable process for Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary, that they could receive Hungarian citizenship without the requirement of settling down in Hungary, with secure livelihood, restrictions of age, schooling and with a clean record. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of persons to be nationalized but it might be hundreds of thousands probably about the number of Hungarian cardholders.

According to the basic rule citizenship is a legal situation between a person and a state with mutual rights and obligations. The legislation and administration of a state is based on this rule, i.e. it defines the persons coming under its legislation either as its own citizens or

as foreigners. Though the introducing of EU citizenship has somewhat modified the traditional two-way approach, the basic rule has remained unchanged. It is this basic rule, the basis of legislation would be modified, or would get into difficulties as it were, by the institution of dual citizenship; such persons would enter the countries' legislation who are citizens and foreigners at the same time. The dual citizenship could threaten law and order that is based on the idea that one person has one citizenship and one domicile; it could be changed but not without considerable confusion. It is not a novelty that persons could have more than one citizenship and is not a rarity either; it is the result of personal mobility and the difference in the law by which persons can obtain their citizenship. Till it remains the exception it would not disturb the efficient working of the state, only would cause incidental disturbances. The question is how would the states be able to manage the situation when the inhabitants of a region, or that of a city would want to lead their life in two states, when the exception would become large scale.

An analysis of the practice of present dual citizens might explain what kind of life situations would be created if hundreds of thousands of Hungarians would apply for it.

There are several tens of thousands of Hungarian – Serbian, Hungarian – Romanian, Hungarian – Slovakian dual citizens and their majority lead a dual life. The relevant data would indicate that only the minority of them have an active and a passive citizenship. There are only few such dual citizens who legally emigrated from Romania, Serbia or Transcarpathia and gave up their residence there, have renounced their right of vote or approached the foreign representation of their birth country as an emigrant living permanently in their new country (in our case in Hungary). Just as those who immigrated to Hungary and later returned to their birthplace did not report to the Hungarian state that they would (again) permanently live in their birthplace. Usually most of the dual citizens have residence in both countries with passports, identity cards, tax numbers, their right to vote, i.e. these persons are doubly registered. The situation has mostly practical advantages for them: they can vote in two countries, get employment without limitation, have health care, various social and family support, can take out credit, etc. The states rarely have the appropriate mechanisms to prevent the enjoyment of the advan-

tages provided by dual citizenship, as the state works by the principle that a person has only one citizenship; even if dual citizenship is legally regulated the chief rule is that the state considers the dual citizen its own subject and thus cannot prevent them from finding a domicile, apply for social and family assistance even as a civic right. Here are two examples to show how unprepared the states are in solving the problems caused by dual citizenship and two domiciles. In the summer of 2009 the problem occurred whether the new customs and traffic regulations in Serbia would allow a Serbian – Hungarian citizen to use a car in Serbia since it had been registered in Hungary. The traffic administration had difficulties in interpreting the regulation: it was verified that the person had his residence in Serbia, where the law does not allow Serbian citizens the use of a foreign registered car, the person also had proof of a domicile in Hungary and that gave him the right to use a Hungarian car. In everyday life the latter interpretation seems to gain ground but what would happen if tens of thousands of Serbian dual citizens would use Hungarian cars in Serbia because the price and costs of cars are lower there. The other example is connected to the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. It is known that Croatia granted hundreds of thousands of Croatian nationals the Croatian citizenship without requiring them to leave their original domicile in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result there are hundreds of cases appearing before the jurisdiction of both countries when criminals with dual citizenship committed crime in one country and escaped into the other abusing the article of the constitution that mutually prohibits extradition. The best-known example was that of Branimir Glavaš sentenced for war crimes. Besides the above examples there are other problems too, e.g. how can a person of dual citizenship enter his country with a foreign passport or could a Serbian – Hungarian citizen claim the back payment of Hungarian VAT when he submits his claim using his Serbian passport at the border station.

In addition there are the legal restrictions that can discriminate dual citizens in certain life circumstances. It is not widely known that in Serbia dual citizens cannot be members of security services; thus in case of mass application for dual citizenship Hungarian nationals would automatically be excluded from such professions and that would hinder the realisation of equality at the birth country.

Certainly the existing problems can legally and administratively be surmounted and regulated to satisfaction, judging by the example of the Hungarian – Serbian contract about the avoidance of dual taxation that contains detailed tax regulation concerning dual citizens with dual residence.

However, to escape serious disturbance in the operation of the countries in question might be that caused by the eventual masses of dual citizens, certain regulations should be amended, various international contracts to be created, and it also would be necessary to create such a close cooperation and data exchange between the countries that could minimize the eventual harm caused by dual citizenship with double domicile.

So many questions, suggestions, dilemmas not treated yet, let alone solved.

Epilogue

The above suggestions that need thorough analysis and consideration do not mean that the present regulation of Hungarian citizenship, the naturalization of Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary were satisfactory or even acceptable. The Hungarians can acquire their Hungarian citizenship only through lengthy legal processes that are necessarily preceded by obtaining a job, a residence and permanent settlement in Hungary. There are very strict and sometimes contradictory requirements and they do not correspond to the policy of responsibility taking and the claims of the unity of the Hungarian cultural nation as declared in the constitution, since there are countries where legislation allows a quick naturalization of persons who are culturally, linguistically, historically connected to the majority population of the country. The present Hungarian citizenship regulations openly discriminate against Hungarians living in regions outside the Hungarian borders. While expatriates who left the territory of present day Hungary can easily regain their citizenship (that they had given up by their own accord), the Hungarians living in the regions of historical Hungary and who are also ex-Hungarian citizens, need to undergo lengthy procedures of residence and repa-

triation, even though they have never renounced their Hungarian citizenship.

It is no question that the legislation about Hungarian citizenship needs to be revised but there is still the fear that everyday political and party-political interests and considerations would hinder acumen and the forming of valid questions in the future too.

Minorities history

THE NINETY YEARS OF THE TRIANON PEACE TREATY

Gusztáv D. Kecskés

The East-Central European background of the Trianon peace treaty from the perspective of the French foreign policy

Abstract

In 1917-18 France was more active in initiations about the region than its British allies who usually were much slower in e.g. acknowledging the emigree organisations and cooperating with them. The more vigorous activity of the French foreign policy was probably due to the fact that France had suffered the greatest losses of life during the war and after the Russian allies had stepped out they had directly to face the growing German menace. After the failure of the separate peace with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the French influence increased within the Entente and considerably influenced its partners' policy about Austria-Hungary too.

During World War I. the French international policy underwent important changes. Earlier it considered the interests of Russia, its ally; in order to keep the European balance it did not support the movements of independence of the nationalities living in the Austrian – Hungarian Monarchy. Since 1916 the French government became more interested especially in Czechs and Poles. It was not because of the activity of experts of the Slavic matters in France or the insistence of the French public but because of the new challenges of the military developments. The fact that the Central Powers exploited the nationality problem using it as a military instrument and the constantly diminishing number of the French army raised the question of mobilizing the Czech prisoners of war and Polish refugees and set them into action. Their potentials in the war had strengthened the political situation of the Polish and Czech emigration in France and they had internationally well known and well received organizations. However, the greatest event influencing the East Central European policy of France was that its ally, Russia, withdrew from

the war because of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Paris had to find another counterweight at the back of Germany to replace Russia. The solution seemed to be offered by the strengthening of a zone of Francophile nation-states created by the withdrawal or collapse of the empires, thus the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy offered itself as a logical program.

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After World War 1 the strategic-security policy remained an important feature of the East Central European policy of France. The Authorities in Paris reckoned with two danger sources: Germany notwithstanding its defeat still remaining dangerous and Russia coming under Bolshevik rule. The countries of the region and their people changed by the war were considered by the French foreign policy according to their possible military ability in averting the German and Russian menace. Consequently the most important country became Poland that re-united could raise the largest military force and thus was intended to step up against Soviet-Russia and to be the bastion against Germany too.

In order that Poland could be able to carry out the tasks meant for it in the French strategy the French government provided Warsaw with all the necessary military and diplomatic aid. The resoluteness of the French foreign policy is proved by the fact that though on the 10th of November 1918 the Polish regent council raised Józef Klemens Piłsudski to power, who earlier was supported by the Central Powers, instead of the Polish National Committee that was accepted by France and the allies, Paris received the delegates of the

¹ Ádám Magda, *A Kisantant 1920–1938*, Budapest, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1981, p.19. [The Little Entente]

new Polish leadership, and even was ready to assist with military and financial aid when the Social Democratic Polish government got into difficulties due to the Red Army's approach. On Polish request the 80 000 strong Haller-army equipped in France was transported to Poland by the beginning of 1919. On the 15th of January there was a French – Polish agreement signed about 2000 French officers to help organizing and training the Polish army. Later there was a special French mission in aid of the Polish general staff. On the 23rd of April there was an agreement about a loan of 4,6 million Francs with the promise of further credit. During the peace conference beginning the 18th January 1919 the French diplomacy firmly stood up for the Polish territorial claims for Poznań, Upper Silesia, the corridor to the sea and - as the realization of the Polish – Romanian border - also for Galicia's eastern part, Lithuania and Belarus. During the Versaille discussions the French foreign policy treated the strengthening of Poland as its most important issue second only to the Rhine-question.² The peace reaty with Germany accepted the independence of Poland and created the so-called corridor to the sea and Danzig. Upper Silesia and Marienwarden became part of Germany through referendum. In spite of French support Poland could not annex Lithuania either.³ Concerning the situation of the country's

² Majoros István, „A lengyel kérdés az első világháború idején a francia külpolitikában” [The Polish question during WW1 in the French politics.g, *A Kárpát-medence vonzásában. Tanulmányok Polányi Imre emlékére*, szerk. Fischer Ferenc, Hegedűs Katalin, Majoros István, Vonyó József, Pécs, University Press, 2001, pp. 300–301. Vö. Kalervo Hovi, *Cordon sanitaire or barrière de l'Est? The Emergence of the New French Eastern European Alliance Policy 1917-1919*, Turku, Annales Universitatis Turkuensis tom. 135, 1975, p. 174; Ghislain Castelbajac, „La France et la question polonaise, 1914-1918”, *Recherches sur la France et le problème des nationalités pendant la première guerre mondiale (Pologne, Ukraine, Lithuanie)*, sous la direction de Georges-Henri Soutou, Paris, Presse de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1995, pp. 96–99; Pierre Renouvin, *Le traité de Versailles*, Paris, Flammarion, 1969, p. 53.

³ Ibid p. 302. Cf. Ormos Mária – Majoros István, *Európa a nemzetközi küzdőterén. Felemelkedés és hanyatlás, 1814–1945*, [Europe in the international arena. Rise and decline] Budapest–Pécs, Osiris–Janus, 1998, pp. 258, 278; Halmosy Dénes, *Nemzetközi szerződések, 1918–1945. A két világháború közötti korszak és a második világháború legfontosabb külpolitikai szerződésai*, [International treaties 1918-1945. the most important treaties of the period between the two wars and WW2], Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1983 (Második átdolgozott és bővített kiadás), pp. 59–63. Paris supported the annexation of Lithuania for security poli-

eastern borders, the French government assisted its Polish ally with arms, ammunition and officers even during the Polish Russian war between April and October 1920, though tried to moderate some of its excessive territorial claims. It was the French general Maxime Weygand who directed the 14th – 17th August 1920 battle at Warsaw ending with Polish victory. The important French involvement was the result of the fear that an eventual Soviet victory would threaten the balance of the European peace system created after WW1. The armistice and preliminary treaty signed in Riga on the 12th of October and also 18th of March 1921 peace treaty delineated Poland's eastern borders further east than the Curzon-line suggested earlier, thus annexing West Ukraine and West Belarus too. How much the French politics subordinated its Polish policy to its – frequently shifting – security political interests is shown by the fact that in 1919 there was no French assistance offered to the eastern politics of the Piłsudski government as Paris and London had still hoped for the victory of General Anton Gennikin's white army fighting against the reds, and for a non-Bolshevik Russia.⁴

Strategic considerations were the motive behind the French attitude toward Czechoslovakia, too, in the period following WW1. In Czechoslovakia with President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and foreign minister Eduard Beneš at the head of the country had excellent French connections and to Quai d'Orsay the inhabitants, too, seemed especially Francophile, therefore well suited to become a decisive anti-German power in the region of the River Danube. The French diplomats supported almost all the Czechoslovakian territorial claims thus they could annex the Sudeten, Csallóköz and Transcarpathia too. The Anglo-Saxons did not hinder France in strengthening its potential eastern allies in offsetting the concessions made in the German question, even that it meant the sacrificing of the ethnic principle.⁵ The close Czechoslovakian – French connections were proved by the

fact that on the 13th February 1919 General Maurice Pellé, the head of the French mission, arrived to Prague and was not only a military advisor but on the 4th of July was appointed to commander-in-chief of the Czechoslovakian army.⁶

Romania had its place according to the need to take action against Soviet-Russia in the French foreign politics. The French authorities reckoned with Romania with its 18 million inhabitants as the number first power in the Danube region and especially after December 1917 provided with extensive military and diplomatic assistance. It happened in spite of the fact that Romania made armistice with the central powers on the 9th of December 1917 and peace treaty on the 7th of May 1918; the most important leaders of France, President Georges Clemenceau and foreign minister Stéphen Pichon did not regard Bucharest a militant ally and considered the 1916 treaty promising territory to Romania ineffective. There was later certain détente in the French attitude, partly because of the favourable American statements, thus Paris urged to get in touch with the Romanians, the national council of the Romanian union was accepted as the representative of the country, King Ferdinand was encouraged to re enter the war against the central powers – the great turn around was in aid of the preparation for the French intervention in the south of Russia. It started with the embarkation at Odessa on the 15th of December 1918 with the aim to cut the Bolshevics from the south Russian economic background and Romania proved to be necessary as a deployment rout toward Russia or as the frontier of a Europe under French leadership. France expected Romania to provide with the missing military force, especially live force. For this reason, on the 28th of December 1918, two months after Romania had re-entered the war, Pichon French foreign minister already expressed his opinion in a telegram that Romania should be given the status of an

tical reasons because thus the German region of Königsberg and Memel would have been enclosed.

⁴ Majoros, „A lengyel – szovjet háború. Wrangel és a francia külpolitika 1920-ban” [The Polish – Russian war. Wrangel and the French foreign policy], *Századok*, 2001. (135. évf.) 3. sz. pp. 533–568. Halmosy, i. m. pp. 173–178.

⁵ Halmosy, *Op.cit.* pp. 79–83; Jean Doise – Maurice Vaïsse, *Diplomatie et outil militaire 1871-1991*, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale – Seuil, 1992, p. 333.

⁶ Majoros, „Az Osztrák–Magyar Monarchia felbomlása és a francia törekvések a dunai régióban”, *Magyarország a (nagy)hatalmak erőterében. Tanulmányok Ormos Mária 70. születésnapjára*, [The disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and the French efforts in the Danube region. In: Hungary in the field of great powers] szerk. Fischer Ferenc, Majoros István és Vonyó József, Pécs, University Press, 2000, pp. 433–434. Vö.: Antoine Marès, „La faillite des relations franco-tchécoslovaques. La mission militaire française à Prague, 1926-1938”, *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 111. sz./1978, pp. 46–47.

ally at the peace conference as it had participated in the fight against the central powers. The change of attitude towards Romania was the result of the change in the strategic revaluation by its participation in the Russian war that was further strengthened by the attack of the Red Army in east Galicia in March and the proclamation of the Soviet Republic in Hungary. The victorious great powers strongly counted on the Romanian active participation in solving these problems. The Romanian military was enforced and during the peace discussions diplomatically supported; the Romanian army received food, clothing and equipment. To enforce the eastern military operations a neutral zone was created between Romania and Hungary. On the 25th of March meeting of the Supreme council of the Paris peace conference Clemenceau suggested to send supplies to the Romanian army enough to provide for 100 000 soldiers that originally was intended for Gennikin. Following the failure of the south Russian action the French leadership elaborated the so-called *cordon sanitaire*, i.e. zone of protection composed of small countries to separate Soviet-Russia, with Poland and Romania as the major pillars. In connection to the Hungarian Soviet Republic Marshall Ferdinand Foch called upon the Romanian representatives to intervene in Hungary together with Czechoslovakia. It was also openly declared that the allied powers were completely exhausted in the war thus the military problems of the region had to be solved by the local allies themselves. It meant that the peace conference accepted all the Romanian territorial claims with French diplomatic help. Thus Romania could annex Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania; Romania more than doubled its territory thanks to the acute anti-Bolshevik attitude of the French foreign politics. Though the local representatives of the French Government drew attention to the latent economic and political possibilities during the time following the end of WW1 the military aspect was more important.⁷

⁷ Ibid. pp. 436–441. Vö.: Ádám Magda, *A Kisantant és Európa 1920–1929* [Little Entente and Europe], Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989, p. 17; Catherine Durandin, *A román nép története*, [The history of Romanian] Budapest, Maecenas, 1998, pp. 213–214, 220, 222, 242–243; Georges Castellan, *Histoire de la Roumanie*, Paris, PUF, 1984 (série: Que sais-je?) pp. 66–67; Hovi, i. m. 76; *Documents diplomatiques français sur l'histoire du bassin des Carpates 1918–1932* (henceforth DDFHBC), volume I. octobre 1918 – août 1919. Rédacteur en chef de la série: Magda Ádám.

In the relationship between Paris and the newly created Yugoslav state created the strategic aspects were of prior importance in the political decisions; since it had no borders with Germany neither with Soviet-Russia it could not be used directly in military matters and thus received much less support from France than Poland, Czechoslovakia or Romania; moreover the Serbian government was not ready to participate in the intervention organized by France and Italy against the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Yugoslavia received much less assistance in spite of the fact that it was an ally since the beginning of the war and did not seek a separate peace following the collapse of its military forces from the central powers. France supported the Italian demands in Dalmatia against Yugoslavia. On the 5th of November Clemenceau declared that no Yugoslav state would be accepted before the armistice. The acceptance was delayed, too, because the French foreign Ministry believed a country with Serbian leadership could not assure peace in the region. Finally the 4th June 1919 was the date of the acceptance of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom. Though the military aid requested from France was not granted, France could still regard the Yugoslav state as its potential ally.⁸

Documents recueillis par Magda Ádám, György Litván, Mária Ormos. La préparation de ce volume fut établie en collaboration avec Zoltán Dercze, Katalin Litván et István Majoros, sous la direction de Magda Ádám, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993: dok. 4, 73, 118, 121, 128, 135, 136, 267; Traian Sandu, *La Grande Roumanie alliée de la France. Une péripétie diplomatique des Années Folles? (1919-1933)*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1999, Dok. 1, 4, 7, 8, 18; Ormos Mária, *Padovától Trianonig, 1918–1920* [From Padova to Trianon], Budapest, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1983, pp. 72, 79, 80, 164, 189, 215–217; Général Jean Bernachot, *Les Armées française en Orient après l'armistice de 1918. II. L'Armée du Danube. L'Armée française d'Orient, 28 octobre 1918 – 25 janvier 1920*, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1970, pp. 69–71; Philippe Masson, *La marine française et la mer Noire, 1918-1919*, Paris, Publication de la Sorbonne 20, 1982, Annexe VI; Juhász Gyula, *Magyarország külpolitikája 1919–1945*, [The Hungarian foreign politics], Budapest, Kossuth, 1988, p. 22; Maxime Mourin, *Les relations franco-soviétiques 1917-1967*, Paris, Payot, 1967, pp. 104–105. Majoros István, „Francia intervenció Dél-Oroszországban (1918–1919)” [French intervention in South Russia], *Századok*, 1998 (132. évf.). 6. sz. pp. 1323–1342; Majoros, *Párizs és Oroszország (1917–1919)* [Paris and Russia], op. cit.; Ormos Mária, „Az ukrajnai francia intervencióról és hatásairól Közép-Európában, 1918. október–1919. április” [On the French intervention in Ukraine and its influence in Central Europe], *Történelmi Szemle*, 1977 (20. évf.) 3–4. sz. pp. 404–405.

⁸ Op. cit. pp. 434–436. Cf. Paul Gradwohl, *Genèse et mise en oeuvre du contrôle militaire interallié en Hongrie: exemple de politique militaire française au centre de l'Eu-*

The French polity concerning Hungary – that led to the Trianon peace – should be considered in this security-political strategy of France. Between 1905 and 1908 the French government directed its attention to the economic claims raised by the Hungarian coalition government that stressed its wish for independence, in the hope to use it to weaken the association between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Germany. But since the Hungarian leaders did not protest against the 1908 annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they did not come up to expectations. That was the end of the short-lived Hungarian-French approach. The French developed a negative image of the Hungarians, that they were the friends of Germany, suppressed the Slavs and archaism and the feudal character clashing with the French republican values were cast up, too. All that, however, should not count as an explanation for the foreign policy of France concerning Hungary after WWI. Both Poland under Piłsudski and after the Romanian separate peace Ion I.C. Brătianu too collaborated with the Germans and the oppression of nationalities was characteristic of almost every state of eastern Central Europe; the Hungarian society was probably not more retrograde than the Polish or the Romanian ones. Clemenceau's alleged anti-Hungarian feelings is no clue to the problem either, as he did not sympathize with the demands of 'tiger' Romania either.⁹ In order to be able to understand the attitude of the French foreign polity toward Hungary the French security-political interest will be revisited.

The bloc to be led by France to replace the Russian ally at the back of Germany was intended to fight against Bolshevism to isolate it became the first priority of the French foreign polity. The concept

rope en 1918–1927 Ph.D. dissertation, Paris, Sorbonne, 1999, p. 783; DDFHBC, vol. I. dok. 30, 316, 320, 341; *Francia diplomáciai iratok a Kárpát-medence történetéről 1918–1919*, [French diplomatic papers on the history of Carpathian Basin 1918–1919], szerk. Ádám Magda és Ormos Mária, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1999. dok. 6; *Témoignages français sur les Serbes et la Serbie 1912–1918*, choix de textes, notes de présentation, traduction et commentaires par Mihailo Pavlović, Beograd, Narodna Knjiga, 1988, pp. 82, 144–145; Ormos, *Padovától Trianonig, 1918–1920*, [From Padova to Trianon] pp. 222–227; Hovi, op.cit. 203.

⁹ Cf. Ablonczy, Balázs, „Távol Párizstól. A magyar–francia kapcsolatok 1920 és 1944 közötti történetéhez” [Far from Paris. To the history of the Hungarian–French connections between 1920 and 1944], *Magyarország helye a 20. századi Európában. Tanulmányok*, Ed.. Sípos Balázs, Zeidler Miklós and Pritz Pál, Budapest, Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 2002, pp. 65–68.

of the eastern security zone was the generally accepted idea among the French political elite. There were two directions for its realization struggling with one another and that influenced the politics towards Hungary too.¹⁰ The nationalist group led by Raymond Poincaré and Clemenceau and Pichon – which earlier supported the dividing of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy – believed to achieve their aim through strict peace conditions, by the weakening of Germany and through the military and territorial strengthening of the East Central European countries selected as allies. With Clemenceau as minister president and Pichon foreign minister that became the winning policy, as the example of Poland and Czechoslovakia exemplified, after November 1917. In 1918–1919 there was no detailed French program or schedule for the remodelling of the region,¹¹ giving wide field for *ad hoc* solutions. There was no well-defined policy concerning Hungary either.¹² However, Hungary was a determinant state of the defeated Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose western assessment was aggravated by the confusing domestic situation and especially by the declaration of the Soviet Republic. It seemed, therefore, obvious for France to support its new allies in their territorial demands for parts of Hungary and their actions for the delineation of the new borders during the peace conference. The ethnic and economic aspects were completely pushed out of consideration by security-political interests. Thus it could happen that areas wholly populated by Hungarians as the Csallóköz and Northern Bácska were taken away from Hungary.¹³

¹⁰ Ádám, *A Kisantant 1920–1938*, pp. 45–46.

¹¹ Paul Gradwohl, „A francia katonapolitika és Magyarország az 1920-as évek elején: egy illúzió illusztrációja” [The French military policy and Hungary], *Történelmi Szemle*, 2002 (44.) No.1–2. p. 157.

¹² Uő, „Aspects interalliés de la politique hongroise de la France, 1918–1922” [Franciaország magyarpolitikájának szövetségesközi aspektusai], *Specimina Nova. A Pécsi Janus Pannonius Tudományegyetem Történelmi Tanszékeinek Évkönyve*, szerk. Majoros István, Pécs, 1999, p. 56.

Uő, „Aspects interalliés de la politique hongroise de la France, 1918–1922”, *Specimina Nova. A Pécsi Janus Pannonius Tudományegyetem Történelmi Tanszékeinek Évkönyve*, szerk. Majoros István, Pécs, 1999, p. 56.

¹³ Romsics Ignác, „Détruire ou reconstruire l'Autriche-Hongrie? Franciaország dunai politikájának dilemmája a XX. század elején” [The dilemma of the French Danube-polity at the beginning of the 20th c.], *Helyünk és sorsunk a Duna-medencében*, Budapest, Osiris Kiadó, 1996, p. 29. Vö.: Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference. The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon*, New York, Columbia

There was another group besides the Poincaré-Clemenceau-Pichon trend too, that was of the opinion that a conception that was concentrating on a couple of chosen successor states would have strengthened the political and economic division of Eastern Central Europe and it would not be able to create a adequately important system of allies to counter-balance Germany and the Soviet Union. That second policy preferred the integration of the small states – winners and losers, deemed incapable of surviving alone - under French leadership. In January 1920 Paul Dechanel became president, Alexandre Millerand prime minister and minister of foreign affairs and Maurice Paléologue the secretary general of Quai d'Orsay that offered possibility to try to realise the latter idea. The politicians who had not sympathised with the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had two scenarios for the solution. The first was the creation of a Danube confederation with a maximal version with the participation of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania or a minimal version with Hungary, Poland and Romania. The other possibility would have been the Habsburg restoration. After the failure of the first solution they attempted at the realization of the second.¹⁴

The peace conference had delineated the new borders for Hungary during the Clemenceau-Pichon era already by May 1919.¹⁵ The so-called Trianon peace treaty –lacking of a legitimate Hungarian government - was signed much later, on the 4th of June 1920. All the long time the severe peace conditions were in force. The question arises whether the January 1920 changes in the French foreign policy had any influence upon the development of the French – Hungarian relationship? From the spring 1920 there was an intensive rapprochement between the French and Hungarian governments for a couple of months widely covered by Hungarian and foreign political-historical literature.¹⁶ According to the experts Paléologue who

was held to have pro-Hungary feelings, considered the pacification and integration of Hungary into the new situation of Eastern Central Europe of prime importance. Especially since Hungary was at the geographic centre of the region and a logistical possibility for military and economy. The railway system, branching out in every direction from Budapest as its centre, had its especial appeal. The diplomatic interest was increased by the important French economic firms, e.g. the Schneider – Creusot Trust and the Bank de Paris et des Pays-Bas looking for investment potentials in the region and were interested in the Hungarian railway and port concessions. In exchange for the economic favours France promised Hungary political support in putting in order its conflicts with the neighbouring countries, especially with Romania. Some territorial concessions were also promised. During the French – Hungarian negotiations that started in March 1920 the Hungarian government tried to put the territorial claims into focus. It wanted to achieve to regain the areas surrounding the delineated borders populated mainly by Hungarians; that in Transylvania the Hungarians, the Seklers and the Saxons get autonomy; that a referendum be organized in western Hungary and Transcarpathia. Soon it turned out that the French foreign policy was not prepared to side openly with the Hungarian claims even in questions of minor importance as the French control of keeping the agreement about minority protection or the withdrawing of the Yugoslavian and

Tapier, Paris, Publication de la Sorbonne 6, 1973, pp. 489–500; Jacques Bariéty, „L'«accord révisionniste» franco-hongrois de 1920 – Histoire d'un mythe”, *Les conséquences des traités de paix de 1919–1920 en Europe centrale et sud-orientale*, éd. par Pierre Aygoberry, Jean-Paul Bled, István Hunyadi, Strassbourg, Presses universitaires de Strassbourg, 1987, pp. 75–83; Ádám Magda, „Duna-konföderáció vagy Kisantant?” [Danube confederation or Little Entente?], *Történelmi Szemle*, 1977 (20. évf.) 3–4. sz. pp. 440–448; -, *A Kisantant 1920–1938*, i. m. pp. 44–58; -, *A Kisantant és Európa 1920–1929* [The Little Entente and Europe], pp. 39–75; Anne Orde, „France and Hungary in 1920: Revisionisme and Railways”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1980 (15), pp. 475–492; Romsics, „Détruire ou reconstruire l'Autriche-Hongrie? Franciaország dunai politikájának dilemmája a XX. század elején”, *Helyünk és sorsunk a Duna-medencében*, op.cit. pp. 30–32; Ormos Mária, „Francia–magyar tárgyalások 1920-ban” [French-Hungarian discussions in 1920], *Századok*, 1975 (109. évf.) 5–6. sz., pp. 904–949; Hovi, *Alliance de revers – Stabilization of France's Alliance policies in East Central Europe 1919-1921*, Turku, Annales Universitatis Turkuensis, ser. B., tom. 163, 1984, pp. 53–64, 85–89, 110–115.

University Press, 1942; Ormos, *Padovától Trianonig, 1918–1920*, i. m.; Romsics Ignác, *A trianoni békeszerződés* [The Trianon peace treaty], Budapest, Osiris, 2004.

¹⁴ Ádám, *A Kisantant 1920–1938*, pp. 45–46.

¹⁵ Fülöp Mihály–Sipos Péter, *Magyarország külpolitikája a XX. Században* [The Hungarian foreign policy in the 20th c.] Budapest, Aula, 1998, p. 63.

¹⁶ Pierre Renouvin, „Aux origines de la Petite Entente. Les hésitations de la politique française dans l'été 1920”, *Études européennes: Mélanges offerts à Victor-Lucien*

Romanian army from the Trianon-delineated Hungarian territory.¹⁷ The negotiations came to a deadlock and its closing of was postponed when the offer of Hungarian aid for Poland in the Polish – Russian war was introduced; had it been realized it could have strategically upgraded Hungary. The Hungarian leadership aimed at the lessening of the military restrictions set by the Trianon peace. Peléologue did not turn it down immediately for strategic reasons. It enabled him to urge the Prague government to cooperate with Poland and to defend the Carpathian line from the Soviets mentioning the possibility of the appearance of Hungarian troops. That is, Paris used Hungary as a tool to manipulate its reluctant ally.¹⁸ After the August 1920 victory of the Polish army at Warsaw made the Hungarian aid unnecessary. The French – Hungarian approach was ended due to the violent protest of the countries surrounding Hungary and of Great Britain and Italy joining them.¹⁹

In spite of the sign of a sincere approach it seems that Quai d'Orsay did not mean to change its earlier policy concerning Hungary. In March and April 1920 – i.e. well into the secret French – Hungarian negotiations - the Council of Ambassadors meeting in London considered once again the question of the Hungarian borders following the Hungarian action. The British and Italian representatives would have been open to accept changes in certain points of the peace treaty with Hungary but the French delegates were adamant in maintaining the earlier severe decisions. That is the French foreign policy led by Peléologue wanted Hungary's integration within the framework defined in the Trianon peace treaty.²⁰

It can therefore be stated that the France had thrust into the background every other consideration and directed its Eastern Central

¹⁷ Fülöp–Sipos, op.cit. pp. 87–91; Ádám, *A Kisantant 1920–1938*, pp. 46–48. Gradvohl, „A francia katonapolitika és Magyarország az 1920-as évek elején: egy illúzió illusztrációja” [The French military polity and Hungary at the beginning of the 1920s: the illustration of an illusion], op.cit. pp. 149–150.

¹⁸ Majoros, „A lengyel–szovjet háború. Wrangel és a francia külpolitika 1920-ban” [The Polish – Soviet war. Wrangel and the French foreign policy], op.cit. pp. 551–552.

¹⁹ Ádám, *A Kisantant 1920–1938*, pp. 49–58.

²⁰ Romsics, „Détruire ou reconstruire l'Autriche-Hongrie? Franciaország dunai politikájának dilemmája a XX. század elején”, *Helyünk és sorsunk a Duna-medencében*, op.cit. pp. 31–32.

European policy according to its own security interests defined by Germany and Soviet Russia. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania had received every possible military and diplomatic aid: their army was strengthened, and their territorial claims fulfilled. Hungary was left to play the vanquished and defenceless adversary.

The eastern Central European aims of Quai d'Orsay was helped by the fact that France had the strongest land forces and was a great power determining the European politics. Its military force were present in the region since the battles of WW1. The Polish, Czech, Romanian and Serbian armies could thank their being or survival to French assistance.²¹ At the conference organized in Paris under the chairmanship of president Clemenceau the French government had the greatest influence on the creation of the peace treaty.²² Since the spring of 1918 it played an increasingly dominant role within the Entente. During the peace negotiations the great powers accepted the principle that by straightening the situation of a region that the great power had the last say which had a ‘special interest’ in the given area and where it was present with armed forces. At the given period it was France who was entitled to the privilege.²³

France's elbowroom in eastern Central Europe was considerably restricted by the fact that though having won the ‘great war’ it became economically and militarily exhausted. Its troops in the region were not strong enough for independent actions. The 7th October 1918 the French military leadership made a decision that changed the situation. The eastern army of the allied powers had been reorganized under the leadership of General Henri Mathias Berthelot and its area of action relocated. There was the separated Danube army consisting of four divisions, a cavalry regiment and an air service under the commandship of General Henri Mathias Berthelot for the French – Romanian attack against southern Russia. The army of Franchey d'Esperey – contrary to earlier plans – were

²¹ Gradvohl, „A francia katonapolitika és Magyarország az 1920-as évek elején: egy illúzió illusztrációja”, op.cit. p. 151.

²² Fülöp–Sipos, op.cit. pp. 51–52. President Wilson could have queried Clemenceau's influence. However, the American president's international manoeuvring was greatly hampered his domestic situation, that his position was undermined by the defeat of the Democratic Party at the November 1918. elections for the Congress.

²³ Op.Cit. p. 46; Ormos, *Padovától Trianonig, 1918–1920*, pp. 7–8.

ordered not to advance toward Austria and Hungary. The decision deprived France of the means of direct pressure in Eastern Central Europe,²⁴ that had further consequences. The French units stationed there could not be supplemented not only because of the above-mentioned lack of recruits but because of logistic problems, too, that were impossible to be solved. Germany had prohibited any passing through its territory. During the Polish – Soviet war Czechoslovakia first put an embargo on the transport of war supplies to Poland, and later obstructed it. According to the decision of the peace conference dated on 11th of August 1919 no outside powers had the right to interfere in Austrian and Hungarian territories which annulled the relevant item of the Padova armistice. Even France could not have evaded the decision.²⁵ All these military, logistic and international legal aspects led to the inability of the French foreign policy to act decisively in the eastern Central European developments contrary to all appearances. It also had to take into account the standpoint of its allies, Great Britain and Italy. Though France accepted the ‘prior responsibility’ in the region, the decisions concerning Hungary were made by the allies between 1918 and 1922.²⁶ If an ally vetoed Paris was unable to carry out its plans. Thus e.g. the intervention of Lloyd George and Thomas Woodrow Wilson Clemenceau could not achieve the Polish annexation of Danzig; the American president vetoed the Polish annexation of Lithuania.²⁷ And the elbowroom of France was even more restricted by the attitude of its chosen allies in the region.

The countries of the region started out from the Wilsonian principles of self-determination and kept repeating them during the peace talks and expected of the great powers to count with them as independent factors. The retraction and collapse of the empires earlier

ruling the region left behind a vacuum that the victors, Great Britain, France and Italy, could not fill by their own decision, because of their limited economic and military sources. That increased the potentials of the local governments in their international manoeuvring as they could themselves decide which of the great powers they would prefer. They were also aware of their own strategic importance in solving the crises of the region and tried to make most of it in their own interests. Thus Prime minister Brătianu stressed at every possible forum the key position of Romania in checking Soviet Russia.²⁸ The so-called small allies of France accepted their role as clients and handed in the bill. Beneš asked foreign minister Pichon to involve Prague in any kind of intervention or war started by the allies of France, in the hope of securing the territories of Hungary to be annexed by Czechoslovakia.²⁹ As we could see above, that was also the Hungarian strategy in the Polish – Russian war. The independent army strengthened the confidence of the Polish, Czechoslovakian and Yugoslav leaders and gave the illusion of equality with the great powers,³⁰ that was increased by their local military success. Though the countries in question had received considerable help to create their own army, they did not remain dependent on it. Since there was not enough military equipment, the French leaders allowed their local allies a free hand to solve the military problems of the regions. As time passed France was left fewer and fewer trumps to keep a firm hand over its small allies: the acknowledging of the emigrant organization, the recognition of the governments, the acceptance of the territorial claims all were gradually introduced. Paris tried to deal with the supported states as subordinates, especially Romania that in certain papers of the French foreign affairs was referred to as a potential future colony. The proof is that France did not allow the ‘little victors’ to militarily control over the vanquished countries.³¹ However, the French leadership became more and more ambiguous. The small allies followed the request of their French protector only if it coincided their own interests. Thus, e.g. Beneš who enjoyed the confidence of the peace

²⁸ Fülöp-Sipos, *op.cit.* pp. 55, 64, 85–86.

²⁹ Ádám, *A Kisantant 1920–1938*, i. m. p. 36.

³⁰ Gradwohl, „A francia katonapolitika és Magyarország az 1920-as évek elején: egy illúzió illusztrációja”, p. 155.

³¹ *op.cit.* pp. 155–156.

²⁴ Majoros, „Francia intervenció Dél-Oroszországban (1918–1919)” [French intervention in Southern Russia], p. 1330; Gradwohl, „A francia katonapolitika és Magyarország az 1920-as évek elején” [French military policy and Hungary] pp. 150–151. For major documents c.f.: DDFHBC, vol. I.

²⁵ Gradwohl, „A francia katonapolitika és Magyarország az 1920-as évek elején: egy illúzió illusztrációja”, pp. 149, 155.

²⁶ Gradwohl, „Aspects interalliés de la politique hongroise de la France, 1918-1922”, p. 56.

²⁷ Majoros, „A lengyel kérdés az első világháború idején a francia külpolitikában”, *A Kárpát-medence vonzásában...*, [The Polish question in the French foreign policy during WW1], pp. 301–302.

conference,³² in 1920 flatly refused to cooperate with Poland that was threatened by Soviet Russian attacks because of the dispute over Teschen. Sometimes the countries allegedly of French orientation made especially adverse steps and asked the help of other great powers against France. The policy can be best illustrated when the Czechoslovakian, Romanian and Yugoslavian governments turned to Great Britain and Italy to stop the French – Hungarian secret negotiations in 1920. On the 14th of August 1920 the Czechoslovakian – Yugoslavian agreement was signed that formed the basis of the Little Entente. The organization later included Romania and it was created originally in opposition of the French aspirations.³³ Between the two wars therefore it was mere propaganda when Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania referred to France as their ‘nurturing mother’. This way they could successfully satisfy the need for spiritual appreciation of the French public and certain political elite. In reality those countries did not consider France as the fundament of their military strategy.³⁴ The public opinion in Hungary and the neighbouring countries have believed that France had an exclusive role in the development of the peace arrangements after WW1 and therefore must bear the whole responsibility; the belief shared by the scholarly literature too, however, does not correspond to the facts, as was revealed by the relevant French papers referring to the period in the 1980s.³⁵

Of the effectiveness of the new French East Central European policy – of which the treaty with Hungary signed in the Palace of Great Trianon was an integral part – it can be stated that

- it could not establish a system of allies that could have been effective economically and militarily against Germany and Soviet Russia;
- the Danube confederation could not be established because of the resistance of the countries involved

³² Romsics, „Détruire ou reconstruire l’Autriche-Hongrie? Franciaország dunai politikájának dilemmája a XX. század elején”, *Helyünk és sorsunk a Duna-medencében*, p. 29.

³³ Ádám, *A Kisantant 1920–1938*, p. 49, 52–56.

³⁴ Gradwohl, „A francia katonapolitika és Magyarország az 1920-as évek elején: egy illúzió illusztrációja”, p. 153.

³⁵ Ormos, *Padovától Trianonig, 1918–1920*, pp. 7–11; Gradwohl, „A francia katonapolitika és Magyarország az 1920-as évek elején: egy illúzió illusztrációja”, pp. 145–146.

- the policy relying on the victorious small allies was just an illusion. They could not muster military power and economic potential comparable to a great power either separately or together. They could not have been able to stand up against an enemy comparable to Germany.³⁶
- They were not to be mobilized with any certainty to defend French interests and at the time there was no alliance concluded with them
- They had no true community of interest with France: it was only Poland that pursued real anti-German politics; Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia did not realized the Soviet menace
- All the antagonism between the countries has been preserved
- The instability of the region was increased by the creation of multinational states with nationalistic antagonisms.

At the beginning of the 1920s the contemporaries still had the impression that France was a strong great power able to domineer East Central Europe. The cracks in its eastern system of defence would come into sight only later.

³⁶ Gradwohl, „A francia katonapolitika és Magyarország az 1920-as évek elején: egy illúzió illusztrációja”, p. 155.

István G. Vass

Nationality movements under the spell of the Wilsonian ideas in the focus of Romanian efforts to gain territory

Abstract

At the beginning of the 20th c. of the inhabitants of the south-eastern region of present-day Hungary two-thirds claimed to be Hungarians, one-fifth Slovaks, the rest Germans, Romanians and Serbians. The Romanian empire occupied the area in April 1919 and organized a movement, especially among the Slovak inhabitants, to urge for the annexation of the region to Romania, in order to support Romania's aspirations for more territories before the Paris peace conference.

The mentality, political and cultural aspirations of the Slovaks living in the area between the Rivers Körös and Maros covering about 8000 square kilometre were mainly influenced by the fact that they were embedded – together with German, Romanian and Serbian groups – among the majority Hungarian nationals. In 1910 the Slovakian population was 23% in Co. Békés, 12% in Co. Csanád, in the two largest counties of the region, while Hungarians represented 73% and 75% respectively.¹ The island-like settlement of the Slovaks and other minorities is even more conspicuous if the data are analysed district by district considering the whole area of the counties Békés and Csanád and the district of Co. of Arad too, that were part of the Romanian territorial claims and also involved in the borders defined by the Trianon treaty.

¹ The 1910 census of the countries of the Hungarian Crown. Part I. Budapest, 1912. Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények. Új sorozat. Vol. 42.

Table 1.

Distribution of the population according to districts in 1910²

District	Total population	Hungarian	%	Slovak	%	Gyerman	%	Romanian	%	Serbian	%
<i>County Békés</i>											
Szarvas	46 255	26 171	56,6	19 899	43,0	78	0,2	39	0,1	3	–
Gyoma	25 213	24 382	96,8	200	0,8	601	2,4	9	–	4	–
Szeghalom	36 004	35 805	99,5	93	0,3	58	0,1	42	0,1	2	–
Békés	45 810	36 640	80,0	5 842	10,8	3 222	7,0	87	0,2	6	–
Békéscsaba	47 930	17 305	36,1	29 936	62,5	287	0,6	313	0,7	42	0,1
Orosháza	59 351	48 443	81,6	10 537	17,8	136	0,2	128	0,2	12	–
Gyula	14 790	10 707	72,4	950	6,4	85	0,8	2 967	20,1	–	–
<i>County Csanád</i>											
Battonya	33 750	26 433	78,3	724	2,2	337	1,0	3 168	9,4	3 011	8,9
Központ	23 786	16 167	68,0	5 077	21,3	111	0,5	1 733	7,3	623	2,6
Mezőkovácsház	26 853	23 289	86,7	3 210	12,0	151	0,6	158	0,6	21	–
Nagylak	25 941	8 515	32,4	7 970	30,7	206	0,8	8 837	34,1	269	1,0
<i>County Arad</i>											
Elek	34 209	9 405	27,4	2 885	8,4	9 945	29,1	11 826	34,6	4	–
Total	419 892	283 262	67,5	87 323	20,8	15 217	3,6	29 307	7,0	3997	1,0

From the above table it becomes evident that with the exception of three districts (Békéscsaba, Elek and Nagylak) the Hungarian inhabitants represented absolute majority and it was only in the Békéscsaba district that the exact number of Slovaks exceeded that of the Hungarians.

It is known that when the area was re-settled after regaining the country from the Turks in the 18th c. The newly founded villages had a more or less homogeneous population, people belonging to the same nationality were settled there. Slovak population was considerable first of all in Szarvas, to a less extent in Békéscsaba and Tótkomlós; there were Romanians in Kétegyháza, Germans in Elek, etc. It also occurred that two or three nationalities settled down at one place: in Mezőberény Hungarians, Slovaks and Germans, In Gyula Hungar-

² Ibid. 'other' nationalities registered by the census (in majority gipsies)– have not been included into the tables as their proportion was below 1%.

ians, Romanians and Germans, In Battonya Hungarians, Romanians and Serbs. Regarding the whole area, the majority of the settlers were Hungarians. Part of them were resettler having fled from the Turks from this area. They occupied Füzesgyarmat, Vésztő, Sarkad, Doboz, Szeghalom, Köröstarcsa, Körösladány, Békésszentandrás and Békés. Hungarians from Transdanubia settled down at Gyoma, Endrőd, Orosháza and other villages. The ethnic pattern was further added to when the town getting overpopulated, sent out settlers Slovaks too, who founded new villages, e.g. poor tobacco cultivating communities e.g. Pitvaros, Ambrózfalva, Mezőkovácsháza and others, or the more prosperous families bought divisions of the crown property that grew into quickly developing settlements, e.g. Medgyesháza.³

It is evident that there was communication between the settlements of different ethnic communities from the start on. After the emancipation of serfs, since the middle of the 109th c., the earlier closed peasant communities gradually loosened and simultaneously the earlier closed ethnic communities too. Market areas had developed, the inhabitants began to migrate, moved into towns and mingled with one another. That meant reciprocal cultural and economical influence. It meant slow assimilation for the minority ethnics since they could only participate in the social development if they accepted the majority language as lingua franca. Bilingualism spread that besides the inner need was assisted by the efforts to make Hungarian the language of the administration, the official policy of education and also through the development within the Lutheran church that was the major support of the identity for a great part of the Slovak minority.⁴

³ Borovszky Samu: Csanád vármegye története 1715-ig. Bp. 1896 [the history of Co. Csanád till 1715]; Karácsonyi János: Békésvármegye története. Gyula, 1896 [History of Co. Békés]; Maday Pál: Békés megye városainak és községeinek története. Békéscsaba, 1960 [istory of the towns and townships of Co. Békés]; Oltvai Ferenc: A Csanád vármegyei telepés községek társadalma és igazgatása a XIX. század első felében. Szeged, 1978 [The society and administration of the settlements of Co. Csanád in the first half of the 19th c.]; Further there are local histories and ethnic monographs recently published by the above mentioned localities.

⁴ Evangélikus Országos Levéltár [National Lutheran Archives = NLA] Békés Megyei Levéltára [Co. Békés Archives] bundles 63. and 74. Gyivicsány, Anna: Fejlődés-változatok amagyarországi szlovákok hagyományos kultúrájában. A magyarországi

The assimilation of Slovak inhabitants in the settlements though went in different ways and at different speed, however, was unstoppable as shown by *Table 2.* below.

Table 2. The proportion of the Slovak inhabitants in localities in 1852/1854 and 1910⁵

Settlement	Proportion of the Slovak population in 1852/1854 %	Number of inhabitants	Hungarian %		Slovak %	
			In 1910			
Szarvas	91,1	25 879	9 533	36,8	16 262	62,8
Békéscsaba	89,8	42 599	13 271	31,1	28 682	67,3
Tótkomlós	97,0	10 502	1 146	10,9	9 307	88,6
Nagybánhegyes	61,4	5 204	2 467	47,4	2 691	51,7
Medgyesegyháza	– ⁶	3 628	1 431	39,4	2 048	57,4
Ambrózfalva	94,3	1 042	45	4,3	991	95,1
Csanádalberti	95,9	1 370	60	4,4	1 303	95,1
Pitvaros	97,1	2 936	170	5,8	2 746	93,5
Nagylak	52,1	14 043	1 439	10,2	7 651	54,5

At the beginning of the 19th c. the centres of Slovak linguistic renewal and national awakening in the capital and the Upland expressed interest in the Slovak population of the Great Plain (and

Banat), partially because the peasants there were supposed to be well to do and willing to offer efficient financial help. It turned out soon that no such assistance will be offered causing severe criticism against the larger settlements (e.g. Békéscsaba and Szarvas).⁷ The disappointment felt toward this region has not abated in the attitude of the Slovaks organizing and then achieving their nationhood.

The settlements that developed into market towns (Békéscsaba, Szarvas, Mezőberény) had developed gradually a stratum of bureaucrats and intelligentsia of double identity without denying their Slovak origins. Thus the inhabitants could communicate with the local representatives of administration in their mother tongue and did not consider the local authorities alien. At the same time the prominent intellectuals, teachers, ministers, historians (Lajos Haan, Mihály Zsilinszky, Károly Sztraka, Pál, Gajdács later Lajos Zsigmond Szeberényi) living in the region at the middle of the 19th c. and who have highly been estimated both by the Hungarian and Slovak cultural history, together with their communities got into the crossfire of both national movements. They could not disregard that they had lived in Hungarian milieu but also tried to protect the Slovak traditions too. That was expressed by their works, published both in Hungarian and in Slovak. They were aware of the fact that the Slovaks in the Great Plain developed different ways of life, different mentality than those in the Upland. As Lajos Haan put it: ‘In character they represent a middle between the Hungarians and the Upland Slovaks.’⁸

Considering the following decades, the events of the turn of the 19th – 20th cc., there are two more aspects to be mentioned. One is that in the spiritual centres of the Slovaks of Co. Békés at Békéscsaba and Szarvas, due to the bourgeois development and urbanization several Jewish families settled down. Though their number was proportionately not significant they were more active than average in organizing and financing societies, cultural institutions. Their presence introduced the liberal ideas alleviating the national approach. By their activities, e.g. publishing Hungarian language newspapers, books, supporting theatre-companies they strengthened the development of Magyarization. The Socialist ideas and political organiza-

szlovákok népi kultúrájának atlasza. Békéscsaba 1996 pp.7-74 [variations in the development of the traditional Slovak culture in Hungary. The cultural atlas of the Slovaks in Hungary]. Etnokulturális változások Tótkomlóson. Tótkomlós néprajza. Tótkomlós – Gyula, 1996. pp.379-395. [Ethno-cultural changes at Tótkomlós] A szlovák kultúra intézményei [Békéscsabán]. Etnokulturális változások. A művelődés évszázadai Békéscsabán. Szerk. Käfer István–Köteles Lajos. Békéscsaba, 1998. 195–219.[The institutions of Slovak culture. Centuries of culture at Békéscsaba]; Dedinszky Gyula: A szlovák betű útja Békéscsabán. Békéscsaba, 1987.[the way of Slovak literacy]; Virág László: A közoktatás évszázadai. A művelődés évszázadai Békéscsabán. Békéscsaba, 1998. 290–346 [centuries of education at Békéscsaba]; Tótkomlós története. Szerk. Szincsek György. Tótkomlós, 1996 [History of Tótkomlós].

⁵ Source: Szabó Ferenc: Békés és Csanád megyék nemzetiségi statisztikája a XIX. század közepén. Békési Élet, 1980. 3. sz. 283–294. [the ethnic statistics of the Counties Békés and Csanád at the middle of the 19th c.], and A Magyar Szent Korona Országainak 1910. évi népszámlálása... 1910 Census. – The Table does not show other ethnic groups except Hungarians and Slovaks.

⁶ In the 1850s Medgyesegyháza was not yet an independent township.

⁷ Gyivicsán Anna: Op.Cit. pp. 196–197.

⁸ Op.Cit. p.208

tions appearing on the scene at the turn of the 19th – 20th cc worked in the same direction and put the social-economic conflict of interest into the focus of public discourse and in the belief that these would automatically solve the minority conflicts too.

The name of András L. Áchim should be mentioned. In his first speech in the parliament on the 11th of May 1905 he dissociated himself from upland politicians fighting for the Slovak national aspirations was not kowtowing in front of the Hungarian majority or self-serving exhibitionism but the sincere expression of the Slovak feeling of the Great Plain saying that it was a fact that not all the citizens of Hungary were of Hungarian nationality, there were several nationalities speaking several languages, serving Hungary with blood and money. He declared, had he been living in France, he would have been a French patriot, in the land of the Jews a Jewish one; since he was living in Hungary he wanted to be among the first patriots of Hungary.⁹ It is noteworthy that the rural representatives of Slovak descent of the agrarian – Socialist movement had published their complaints, reports, opinions both in Hungarian and Slovak newspapers.¹⁰ That approach characterized Áchim's political appearance too, depending on the occasion and his audience he delivered his speech either in Hungarian or in Slovak. It also happened that at the same occasion he delivered a part of his speech in Hungarian and the other part in Slovak.¹¹ Both the various agrarian Socialist movements and Áchim's Peasants' Party took the preservation of the linguistic-cultural identity for granted, but never transformed it into a policy of venting minority grievances. More importantly the message of the Agrarian Socialist movement and Áchim's peasant movement was that their interests should be asserted through the local self-governments, the

⁹ Az 1905–1910. évi országgyűlés képviselőházának naplója. I. Budapest, 1905. 259–260. [the Diary of the House of Commons of the 1905-1910 parliament.]; Fancsovits, György: Áchim L. András beszédei az országgyűlésben. Békéscsaba, 1986. p.5. [The speeches of A.L.Á.].

¹⁰ Siraczky, Jan: A tótkomlói szlovákok 1918 előtti nemzetiségi, kulturális és társadalmi mozgalmainak történetéhez. Békési Élet, 1982. 1. sz. pp. 28–38 [The history of national, cultural and social movements of the Slovaks of Tótkomlós before 1918]; Gombos János: Agrármozgalom Tótkomlóson. Áchim L. András az idő mérlegén. Szerk. Hrivnák Mihály és Molnár M. Eszter. Bp., 2003. pp.75–79. [Agrarian movement at Tótkomlós].

¹¹ Gombos Op.Cit.

positions obtained in township, and eventually in the county administration and through an active participation in the local life.

A different road was chosen by the society of Tótkomlós in the south western corner of Co. Békés and the small villages of Co. Csanád shown in *Table 2*. Their mentality was considerably different from the one explained above. At the beginning of the 20th c. these settlements had still preserved their closed peasant communities and their Slovak identity. In 1910 only 4-10% of the inhabitants claimed to be Hungarians, and according to the census data more than half of them did not speak Hungarian. Nevertheless such notaries were usually appointed who did not know the Slovak Language that became the source of conflicts for long decades.¹²

It was the inhabitants who created the institutions of self-education, preservation of traditions, however modest they were, which also were the basis of the awareness of ethnic identity. In 1903 the Folkbank was founded in Nagylak, the largest Slovak bank on the Great Plain.¹³ Between 1902 and 1910 the inhabitants of Tótkomlós, Nagylak and Pitvaros organized societies that served special nationality aspirations besides social and cultural aims. These townships had Slovak language theatre groups too.

Before WW1 the situation was especially explosive at Tótkomlós. The readers' complained in various papers about the lack of specialists to educate them in their mother tongue, because the Lutheran teachers did not care about it. In 1904 there was a well committed applicant, Lajos Hrdlicska, for the post of the Lutheran minister but was turned down because the higher ecclesiastical authorities found his patriotism insufficient. But the members of the Agrarian Society (farmers, small landowners and some members of the intelligentsia) hurt in their Slovak identity, after carrying out wide propaganda activities among the Slovaks of the region, managed to have Hrdlicska's appointment consented.¹⁴ Similar conflict broke out because of

¹² 1868. Article XLIV. Rules about the language use of the nationalities and the required duties of the administration §§14, 20. 21. ruling that the nationalities had the right to decide what should be the language of matriculation and education, township meetings, and the administrative persons must use the language of the township.

¹³ Pechány Adolf: A tótokról. Bp. 1913. 167–174. [On the Slovaks].

¹⁴ Gombos Op.Cit.

the appointment of judges. In January 1908 Mihály Lehoczky, a self-respecting Slovak farmer, member of Achim's movement, was elected judge, in spite of the objections of the district and county authorities.¹⁵

Without reciting more examples it can be stated that the small closed rural societies were influenced by the changes occurring in their wider environment, by the connection to the Hungarian population of the neighbouring settlements and frequently suffered from the undiplomatic behaviour of administrative authorities that disregarded the law regulating language use and that became the source of real and imagined grievances and that led to further conflicts.

Following the collapse after WW1 the government of the bourgeois democratic revolution promised to insure the general human rights, improve the social services, the realization of the agrarian reform, the more equitable distribution of working time and wages and tried to redress the grievances of the multiethnic country's non-Hungarian inhabitants. The Károlyi-government entering office on the 31st of October 1918 promised important measures in the field of administration, education and language use. It planned to establish counties and districts for the ethnic nationalities to enable the Slovaks, Romanians, Germans and other minorities living in the area to create self-governments of county rank for their own administration and education. Considering the present topic besides the X. 1918. and VI. 1919 laws especially important is Law XXX. 1919 too 'On the self-government of Slovenska Krajina'. It is well known that the latter became irrelevant already at its creation as the Upland had already come under the rule of Czechoslovakia and the law did not mention the Slovaks of the Great Plain. It was suitable, however, to embolden the leaders of some minority communities and also to give arguments to the local authorities in support of their rigid policy.

The events of 1918–1919 support the above discussed difference between the mentality of the Slovaks living in the southern and northern area of the southern region east of the River Tisza.

¹⁵ Lapusnyi András: Lehoczky Mihály életútja. Áchim L. András az idő mérlegén. Szerk. Hrivnák Mihály és Molnár M. Eszter. Bp., 2003. pp. 80–81. [The life of Mihály Lehoczky. Á.L.A. examined].

In the strained situation the Slovak inhabitants of the market towns in the centre and northern part of Co. Békés, who were already connected to the processes of integration generated by the general economic and bourgeois developments – as was the case among the Hungarian population too – were especially interested in the following questions: they demanded the extension of political rights general suffrage included, measures against the acute social problems and the realization of the land reform.¹⁶ The inhabitants of Békéscsaba, Mezőberény and Szarvas, though preserving its cultural and linguistic identity showed little interest in the realization of national aspirations at political level. According to researches these settlements did not raise national political or cultural claims either at that period or later after the Communist takeover.¹⁷ The Law 206 631/1918. VKM issued in November 1918 did not cause any response either that permitted the teaching of the nationality languages schools, stopped the compulsory lessons of Hungarian in the first and second forms and ordered the teaching of the minority languages as subjects. In the above-mentioned settlements there was no change in the proportion of the subjects taught in Hungarian and Slovak during the time of the two revolutions. Concerning the teaching of the mother tongue in secondary schools, there were optional language courses at the secondary schools with only 2-4% of the pupils participating. In February 1919 these students too quitted.¹⁸

¹⁶ Hajdu Tibor: Az 1918-as polgári demokratikus forradalom. Bp. 1968. 119 [The 1918 bourgeois democratic revolution]; Fancsovits György: A polgári demokratikus forradalom sajátosságai Békés megyében. A Tanácsköztársaság Békés megyében 1919. Békéscsaba, 1969. pp. 98–100 [The characteristics of the bourgeois democratic revolution in Co. Békés]. The national council of Co. Békés – together with the representatives of minority settlements – accepted a radical land policy on the 15th of November 1918.

¹⁷ A Tanácsköztársaság Békés megyében 1919. Szerk. Szabó Ferenc. Békéscsaba, 1969 [The Hungarian Soviet Republic in Co. Békés]; Nádor Jenő: Szarvas története. Szarvas, 1922 [The history of Szarvas]; Dedinszky Gyula: Békéscsaba nyelvi és vallási képének alakulása. Békéscsaba, 1987. stb [The linguistic and religious development of Békéscsaba].

¹⁸ Tilkovszky Lóránt: A szlovákok történetéhez Magyarországon 1919–1945. Bp. 1989. 41–42. [Hungaro-Bohemioslovaka, 3.] [The History of Slovaks in Hungary 1919–1949].

At Tótkomlós and other smaller settlements in Co. Csanád the situation was different. Besides social demands and the land reform nationality sentiments came also to the surface.¹⁹

Lajos Hrdlicska, the Lutheran minister who had been and active participant in the Slovak movements of Tótkomlós for 15 years wrote in his memoirs that the war had represented the turning point in the widening of their aspirations. They were in constant contact with the Slovak and Czech politicians of the Upland and Prague respectively who introduced them to the activities of the Czech and Slovak emigration, to the aspirations towards an independent Czechoslovakia. During WW1 it became apparent for the Slovaks of the Great Plain that besides the demand of cultural rights political rights too should be included.²⁰ They shared their information and aspirations with the similarly thinking Slovak leaders of the settlements in Co. Csanád and were in contact with the Slovaks of Nagylak too.

The news of the events coming from Budapest caused disturbances on the 1st and 2nd of November 1918. The shops of Jewish merchants were broken into and the notary and administrators who did not speak the Slovak language were chased away. The meeting scheduled for the 2nd of November re-elected Mihály Lehoczky the popular Slovak farmer as judge, and the new organization of authority the National Council with Lajos Hrdlicska as its president; some its members were not ready to give their oath in Hungarian saying that they Slovaks and not Hungarians.²¹

¹⁹ The centre of the nationality movement was Nagylak (that was annexed to Romania in 1920). The Slovaks of Nagylak would have liked to join Yugoslavia, however the Romanian influence became stronger and from January 1919 the organization of the Romanian inhabitants of the place and the armed Romanian guard defined the developments. OL K40 830/1918. sz.; Cf. the contemporary periodicals of the region: Csanádvármegye Hivatalos Lapja 1919. június 26. és július 3.; Makói Független Újság 1918. december 2. és december 24.; Arad és Vidéke 1918. december 20.; Délmagyarország 1919. február 23.; Népköztársaság 1919. február 22. és február 25.; Makói Független Újság 1919. február 25.

²⁰ Prof. L. J. Hrdlička: Spoved e učtovanie exulanta. Bratislava, 1945. Idézi: Koppány János: A tótkomlósi evangélikus gyülekezet és az 1918–1919-es forradalmi időszak. 6. (Kézirat, Békéscsabai Munkácsy Mihály Múzeum adattára.) [The Lutheran congregation of Tótkomlós and the 1918-1919 revolution].

²¹ HL HM PDF II. Szegedi Katonai Kerület Parancsnoksága No. 47-10-398. [The Szeged Military HQ Archives].

In Csanádalberti and Pitvaros the anarchic developments of the first November days were to replace the notary who did not know the Slovak language and the demand was consistently held even after the uproar abated. However, the authorities of the Co. Csanád sabotaged the appointment of administrators with knowledge of Slovak. They could not prevent the meetings and minutes being kept in Slovak, it was also possible to regulate School teaching in Slovak that was kept till the Romanian army marched in April 1919. Afterwards the Hungarian teaching language was re-introduced causing the schools to shut in some townships for several months.²²

Besides the requirement of the use of the mother tongue there were peculiar political demand too, especially at Pitvaros probably instigated by the Slovak agents coming from Nagylak and the southern region and the propaganda material distributed by them could be the basis of the creation of the Slovak Democratic Party on the 7th of November, with Pál Veszelszki retired Lutheran teacher as chairman. The party held daily meetings where the common understanding developed that the only way of the Slovak success was by independence from Hungary. On the 27th of November the party – analysing the Wilsonian idea of self-determination in their own way – declared their wish to annex Pitvaros to Slovakia.²³ At the beginning of January the national council was re-organized, all the Hungarian members left out; and ruled that the minutes be kept only in Slovak and it will be the language of administration and education too. On the 7th of January – probably after realizing that joining up with Slovakia was unfeasible – there was the resolution made to *annex Pitvaros to Yugoslavia* as was also the wish of Nagylak and Újvidék (Novi Sad). The copy of the minutes were taken to Pécs to the Yugoslav authorities staying there, however, eleven days later the delegation came back with the reply that *Yugoslavia did not want Pitvaros*.²⁴

The attempts of Pitvaros, a community of 3000 inhabitants who were mainly day workers without their own land, where there were

²² Report of the Co. Csanád-Arad-Torontál administrative committee of the year 1927. Makó, 1928. pp. 171–174.; Csanádvármegye Hivatalos Lapja, 1919. június 26. és július 3.; A Csongrád megyei munkásmozgalom 1917–1919. augusztus 1. Ed. Gaál Endre. Szeged, 1969. 162–165. [Workers' movement in Co. Csanád 1917-1919].

²³ Op.Cit. p.173.

²⁴ Ibid.

no local intelligentsia or urbanized elements, tottering between the slogans of the international power politics and its real political possibilities might be regarded as a curiosity of the time if there had not been there the comparison with Nagylak described above and the case of Tótkomlós to be analysed below. In spite of the similarities may be the real question could have been why did not Pitvaros take similar steps and join the other two townships.

Tótkomlós with its more differentiated society of 10 500 inhabitants had more possibilities to adequately respond to the challenges of the time. However, the extremist ideas got into the foreground instead of choosing more realistic solutions was the result of the attitude of the district and county authorities that kept declining even the rightful demands of the language use, and also there were the ill-proportioned aspirations of some local politicians.

From the beginning of January life in *Rolniczky Spolok*, the agrarian society, was revitalized. Most of the members were well-to-do landed peasants but it was visited by workers and artisans too. Lajos Hrdlicska Lutheran minister, Márton Matejdesz and Mihály Franciszti Lutheran teachers were the leaders. The members got their political information through the peasant movement led by András L. Áchim and Vilmos Mezőfi and construed their demands accordingly. The sign for that lay in the fact that they got into contact with the most promising of the re-organized Hungarian political organization, the Smallholders' Party led by István Nagyatádi Szabó. At the beginning of 1919 local organizations of the party were in preparation.²⁵ At the same time *the traditions* set by Áchim were abandoned for some reason because instead of getting hold of self-determination at the local forums *foreign powers* were approached for the improvement of their situation.

The other pole of the political life of the township was the local organization of the Social Democratic Party. That collected the masses of diggers, some blue-collar workers and certain circles of artisans and small-holders. The party organization, led by the diggers Mihály Pips and András Hirka, considered the representation of the poorest layers of the population, the solving of social problems and the land

²⁵ EOL Békési Evangélikus Egyházmegye Levéltára, 171. csomó; Koppány, János idézett kézirat pp.4–5. [Archive of the Lutheran diocese Békés. MS cit.]

reform to be their most important task. The group did not deal with nationality problems even opposed some of the extreme demands, though the leaders and the majority of the members were Slovaks.²⁶

Besides these two organizations there was the group collected around Pál Gajdács director-minister, teachers, artisans, peasants without forming any organization. The members of the group were active in the public life of the township. Since Gajdács was always in favour of assimilation and of smooth cooperation with Hungarians, he wanted to lessen the nationalist aspirations with the help of his group.²⁷

The bone of contention was the teaching language at school at Tótkomlós too. Probably it was at the agrarian society where the petition was composed signed by Mátyás Sebo and further forty-seven inhabitants of the township requesting the teaching language to be uniformly in the Slovak language. The petition was discussed first by the Lutheran school committee then by the presbytery. The latter could not decide because there were some seconding the petition and some opposing. Therefore on the suggestion of the director minister Gajdács turned to higher ecclesiastical authorities with the result that the question was removed from the agenda and the practice remained as before. Religious education was in Slovak at every school; the general subjects were taught in Hungarian by the teachers belonging to the colleagues of Gajdács, while the followers of Hrdlicska taught every subject in Slovak.²⁸

The debate about the teaching language and the language use in the administration was a logical outcome of the suppressed emotions. Parallel to it – with enthusiasm about the newly created Czechoslovakia and the quick and unbelievably complete realization of the Slovak national aspirations – Tótkomlós, too, especially the members of the agrarian society came up with unrealistic ideas similar to those at Nagylak and Pitvaros. In addition, the Slovak national committee created in Újvidék sent agents to urge the Slovaks of the Counties Békés and Csanád to express their wish to be annexed to Yugoslavia. Though the local national committee led by Lajos Hrdlicska had not

²⁶ Prof. L. J. Hrdlička: I. m. – Cited: Koppány, János MS cit. p. 6.

²⁷ EOL Békési Evangélikus Egyházmegye Levéltára Bundle 171.

²⁸ BML Békés vármegye Közigazgatási Bizottságának iratai, No. 144/1920. [Archive of the Administrative Committee of Co. Békés] also Koppány, János MS cit. pp. 5–6.

yet made such a proclamation but the matter was under discussion which state would be preferable that would be ready to fulfil the aspirations of the Slovaks of the region. The borough council sent a telegram to the Ministry of home affairs about the activity of 'Southern Slavic' agents that was forwarded to the detachment of police of the Ministry of Defence. The squad sent to Tótkomlós on the 16th of December 1918 stopped the unrealistic plans for a while.²⁹ Within the committee the pro-Hungarian tendencies strengthened with the result that Hrdlicska as chairman was replaced by Gábor Povázsai, who belonged to the group of Pál Gajdács.³⁰

Lajos Hrdlicska started another campaign. Shortly before Christmas he went to Budapest and looked up Milán Hodzsa, the first ambassador of Czechoslovakia in Budapest. There is no information about their discussion but it seems certain that he explained the events of the previous two months, and also tried to find out where the new borders between Hungary and Yugoslavia as well as Romania would be; and also how the great powers planned to realize the self-determination of the small groups of minorities and what was the stand point of the Czechoslovakian politicians. Milán Hodzsa gave a certificate to Hrdlicska to use on his journey to Újvidék. After discussions with the Slovak leaders there he returned to Tótkomlós where he started animated campaign in favour of secession from Hungary.³¹

There was another meeting on the 31st of December with the participation of the representative of *Slovenski Rada*³² of Nagylak, Dr. János Laurovics formerly lawyer at Tótkomlós. Hrdlicska presented a draft resolution to join the Slovak National Committee of Újvidék together with the Slovaks of Nagylak and request the annexation of the Slovak townships to Yugoslavia. The committee commissioned Mihály Franciszti teacher and András Benyó farmer to present the accepted resolution at Újvidék and to take up official contact with the leaders there as the representatives of the township. Tradition has it

²⁹ HL HM PDF 7. (Karhatalmi) osztály 10-318. és 10-477.

³⁰ EOL Békési Evangélikus Egyházmegye Levéltára, Bundle 171.; Koppány János MS cit.

³¹ HL HM PDF Szegedi Katonai Kerület Parancsnoksága, 10-398. [Military district HQ Szeged].

³² At Nagylak there was already a separate Slovak and Romanian national committee at the time.

that the deputation started out but was held up at Szeged because the authorities there did not allow them to cross the demarcation line.³³

It is noteworthy that during a later disciplinary investigation of the employees of the Lutheran Church some witnesses declared that the committee had no resolution in the matter, the decision was left to the general assembly of 9th January 1919, which declared fidelity to Hungary by a majority decision. The minutes were supposed to prove it, but the authenticity of the paper kept in the Archives of Co. Békés is highly arguable.³⁴

The fiasco of the Újvidék deputation might have shown how unviable the plan to join Yugoslavia really was. The gaining ground of the local Social Democratic Party was also of importance since they constantly stressed the economic demands and the participation in the local authority as the primary interest of the Slovaks of the neighbourhood from the beginning. In January 1919 they severely criticized the leaders of the agrarian society for their extremist demands. According to Lajos Hrdlicska's memories the debates almost ended in fisticuffs and he saw it necessary to explain that he did not necessarily regard the secession from Hungary as the only solution of the success of the Slovaks.³⁵ In fact, the two camps approached one another in January – February of 1919. As a consequence Lajos Hrdlicska was reelected president of the national committee that from then on called itself *narodna rada*, the language of the meetings and also that of the minutes was Slovak,³⁶ as had already been laid out in the law. Slowly it was worked out how could further rights be ensured for the Slovaks of the neighbourhood, greater possibilities for their success and wider representation of interest. At the same time the agrarian society too accepted the major social and social political demands of the Social Democrats. As the result of the cooperation the inhabitants of the township accepted a memorandum at the 13th March 1919 meeting signed by 500 inhabitants and the next day a twelve-person

³³ EOL Békési Evangélikus Egyházmegye Levéltára, Bundle 171.; HL HM PDF Szegedi Katonai Kerület Parancsnoksága, 10-398.; BML Békés vármegye Közigazgatási Bizottságának iratai, No. 144/1920.

³⁴ EOL Békési Evangélikus Egyházmegye Levéltára, Bundle 171.; BML Békés vármegye Közigazgatási Bizottságának iratai, No. 144/1920.

³⁵ Prof. L. J. Hrdlička: op.cit. – Koppány, János MS cit. p. 6.

³⁶ EOL Békési Evangélikus Egyházmegye Levéltára, Bundle 171.;

strong delegation brought it to Budapest to present it to the government. The delegation was led by Lajos Hrdlicska. The list of names is not known but it can be taken for granted that both groups were represented in it. The representatives of Tótkomlós were received by the National Propaganda Committee (NPC) on the 14th of March and the next day by the President of the Republic, Mihály Károlyi too.³⁷

In the memorandum The inhabitants of Tótkomlós assured the Hungarian revolutionary government of their fidelity then presented their requests. First of all that Tótkomlós should be annexed to Co. Csanád (from Co. Békés) and made into a district centre with the neighbouring Slovak settlements belonging under its authority: Ambrózfalva, Pitvaros, Csanádalberti, Nagybánhegyes, Nagylak and also Nagymajlát, though inhabitants of the latter were Hungarians. In exchange they offered to open an agricultural school with Slovak teaching language financed by the state. Another the demand was the building of a narrow-gauge railway between the district centre, the townships in question and the county town of Co. Csanád as well as the building of roads between Tótkomlós and the above mentioned townships and villages in aid of to help Tótkomlós act out its expected role.

Another important demand expressed in the memorandum was the quick and radical land reform. According to the memorandum there were 1800 persons with land claim in the area. The expropriation and distribution of the neighbouring large estates (Hász, Wenkheim, Montágh, Spilkovszky, the city of Makó and the stud farm of Metőhegyes) was suggested, and finally – in order to lessen the social tension – the building of 100 so-called workers' houses at the cost of the state.³⁸

The meeting with the chairman of NPC was rather strained as the governmental officer reprimanded Hrdlicska for his propaganda in favour of joining Yugoslavia, his negotiations in this respect and

³⁷ Prof. L. J. Hrdlička: op.cit. – Koppány, János MS cit. p.7. The National Propaganda Committee functioned for the Minister President's Office its task was to propagate the adherence to Hungary among the nationalities – after the closing of the Ministry of Nationality of Oszkár Jászi.

³⁸ Prof. L. J. Hrdlička: op.cit. – Koppány, János MS cit. pp. 8-10; and EOL Békési Evangélikus Egyházmegye Levéltára, Budle 171. The document itself could not be found either in the National Archive or in the Archives of Co. Békés.

demanded a declaration to be published in the central Budapest papers that Tótkomlós declares its wish to remain part of Hungary but Hrdlicska was not ready to comply.³⁹ The next day the meeting with President of the Republic was in friendlier atmosphere, Mihály Károlyi listened carefully to the proposition and promised to do as much as possible.⁴⁰

In order to prepare the elevation of Tótkomlós to district centre the national council created yet another committee with the task to propagate the idea in the townships concerned in Co. Csanád and to urge them to cooperate in its realization.⁴¹ The committee, however, was not able to do anything because of the political changes occurring from the 21st of March that prevented the government too from fulfilling its promise.

The description of the events cannot be concluded without mentioning the attitude of district and county authorities and the rejection of the majority of the inhabitants. The opinion was that there never was minority oppression in Hungary and the nationality movements were the result of irresponsible agitators.⁴² The question was especially severely discussed during the 13th January 1919 meeting of the municipality of Co. Csanád, where the members denounced the 'Eastern Switzerland' concept of Mihály Károlyi and Oszkár Jászi. The committee passed a resolution that the government should defend the integrity of the country.⁴³ Of course the use of the Slovak language in education and certain fields of social life could not have been prohibited as it was assured by the law but wherever it was possible it was obstructed. The most serious shortcoming of the authorities of Co. Csanád was their lack of knowledge of the Slovak language and the insistence of the employment of notaries without the knowledge of the language and with anti-nationality feelings. Under such circumstances the organization of a Slovak majority

³⁹ EOL Békési Evangélikus Egyházmegye Levéltára, Budle 171.

⁴⁰ Ibid.; and Prof. L. J. Hrdlička: op.cit. – Koppány, János MS cit. p.10.

⁴¹ BML Békés vármegye Közigazgatási Bizottságának iratai, No. 144/1920.

⁴² CSML Csanád vármegye alispánjának iratai 7910/1919 [archive of the Subprefect of Co. Csanád]; Csanádvármegye Hivatalos Lapja, 1919. július 3. [The official publication of Co. Csanád].

⁴³ A Csongrád megyei munkásmozgalom 1917–1919. pp. 207–208. [Workers' movement in Co. Csanád].

district with Tótkomlós as its centre would not have been possible had the government had longer remained in power.

In the southern Trans-Tisza region the Soviet Republic existed only a couple of weeks. The takeover happened as elsewhere: answering a telegram sent from Budapest the workers' council elected the directorate that took over power after the 22nd of March. The system of councils created a peculiar situation. The Communist-Socialist leaders believed that the nationalist aspirations would be automatically fulfilled as part of the international battle for the proletarian revolution. According to the sources the Slovak language use was not restricted. The orators and audience used both the Hungarian and the Slovak language in their speeches in the settlements with Slovak inhabitants during the meetings and discussions, the local directorates published and distributed the text of regulations and important propaganda materials in Slovak too.⁴⁴

The special nationality aspects were gradually shoved into the background. The major reason might have been due to the antidemocratic way of the takeover and practising power. Those groups grabbed the power that earlier had not cared too much for the nationality interests; thus those intellectuals, farmers, artisans and merchants were left out of the direction who had been the important representatives of the nationality aspirations. At Tótkomlós the differences grew so severe that Hrdlicska and some of his followers were threatened with hanging, and Mihály Franciszti who was not eager to cooperate with the directorate with deportation.⁴⁵ The 7th of April 1919 elections too, threw light on the difference between the declared high principle, i.e. 'every worker has the right to participate in the dealing with common matters' and the political practice. At Békéscsaba the government's delegate annulled the results of the election saying that there were too many 'bourgeois elements' among them, though the candidates were nominated by the unions. Thus in the second round of the elec-

⁴⁴ Békésmegyei Népszava, 1919. április 1. [daily paper]; BFL Budapesti Büntetőtörvénytörvényes iratok. (Korábbi jelzete: PI Arch. 653. fond 3/U. 1920-19.) [Criminal Court of Budapest, Archive of criminal proceedings].

⁴⁵ EOL Békési Evangélikus Egyházmegye Levéltára, Bundle 171.

tions the intellectuals preparing the system of the local administration were left out.⁴⁶ Similarly peculiar interpretation characterized the elections at Tótkomlós too. The list of names of the nominees and the votes were crossed out with added remarks as 'not a true proletarian', 'exploiter', 'unreliable', etc. probably made by the members of the directorate thus the members of the local council were not the ones who got the most votes but those who were deemed good proletarians by the leaders of the directorate.⁴⁷ The intellectuals, farmers and artisans who represented the nationality ideas were deprived of the possibility of political activity and participation in the leadership.

The Romanian army crossed the demarcation line on the 16th of April 1919 and started the offensive to occupy the Trans-Tisza region that was completed by the end of April.

It is known that the entente powers agreed in the 16th August 1916 Bucharest agreement with Romania that if Romania joins the war against the Central Powers the Romanian Kingdom would receive Transylvania and a part of the Trans-Tisza region.⁴⁸ Based on this promise the Romanian peace delegation handed in a memorandum to the peace conference on the territorial demands of its country in which – following the above agreement – wanted to delineate the future western borders of Romania: the valley of the River Tisza 4 km from the point it is joined by the River Szamos, following in South-South West to a point 6km east of Debrecen, than again to the River Körös, 3km to a confluence point of the White Körös and the Swift Körös then north of Szeged, and west of Orosháza and Békéscsábony in the height of Algyó to the River Tisza.⁴⁹ The Romanian (and Yugo-

⁴⁶ Fancsovits György: A magyar októberi forradalom és a Tanácsköztársaság Békés megyében. Tanulmányok Békéscsaba történetéből. Szerk. Kristó Gyula – Székely Lajos. Békéscsaba, 1970. 272 [The Hungarian October revolution and Soviet Republic in Co. Békés].; G. Vass István: Egy kortörténeti mű 1920-ból. Levéltári Szemle, 1989. No.1. [A documentary from 1920].

⁴⁷ OL Belügyminisztérium. (Korábbi jelzete: PI Arch. 603. fond, 6/9 ö. e. [National Archive Ministry of interior].

⁴⁸ Cf. *Trianon* Ed. Seidler, Miklós. Budapest 2003. pp.17-18.

⁴⁹ The full text of the memorandum is published in: Francia diplomáciai iratok a Kárpát-medence történetéről 1918–1919. Összeállította és szerkesztette Ádám

slavian) claims handed in by their governments i.e. about the future borders between Hungary and Romania and Hungary and Yugoslavia were first discussed by the committee for Romanian and Yugoslavian matters. On the 6th of April the committee finalised its report and the draft about the future borders to be handed in to the supreme council of the allies. The finalised proposal had been accepted with small changes and they are the same as present borders of Hungary prescribed in the Trianon treaty, as the higher forums of the peace conference had not carried out any changes.⁵⁰

As is known Hungary was not represented at this stage of the preparations at the peace conference in Paris. The diplomats of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were there and followed the proceedings with minute interest and the participants of the conference continuously discussed with them the matters, in order to justify their claims with new arguments.⁵¹ The Romanian delegation and the government had to face the decision of the committee that they wanted to draw the border 30-50 km to the east compared to the Romanian claims. They more or less came to terms with the 'loss' of the area north of the Rivers Körös, as it was a great gain for them to obtain the region around Nagykároly, Szatmárnémeti and Szilágyság, with mostly Hungarian population. But they were not ready to denounce the area south of the Rivers Körös and especially of Békéscsaba as an important junction. Therefore on the 11th of June 1919 before the discussion of the proposal by the Regional Committee and later the supreme council of the peace conference and later after the occupation of Budapest in August the territorial claim for part of south Trans-Tisza was repeatedly submitted.⁵² In support of the claims so-called 'joining movements' were organized among the inhabitants of southern Trans-Tisza, especially among the Slovaks living there.⁵³

The Romanian military occupation of the area had two way aspects from the start.

In order to abolish of the Council system and the prevention of possible resistance strict terror – measures were introduced. Several thousand young men were interned. In some townships the directorate members and disobedient civilians were publicly flogged. That was the fate of Mihály Pipis, chairman of the Tótkomlós directorate and the other members too. At Gyula there were four left wing leaders, at Békés eleven farms were executed. At Apátfalva where the inhabitants resisted requisition the military replied with a veritable blood bath: there were 35 casualties and more than 100 persons, among them the notary, the minister and several teachers were arrested. The population was severely hit by the ever stricter requisitions or as is described in the history books, the economic plundering of the region. Not only foodstuff, grain for bread and fodder, animals were taken away but the farm appliances, factory equipments and even household items and luxury items (piano, typewriter, sewing machine) too.⁵⁴

The Romanian authorities tried to make the population to declare their wish to join to Romania by propaganda, by threats and by the promise of lightening the requisitions. The canvassing was not only directed to the nationality population but to the more well to do layers irrespective of nationality, who had most to fear from the requisitioning. According to some contemporary reports some members of the Hungarian landed farmers had also been won over.⁵⁵

The reason Romania could rely on the support of the nationality population of the area, was not only because of the general feelings caused by the earlier thwarting of their aspirations but also on the ambitions of the nationality leaders coming to the field after the situation that developed after WW1, and who acted in the belief that time had come to have their demands presented to whoever owns the region.

The burden of the Romanian occupation fell with equal weight and strictness to everybody. After a couple of months the situation

Magda és Ormos Mária. Bp. 1999. pp. 97–104 [French diplomatic papers on the history of the Carpathian Basin 1918-1919].

⁵⁰ Ibid. V.-VII. Also Ormos, Mária: Padovától Trianonig 1918–1920. Bp. 1983. pp. 202–205 [From Padova to Trianon].

⁵¹ Francia diplomáciai iratok VI.

⁵² Ormos, Mária Op.Cit. pp. 303 and 355.

⁵³ The facts and most important momentums are described in local documentations: Orosháza története. Szerk. Nagy Gyula. Orosháza, 1965. p. 608 [The history of

Orosháza]. Tótkomlós története Szerk. Szincsek György. Tótkomlós, 1996. pp.191–195 [The history of Tótkomlós].

⁵⁴ OL TAGYOB II/18.; Békésmegye, 1919. június 8.; Csanádvármegye Hivatalos Lapja, 1920. március 27.; Orosháza története és néprajza. Szerk. Nagy Gyula. Orosháza, 1965. I. köt. 607–608 [The history and folklore of Orosháza].

⁵⁵ HL HM 1920. Elnöki C. osztály, Bundle 770. No. 62 661.

changed, probably in connection to the newer territorial demands presented to the peace conference. The Szarvas, Orosháza and Gyoma districts of Co. Békés came under military administration under the command of Major Elek Babescu. The rest of the county remained under the commandship of Mihály Márkus lawyer of Gyula and there the requisition was lessened; similar was the case in the Nagylak, Battonya and Mezőkovácsháza districts of Co. Csanád. These were areas the west of the border line suggested by the committee of the peace conference and that the Romanians wanted to keep for themselves. The propaganda always stressed that the area would remain part of Great Romania. The Romanian authorities took so much for granted that following the electoral law issued by the Romanian king there were members of the parliament and senators elected in the occupied Hungarian region too. Lajos Hrdlicska became a nominee at Nagylak but it was Aurél Petrovics a local lawyer who got elected. The senator of Tótkomlós became Pál Veszelszki teacher at Pitvaros. According to the later report of the subprefect of Co. Békés, of the 8000 inhabitants only 150-160 persons had voted; at Békéscsaba nobody participated in the elections.⁵⁶

The Romanian authorities wanted to achieve the support of the local population as the proof to their territorial claims. They concentrated their propaganda at Békéscsaba as the strategically most important city. György Hrabovszky and János Zsilinszky farmers and Mihály Szák bank accountant were won over to organize the project. At the end of June and beginning of July Hrabovszky and his companions called on Szarvas. Tótkomlós and other smaller townships in Co. Csanád contacted the leaders of the local agrarian societies and other organization and members of the intelligentsia. They tried to convince the people that the inhabitants of the Counties Békés and Csanád would be better off if they would join Transylvania and together they would belong to Romania; that such a decision would result in the abating of the requisitioning, and later the restoration

⁵⁶ Békésmegye, 15th May, 18th May, 8th June 1919. Békés vármegye alispánjának jelentése a Törvényhatósági Bizottság részére a forradalom, a proletárdiktatúra és a román megszállás alatt előfordult eseményekről. Békésvármegye Hivatalos Lapja, 1920. április 20.; Csanádvármegye Hivatalos Lapja, 1920. március 27. [the report of the subprefect of Co. Békés on the events during the revolution, proletarian dictatorship and Romanian occupation].

of the commerce between Transylvania would ensure the population enough fuel, consumer goods and the industry raw material. They also believed that the political situation of the Slovaks, the assurance of their nationality rights had better chances in the Romanian state.⁵⁷

At Tótkomlós the public opinion was greatly divided whether to join the proposition. Lajos Hrdlicska, Márton Matejesz and Mihály Antal, a well to do farmer the then chairman of the Farmers's Society, the shoemaker János Lászik, the small holder Benyó András and some others too, were ready to accept the argument presented by Hrabovszky and company. They circulated a list to be signed that they claimed was to accompany a petition about abating the requisition. It was, however, suspected that it was meant to serve the resolution about joining Romania. On the 12th of July there was a meeting of the Farmers' Society where Hrdlicska outlined the aims of the Slovak assembly to be held at Békéscsaba the next day and suggested to send a delegation to represent the people of Tótkomlós. First the petition about the abating of the requisition was mentioned but then also about joining Romania. Hrdlicska stressed that everybody should follow their own conscience and act on their own risk. Next day a fifty strong delegation went to Békéscsaba where they called on the Romanian prefect first to hand in the petition about the abating of requisition than participated in the assembly in front of the townhall.⁵⁸

There were delegations coming from Pitvaros and Ambrózfalva, but the inhabitants of Csanádalberti and Nagybánhegyes had not responded to the propaganda. Similarly unsuccessful was the agitation at Szarvas too. Pál Borgulya, the chairman of the local Smallholders' Circle announced the content of the circular on the day of the assembly but those present received it with aversion. There was just a telegram sent in greeting to Békéscsaba.

At Békéscsaba György Hrabovszky, among others, made a speech from the balcony of the town-hall demanding the town and the neighbouring townships and villages to be annexed to Romania. The assembly made a unanimous decision in this respect and decided to send it together with the signed lists by a three strong delegation to

⁵⁷ EOL Békési Evangélikus Egyházmegye Levéltára, Bundle 171.

⁵⁸ Ibid.; and also BML Békés vármegyei Közigazgatási Bizottságának iratai No. 144/1920 [Archive of the administrative committee of Co. Békés].

the Council of Five in Paris. The assembly was held in a most agitated atmosphere. Some sources had it that it was only the presence of the Romanian army to prevent the physical conflict between the of pro- and anti-annexation groups.⁵⁹

In spite of these facts the delegation consisting of György Hrabovszky, Mihály Szák and Sámuel Sirka, Lutheran minister of Apatelek, first left for Bucharest then to Paris to act as the representatives of all the Slovaks of the Counties Békés and Csanád. The gist of their memorandum was that the future Hungarian – Romanian border should run above Gyula along the Rivers White and Double Körös to the north-west, following the River Körös to the bend it makes south-west of Szarvas. The border than should run west from Szarvas, Csanádalberti, Pitvaros and Magyarcsanád reaching the River Maros. The townships mentioned and all the settlements east to them should belong to Romania.⁶⁰ In the area encircled by the present border and the one suggested above there were 42 townships with about 300 000 inhabitants. According to the 1910 census the nationality distribution of the area was 63,5% Hungarian, 25,5% Slovak, 5.1% Romanian, 4,6% German and 1,2% Serbian.

The data speak for themselves.

In retrospect to the Romanian occupation that lasted almost a year it can be stated that the movement was mainly organized and directed by the Romanian authorities and the most active, mostly newly appearing, Slovak leaders joined in the hope of material advantages and later offices. It is indicated by the fact that Békéscsaba became the centre of the movement, although earlier there was very little interest shown about the Slovak nationality movement there. It is also instructive, however, that such old leaders also joined the movement who already had wider political experience. They, however, were caught in the web of illusions and could not offer any such solution to their community that would have meant real possibilities of success. These Slovak leaders – while stressing the right for their

⁵⁹ BML Békés vármegye főispánjának iratai. Kigyűjtött munkásmozgalmi iratok 1920-907.; Békésmegye, 1920. március 31. [The papers of the Lord Lieutenant of Co. Békés. Collected papers of the workers' movement].

⁶⁰ EOL Békési Evangélikus Egyházmegye Levéltára, 171. csomó.; Békésmegye, 1920. szeptember 14.

own self-determination had not taken any account for the national self-determination and interests of the Hungarian majority.⁶¹

Considering the events of 1918 – 1919 the period was troublesome teaching severe lessons to the nationalities (especially for the Slovaks) of the Counties Békés and Csanád. It became, however, evident that the demand for nationality language use, for the assurance of their rights – especially in the closed communities of small villages of Co.Csanád and Tótkomlós – was not merely the result of the propaganda of some agitators but the natural claim of the majority of the minority population. It became also evident that the leaders of the movement overstepped the usual educational aims and represented such demands that concerned the language of official communication, certain contents of administration and political representation of interest. They were wrong when disregarded the interests and possible attitude of the majority Hungarian inhabitants and in their own way they, too, were extreme nationalists. The events were traumatic experiences for both nations that had their influence over the history of the region between the two world wars and after the second world war too.

Abbreviations

BFL	Budapest Főváros Levéltára: Budapest Metropolitan Archives
BML	Békés Megyei Levéltár: Archives of County Békés
CSML	Csongrád Megyei Levéltár: Archives of County Csongrád
EOL	Evangélikus Országos Levéltár: National Lutheran Archives
HL	Hadtörténelmi Levéltár: Military Historical Archives
HM	Honvédelmi Minisztérium: Ministry of Defence
OL	Országos Levéltár: National Archives
PDF	polgári demokratikus forradalom: Bourgeois Democratic Revolution
PI Arch.	Párttörténelmi Intézet Archivuma: Archives of the Institute of Party History
TAGYOB	Tanácsköztársaság Adatait Gyűjtő Országos Bizottság: National Committee for the collection of the data referring to the Soviet Republic of Hungary

⁶¹ It has to mentioned the attitude was induced by the spirit of the time and was characteristic not only of the Slovak nationality leaders of the southern Trans-Tisza region. It is known that the whole process of the peace talks was based on the principle that the right for self-determination is due to the winners and to the nations joining them, but not to the defeated people. Cf.: Ormos, Mária pp.139-140.

Béla Pomogáts

Wounds caused by Trianon

Abstract

As the battle at Mohács in 1526 had defined the fate of the once prosperous Hungarian kingdom, Trianon has similar effects on Hungary in the 20th c. Its consequences has still been felt both in the anti-Hungarian passion of the neighbouring states and in the frustration of the Hungarian national consciousness. Reparation has still remained topical as well as difficult: curative intents were frequently mishandled by politics. Could the Hungarian and European cultural background be helpful in finding a remedy to heal the gangrenous wounds cut by Trianon?

It is a decade less than hundred years that in the Great Trianon Palace near Versailles Ágoston Bernárd minister of labour and national welfare and Lázár Alfréd Drasche envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, as the representatives of the Hungarian government, signed the peace treaty between Hungary and the Allied Powers (British Empire, France, Italy, the United states Of America, Japan, China, several smaller countries, e.g. Greece, Portugal, Panama, Nicaragua, as well as the neighbouring countries: Romania, Czechoslovakia and the Serbian-Croatian Kingdom) that usually is referred to as the Trianon Treaty in history and became the most tragic event of the Hungarian history in the 20th c. The treaty closed the thousand-year-old development of Hungarian history and definitely closed the developments of the last two hundred years after the liberation from the Turkish occupation that brought the re-unification of the country torn into three parts.

In those two hundred years Hungary was not entirely independent (a fact influencing the events of World War I. too). It was part of the Habsburg empire consisting of several territories of historical statehood; was an acknowledged member of the community of European

nations and up to the outbreak of WW1 enjoyed the advantages offered by the power of the empire especially the thus provided 'common market'; internal independence that made possible the development toward the nation state, too. It is a fact that the then leading politicians did not use the possibility to create a national strategy suitable to defend the historical territory of the country in case of world crises (e.g. a lost war).

The Hungarian leading political groups had fifty years given from history from the compromise of 1867 to the end of WW1 to consolidate the advantages gained in the dualistic state system; instead they conserved the anachronistic establishment of society and power that did not correspond at all to the social and political norms of (western) Europe; it did not correspond to those developed west of the River Leita in Austria and Bohemia either. They were unable to give any kind of answers to the problems raised by the multi national composition of the country.

The first challenge would have required consistent social and political reforms, i.e. some reformation of the system of latifundia, if not in its radical form as happened after WW2, but realized as a sober national policy that would have asserted the concept of social justice for the sake of the strengthening of the state itself. History would have required the involvement of the peasantry and the working masses into the governing of the state, i.e. the extension of suffrage, the progressive development of the system of local autonomies and finally the creation a state form similar to that of Switzerland in order to gain the solidarity of the non-Hungarian national population (46% with the exclusion of Croatia) and to develop a feeling of 'Hungarus' patriotism. The 'Hungarus' idea was not unfamiliar among the Germans, Transcarpathian Ruthenes, Slovaks of the Upland and assimilated Jews living in Hungary; it were mainly the Serbians and Romanians who opposed the special identity the creation and strengthening of which could have been a vital strategic aim. The idea of 'Hungarus' patriotism was not merely the idea of the leftist intelligentsia (bourgeois radicals grouped around the periodical *Huszadik Század* [Twentieth Century]) it would have corresponded to the political tradition of Old Hungary too that through the system of *voivode* and *banate* was able to successfully represent regional interests.

Entering WW1 was least in the historical interests of the Hungarians, as the clearest thinking brains of the country Endre Ady and Mihály Babits saw and expressed already in 1914; it was the German Empire and the military circles gathered around Franz Ferdinand, the murdered heir apparent (hostile toward the Hungarians) in the Viennese court who forced István Tisza Hungarian prime minister into accepting the idea of war in spite of the fact that in 1914 Hungary was not prepared for it either militarily or economically or politically, and neither was the Monarchy to wage war on several fronts. The Austrian – Hungarian armed forces had not been able to overcome the considerably weaker Serbia, and could win over the Romanian perfidiously attacking Transylvania in 1916 only with German help. The leadership of the Monarchy made many strategic mistakes, e.g. could not achieve the neutrality of its former ally, Italy, the renouncing of Trieste and Trentino could have provided basis for a compromise as the population was fast completely Italian there, and the area would have been considerably smaller than what was taken away from Austria and annexed to Italy at the end.

The Hungarian nation had no hostile feelings towards the Italians who counted as friendly nations before on account of Lajos Kossuth getting asylum there and the Hungarians fighting on Garibaldi's side. It was only at the Italian front that the army of the Monarchy was defeated: Serbia and Romania were already defeated; Russia quit the war due to the Bolshevik take-over and the ensuing civil wars. Had the Hungarian troops not perished at the Rivers Isonzo and Piave, there would have remained enough military strength to fight for the protection of the country. During the last month of the war there were almost one million soldiers at fight at the southern borders of the country consisting mainly of Hungarians who could have been mobilized to defend the territory of the country. The French, British and American government would not have been ready to shed blood for Romania and the new Czechoslovak state assisting them in their gaining territory in the Hungarian inhabited regions.

It was also a strategic mistake that Charles IV's 1917 attempts at separate peace were let to fail in 1917. The fiasco was not mainly the result of the aggressive intervention of the German ally; the majority of the political and military leaders of the Monarchy had received the initiative with misunderstanding and suspicion, and the only result

of the separate peace attempt was the king's loss of authority (and he would have badly needed that authority at the end of the war). At the time of Charles IV's attempt the carving up of Hungary was not yet on the agenda of the entente powers, both the British and American government declared being in favour of preserving the Danube power: London looked at it as the traditional means to keep the European balance; Washington was of the opinion that a central European federation (the idea propagated by President Wilson) would have been more creditable for the maintenance of peace than small countries suffering from minority grieves always competing with each other. History has justified the British and American reserves; it is a great pity that neither of them had stuck to their original strategy, maybe Central-European history would have taken a different turn; who knows, may be that of Europe too.

By the end of the war the earlier world political considerations and the plans for consolidation developed in Hungarian politics lost their importance. It is well known that the US delegation got into a difficult position in spite of the fact that without the military and economic assistance of the USA the entente would have been defeated, and hardly participated in the discussion of the resolutions of peace debates and returned earlier to Washington disillusioned, without signing the Trianon papers. The British government made vent of its dissatisfaction with the peace system, Italy was even less satisfied because in spite of earlier promises it had to renounce Dalmatia, that used to be an Italian territory, for benefit of the new southern Slavic state. Thus the new arrangement of peace reflects French political decisions that was heated by the anti-German revanchist policy since 1871 and thus was lenient toward the new states – Czechoslovakia, Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom as well as Romania that were to be created aggressively ambitious for gaining territory from the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. If the war was a 'German' matter as it was mainly forced by the German Empire, the peace became 'French' and the French peace-makers were lacking reason and sobriety very much the opposite of what the Vienna Peace Conference displayed (mostly under the influence of the Austrian Prince Metternich) when it restored the borders of France and Alsace and Lorraine were not given back to Germany.

When construing the peace conditions French politics gave up its earlier reasonableness and soberness in the hope that the successor states would be better able to maintain balance against the German and Russian expansive policy as well as Bolshevism than a Central European federation built on compromise. As it has become clear by now Paris was badly mistaken and the French political leaders, more recently President Mitterand and ex-minister president Balladur had to admit that the Trianon arrangement caused severe injury and has not achieved the required results.

The peace treaty signed by two insignificant Hungarian politicians (soon to disappear from the Hungarian public life) became one of the world's cruellest interstate treaty that completely sacrificed Hungary to the territory gaining wishes of its old and new neighbours. The historical Hungarian state (that had been legally preserved even during the 150 years of Turkish occupation) with the exclusion of Croatia (which was not part of the Hungarian state, only one of the countries of St. Stephen's crown, a co-state of Hungary), was 283 000 square km large, of which 93 000 square km were left; the 18,2 million inhabitants was reduced to 7.6 million, thus only 30% of the territory and 42% of the population remained under Hungarian sovereignty. Romania was given 102 000 square km territory (more than what was left to Hungary) with 5,2 million inhabitants, of which 1,66 million (1,8 million according to the last Austro-Hungarian estimates in 1918) were Hungarians. Czechoslovakia received 63 000 square km with 3,5 million inhabitants of which 1,1 million were Hungarians, Yugoslavia (Croatia excluded) 21 000 square km 1,6 million inhabitants among them 292 000 Hungarians, Austria 4000 square km with 292 000 inhabitants of which 26 000 were Hungarians. Poland also got two smaller areas in the Tatra district, and Italy got Fiume (present day Rijeka) though it was also on the wish list of Yugoslavia, nevertheless the majority of the inhabitants were Italians.

More than 3,5 million Hungarians, one third of the total population were distributed in foreign and moreover hostile countries, whose governments were intent to destroy Hungarian identity. In addition there was a considerable German population (Saxons, Swabs, Zipsers) in Hungary, an accommodated part of the Hungarian society who were forced into new states, too, and their number also exceeded one million. Thus there was a population of 4,5 million, i.e.

43% of that of the distributed areas that were ethnically and culturally foreign in the newly created nation-states.

Considering that the population of historic Hungary (without Croatia) was 54% Hungarian and only 46% non-Hungarian, it has to be stated that the solution in the Trianon treaty has not fulfilled its reasons and the division of the area has not brought the justifiable solutions that could have been accepted by the Hungarian populace on the long term, as has been proved by the events of the last twenty years. It could not show any permanent results in consolidation of the region either: of the newly formed states (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania) two fell apart after the fall of the Communist system. The last two hundred years of European history has no other example of loss of population comparable to that of Hungary that even exceeded the losses of Germany that was primarily held responsible for the outbreak of the war.

Every peace system has a kind of 'ideological' and 'legal' basis. The arrangements following the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 was based on continuity of rights and legitimacy, and France could keep the territories it had before the 1789 revolution and before the Napoleonic wars (during the reign of the Bourbons). The peace arrangements following WW1 had naturally had legal foundation but it is a great mistake to believe that 'self determination of people' was the only criterion, as was constantly referred to by Czechoslovakian, Yugoslavian and Romanian politics.

The decision made at Trianon that put 70% of the historic territory of Hungary under the rule of the neighbouring countries together with the 1/3 of its population was based on three arguments: 1. the ethnic principle that started out from the ethnic composition of the population; this was not used in favour of Hungary, and thus Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania were given areas with large Hungarian population along the the Trianon borders: Partium, Transcarpathia, Upland and along the River Tisza in Voivodina. 2. the historic principle that considered the earlier situation defined by political law; Hungary was given no relief according to this principle either (there were 3,5 million Germans annexed to Czechoslovakia under the pretext that the region they lived used to belong to the historic Czech kingdom). 3. and finally the principle of economy, transport and strategy; it was again applied against Hungary, e.g.

by the annexation of the areas north of the River Danube where the Czechoslovakian interests were considered, or when the Arad-Nagyvárad-Szatmárnémeti-Máramarossziget area was given to Romania with the justification that - a region populated by Hungarians - the Romanians needed the railroad crossing it to reach Bukarest. In the case of Hungary all the criteria of ethnic, historic and economic strategy had not been considered and all the regional debates were solved at the expense of Hungary; the country practically was treated as a bounty to be given away to anybody reaching a hand for it.

It is painful to explain how the political leaders of the successor states by what mendacious propaganda and cynical manipulation had prepared all the wrongful decision at Trianon. Without doubt Eduárd Beneš, the prime minister of Czechoslovakia and Ion Brătianu, prime minister of Romania had the leading role in the creation of the system of propaganda and manipulation; both politicians are greatly responsible for the crises the nations in the Central European region has had to suffer. That the nations of the region have not been able to find the road to a more efficient political, economic and cultural cooperation on spite of the fact that time and again there were political and especially cultural movements, groups that suggested feasible ways of cooperation.

It causes pain to mention some elements of the 1919 Paris peace talks but it is important to through light on the circumstance the peace system came into being. On the 1st. of February 1919 meeting of the Council of Ten, the chief body responsible for the decisions, the Romanian prime minister declared that "Hungary had created an area together with Banat that could be called Erdély (Transylvania) because Transylvania had always been of central importance in the region. In order avoid repetition in naming the various parts of the region let be enough to mention that in the concept of Erdély, the regions from the Galician Carpathians to the line of the River Tisza, belong as part of the later Hungarian Kingdom." When Orlando Italian prime minister asked how many Hungarians were living in the area claimed by Romania the answer was that "If there were exact estimates about the distribution of nations, may be there were 2 900 000 Romanians (72%) and 687 000 (15%) Hungarians. The proportion of Romanian city dwellers would be 23%, in the rural

areas 72%, while Hungarians are 40% in the towns and merely 13% in rural areas. The Hungarians mainly are civil servants and soldiers, and ethnically over-represent the ethnic they belong to. The Hungarians are an elite living among the Romanian population.”

The reality was entirely different. The last Austrian-Hungarian census of 1910 in the territory of Erdély (south eastern Hungary) in the wider sense there were 2,8 million Rumanians, as Brătianu mentioned, but they represented only 53,4% of the population and not 72% as Brătianu stated as there were 1 658 000 Hungarians living in the region, i.e. 31,7%; in addition there were 556 000 (10,6%) Germans too. The majority of the inhabitants of the towns were Hungarians, 62,7% Hungarian and 28,9% Romanian in the forty-nine towns; even the 1930 census found that the 39% of the population was Hungarian and only 31% Romanian (the rest were Germans, Jewish and other nationalities; the category of Jewish was introduced by the Romanian since the majority of persons of Jewish religion or origin claimed to be Hungarians.) The statement too, that the Hungarians were mainly bureaucrats and soldiers draining the blood of the Romanian population was an outright lie.

Brătianu, with diplomatic finesse, showed readiness to leave Debrecen and its neighbourhood to Hungary saying that there was only one area, Debrecen, though it was surrounded by villages with Romanian ethnics, the Romanians were ready to renounce it in order to keep their claims on the basis of ethnic ground blameless. If he found necessary he did not shrink back from statements that were aggressively opposing basic human rights (i.e. the conditions of national self-determination which were supposed to be the principle of the Trianon peace treaty). When David Lloyd George British prime minister asked whether the Transylvanian Hungarians too declared their opinion about the affiliation of their country, the Romanian prime minister was hurt and said that Romania joined the war to carry out its will over the Hungarian minority. Probably the Hungarians would have voted ‘nay’ but the situation had been solved by the results of the war and thus there was no need for elections and the area had to return to Romania. It has to be noted that Transylvania had never belonged to Romania, thus there was no historical question of ‘returning’.

Brătianu was a true Balkan politician where political lies did not count morally objectionable. Prime minister Beneš on the other hand appeared as the representative of a western type bourgeois nation and in this guise kept telling lies when the legal situation of Upland was the topic of discussion. He claimed that Slovakia had belonged to Czechoslovakia till the Hungarians occupied the area in the 10th c. they were not successful in Magyarizing the population; the people there felt like Czech and wished to belong to the new state; that there never were separatist movements in Slovakia, that the language was the same, the religion too; moreover the Slovaks were always motivated by anti-Hungarian emotions.

The Czech politician used the same misleading sophistry when giving information about the population of the region he wanted to be annexed to the new Czechoslovakia juggling with numbers of inhabitants, proportions of population and areas with doctored figures; and stressed the existence of aggressive instances of Magyarization and he too offered that those Slovaks living around Budapest could stay in Hungary as a way of compensation.

The peace treaties thus became the scene of a flea-market of distorted or untrue ethnic dates and since the representatives of the victorious entente simply could not imagine that heads of European states, their allies presented sheer lies in front of the peace conference, basically accepted the requests of the successor states. Though in order to verify the requests there were committees put up to analyse the situation, however, in the meantime the strategic potentials of Romania against Russia and that of Czechoslovakia against Germany grew with the result that strategic considerations were preferred to ethnic ones which then were sacrificed. There were just a couple of transgressions rejected thus the idea of a Czechoslovakian corridor leading down the western part of Hungary to the Yugoslav border to connect the two Slavic countries; some areas (Salgótarján, Miskolc and the wine-region of Tokaj) was denied the Czechoslovakians, Orosháza, Békéscsaba, Hódmezővásárhely the Romanians, and the city of Pécs the Yugoslavs; all in all one third of present day Hungary as was defined in Trianon.

The Trianon decree – a historic document not frequently referred to – was based on several political elements. 1. *Lost war* that was the result of a war which never served the interests of the Hungarian

nation but from its start on threatened to become national tragedy: in case of defeat becoming the pray of the neighbouring countries, in the case of victory, reform strategies would have changed the structure of the Monarchy. 2. *A completely incorrect earlier nationality policy* that instead of trying to win over at least part of the minorities (Ruthenes, Germans, Slovaks, Rusins) alienated them from the Hungarian state by needless and ineffective measures. 3. *Military failure*, the policy that disbanded the then still considerable Hungarian military force while the nationalities who wanted to secede were armed. The Romanian army defeated in 1918 was left in arm contrary to any examples, and that is why the Romanians could break into Transylvania and occupy it. 4. *No social reforms were realized* that made the peasantry indifferent in the defence of the country (in contrast to the 1848-49 war of independence when the abolition of serfdom was the largest political and moral resource.) 5. *The “red power” of Béla Kun* that turned the western European bourgeois governments against Hungary. It is true, there was the successful northern campaign led by Aurél Stromfeld earlier K.U.K colonel that was stopped by the commissars on entente requests. To stop a victorious army inevitably leads to defeat.

It has to be established that Albert Apponyi and the delegation he led tried everything – though without much result - to appease the harsh peace conditions. In the past decades Apponyi frequently was charged with fighting for the whole and integer Hungary and did not forced the suggestion of a referendum by the population. It is not true, according to the documents, both Apponyi and the Hungarian delegation wanted referendum. Apponyi himself considered the system of referendum as the only real basis for decisions over territories, saying that in order to establish reality the means of referendum was at their disposal that the Hungarian delegation required in reference to President Wilson’s concept that no relationship of persons, no part of the population of states could be replaced without its consent, to be put like cattle under the rule of another state. In the name of to this concept the Hungarian delegation required the referendum in the regions which were to be detached from Hungary. He assured the conference that the results would be accepted however they turned out, provided the conditions would assure its freedom.

But in 1920 at the Paris conference nobody was already interested in this freedom – the peace treaty signed in the Palace of Great Trianon sealed the doom of Hungary: the result of this and the March 1919 ‘suicide’ was the antidemocratic restoration in the 1920s, the commitment to Berlin in the 1930s, entering into WW2 – that is a whole series of Hungarian tragedies in the 20th c. As in 1526 Mohács meant the fate of the earlier successful Hungary, thus did Trianon of Hungary in the 20th. Its consequences has still been felt both in the anti-Hungarian passion of the neighbours and in the frustration of the Hungarian national identity. Reparation is still topical and still difficult: politics has frequently led astray the goodwill to cure. May be the balm for the necrotic wounds caused by Trianon should be sought in Hungarian and European culture.